Le 06/06/2016 à 00:43, Paul Syverson a écrit : > For this you might look at > "Preventing Active Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Anonymous Communication" > Johnson et al. 2010, also on anonbib
"Let M be the message to be sent. We will encrypt the message with a public key shared by all members of a layer. Given that the layers are set up in advance and known to all, such a key can be generated by a trusted third party or by electing a leader to do it" Looks a little difficult to set in practice, and expensive in terms of processing, no? I have suggested something here https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2016-June/041084.html The split of a Tor circuit into n Tor circuits is not originally thought to protect against traffic correlation attacks but because the upload bandwidth of the peers is likely to screw up the efficiency of an incoming Tor circuit, so the idea is to split the circuits and split the messages. Again I have not studied it but then we can think that the timing of packets becomes unpredictable, that it is difficult to compromise the peers to perform active attacks, that unpredictable events might happen like a peer leaving and breaking one of the splitted Tor circuits and that adding some additional mechanisms like dropping randomely some packets (or sending dummy ones) might probably render any traffic correlation much more complicate. I suppose that some papers exist about this (?) -- Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org Peersm : http://www.peersm.com torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk