On Sun, Jun 05, 2016 at 05:20:24PM -0400, Allen wrote: > > > > So randomizing the times that traffic enters the network and exits the > > network wouldn't work? Like it enters a note and 30 ms after received or > > another random delay couldn't it exit. It would be harder to correlate the > > traffic right? > > > IMO, the packets would probably need to be randomly delayed at each node, > not just entering and exiting the network. A mathematical model would be > needed to determine the necessary amount of delay (I doubt 30 ms would be > enough). The delay could be chosen by the originating node, so it could > chose the privacy vs latency tradeoff.
You guys might want to look at the stop-and-go mix paper (Kesdogan et al. 1998) and the alpha mixing paper (Dingledine et al. 2006) at freehaven.net/anonbib/ Other topics touched on in this thread include defensive dropping "Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Mix-Based Systems" Levine et al. 2004, also at anonbib. There are many research papers that have explored aspects of these ideas. > > It might also be beneficial to have two channels to each exit node, with > each channel used in only one direction, i.e., outbound packets travel one > route, while inbound packets travel a different route. For this you might look at "Preventing Active Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Anonymous Communication" Johnson et al. 2010, also on anonbib aloha, Paul -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk