Got any beta code on this? Maybe add/c ode it as a daemon ?;) Not Friendly <notfrien...@riseup.net> skrev: (5 juni 2016 16:40:52 CEST) >After about an hour of brain storming I may of found a way to stop >traffic correlation attacks. The idea is to add an artificial delay of >a few randomized ms (two separate delays, one to the tor exit and >another deal on traffic exiting the network) and add an extra chunk of >randomized data (just a small random amount of KB that never exits the >network). It would make traffic harder to correlate. What are your >thoughts on this? >-- >tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org >To unsubscribe or change other settings go to >https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
-- Sincerly Flipchan -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk