On 2016-06-05 16:34, notfrien...@riseup.net wrote:
On 2016-06-05 17:20, Allen wrote:
So randomizing the times that traffic enters the network and exits
the
network wouldn't work? Like it enters a note and 30 ms after received
or
another random delay couldn't it exit. It would be harder to
correlate the
traffic right?
IMO, the packets would probably need to be randomly delayed at each
node,
not just entering and exiting the network. A mathematical model would
be
needed to determine the necessary amount of delay (I doubt 30 ms would
be
enough). The delay could be chosen by the originating node, so it
could
chose the privacy vs latency tradeoff.
It might also be beneficial to have two channels to each exit node,
with
each channel used in only one direction, i.e., outbound packets travel
one
route, while inbound packets travel a different route.
That's a good idea. If we could get a system of micro delays which
wouldn't cause major issues it'd be nice in protecting Tor users
anonymity. It's an issue that has been acknowledged by the tor project
but we haven't been able to find a working system yet. I think it's
more important then ever that we begin to address these issues.
I have had the idea of randomized micro delays between each node for
long time, but have been told by many in the Tor community that this is
bad idea for low latency network. I know that Tor has stated in past
that they don't claim to protect from a GPA. But we must realize that
the true threat is a GPA which must be dealt with by collaborating on
solutions to protect from global view traffic analysis. Another idea, if
micro delays would not work out for low latency anonymizing networks
such as Tor would be to perhaps add padding, randomized padding between
each node. If micro-delays and/or padding is bad idea, then other
solutions should be discussed.
--
Cannon N. Ciota
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Email: can...@cannon-ciota.info
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