Thanks Raja, it was helpful Now I am able to start zookeeper and broker in secure mode ready for SSL handshake. I get *java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Java heap space* on producer.
I using the default configuration and keystore. Is there anything missing *Start broker:* *bin/kafka-server-start.sh config/server.properties* *broker.log:* [2014-07-17 15:34:46,281] INFO zookeeper state changed (SyncConnected) (org.I0Itec.zkclient.ZkClient) [2014-07-17 15:34:46,523] INFO Loading log 'secure.test-0' (kafka.log.LogManager) [2014-07-17 15:34:46,558] INFO Recovering unflushed segment 0 in log secure.test-0. (kafka.log.Log) [2014-07-17 15:34:46,571] INFO Completed load of log secure.test-0 with log end offset 0 (kafka.log.Log) [2014-07-17 15:34:46,582] INFO Starting log cleanup with a period of 60000 ms. (kafka.log.LogManager) [2014-07-17 15:34:46,587] INFO Starting log flusher with a default period of 9223372036854775807 ms. (kafka.log.LogManager) [2014-07-17 15:34:46,614] INFO Initializing secure authentication (kafka.network.security.SecureAuth$) [2014-07-17 15:34:46,678] INFO Secure authentication initialization has been successfully completed (kafka.network.security.SecureAuth$) [2014-07-17 15:34:46,691] INFO Awaiting socket connections on 0.0.0.0:9092. (kafka.network.Acceptor) [2014-07-17 15:34:46,692] INFO [Socket Server on Broker 0], Started (kafka.network.SocketServer) [2014-07-17 15:34:46,794] INFO Will not load MX4J, mx4j-tools.jar is not in the classpath (kafka.utils.Mx4jLoader$) [2014-07-17 15:34:46,837] INFO 0 successfully elected as leader (kafka.server.ZookeeperLeaderElector) [2014-07-17 15:34:47,057] INFO Registered broker 0 at path /brokers/ids/0 with address 10.1.100.130:9092. (kafka.utils.ZkUtils$) [2014-07-17 15:34:47,059] INFO New leader is 0 (kafka.server.ZookeeperLeaderElector$LeaderChangeListener) *[2014-07-17 15:34:47,068] INFO [Kafka Server 0], started (kafka.server.KafkaServer)* *[2014-07-17 15:34:47,383] INFO begin ssl handshake for /10.1.100.130:9092//10.1.100.130:51685 <http://10.1.100.130:9092//10.1.100.130:51685> (kafka.network.security.SSLSocketChannel)* *[2014-07-17 15:34:47,392] INFO begin ssl handshake for 10.1.100.130/10.1.100.130:51685//10.1.100.130:9092 <http://10.1.100.130/10.1.100.130:51685//10.1.100.130:9092> (kafka.network.security.SSLSocketChannel)* *[2014-07-17 15:34:47,465] INFO finished ssl handshake for 10.1.100.130/10.1.100.130:51685//10.1.100.130:9092 <http://10.1.100.130/10.1.100.130:51685//10.1.100.130:9092> (kafka.network.security.SSLSocketChannel)* *[2014-07-17 15:34:47,465] INFO finished ssl handshake for /10.1.100.130:9092//10.1.100.130:51685 <http://10.1.100.130:9092//10.1.100.130:51685> (kafka.network.security.SSLSocketChannel)* *[2014-07-17 15:34:47,617] INFO [ReplicaFetcherManager on broker 0] Removed fetcher for partitions (kafka.server.ReplicaFetcherManager)* *[2014-07-17 15:34:47,627] INFO [ReplicaFetcherManager on broker 0] Added fetcher for partitions List() (kafka.server.ReplicaFetcherManager)* *[2014-07-17 15:34:47,656] INFO [ReplicaFetcherManager on broker 0] Removed fetcher for partitions [secure.test,0] (kafka.server.ReplicaFetcherManager)* [2014-07-17 15:37:15,970] INFO begin ssl handshake for 10.1.100.130/10.1.100.130:51689//10.1.100.130:9092 (kafka.network.security.SSLSocketChannel) [2014-07-17 15:37:16,075] INFO begin ssl handshake for 10.1.100.130/10.1.100.130:51690//10.1.100.130:9092 (kafka.network.security.SSLSocketChannel) [2014-07-17 15:37:16,434] INFO begin ssl handshake for 10.1.100.130/10.1.100.130:51691//10.1.100.130:9092 (kafka.network.security.SSLSocketChannel) [2014-07-17 15:37:16,530] INFO begin ssl handshake for 10.1.100.130/10.1.100.130:51692//10.1.100.130:9092 (kafka.network.security.SSLSocketChannel) [2014-07-17 15:37:16,743] INFO begin ssl handshake for 10.1.100.130/10.1.100.130:51693//10.1.100.130:9092 (kafka.network.security.SSLSocketChannel) [2014-07-17 15:37:16,834] INFO begin ssl handshake for 10.1.100.130/10.1.100.130:51694//10.1.100.130:9092 (kafka.network.security.SSLSocketChannel) [2014-07-17 15:37:17,043] INFO begin ssl handshake for 10.1.100.130/10.1.100.130:51695//10.1.100.130:9092 (kafka.network.security.SSLSocketChannel) [2014-07-17 15:37:17,137] INFO begin ssl handshake for 10.1.100.130/10.1.100.130:51696//10.1.100.130:9092 (kafka.network.security.SSLSocketChannel) [2014-07-17 15:37:17,342] INFO begin ssl handshake for 10.1.100.130/10.1.100.130:51697//10.1.100.130:9092 (kafka.network.security.SSLSocketChannel) *Start producer* *bin/kafka-console-producer.sh --broker-list 10.1.100.130:9092:true --topic secure.test* *producer.log:* bin/kafka-console-producer.sh --broker-list 10.1.100.130:9092:true --topic secure.test [2014-07-17 15:37:46,889] WARN Property topic is not valid (kafka.utils.VerifiableProperties) Hello Secure Kafka *[2014-07-17 15:38:14,186] ERROR OOME with size 352518400 (kafka.network.BoundedByteBufferReceive)* *java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Java heap space* at java.nio.HeapByteBuffer.<init>(HeapByteBuffer.java:57) at java.nio.ByteBuffer.allocate(ByteBuffer.java:331) at kafka.network.BoundedByteBufferReceive.byteBufferAllocate(BoundedByteBufferReceive.scala:80) at kafka.network.BoundedByteBufferReceive.readFrom(BoundedByteBufferReceive.scala:63) at kafka.network.Receive$class.readCompletely(Transmission.scala:56) at kafka.network.BoundedByteBufferReceive.readCompletely(BoundedByteBufferReceive.scala:29) at kafka.network.BlockingChannel.receive(BlockingChannel.scala:102) at kafka.producer.SyncProducer.liftedTree1$1(SyncProducer.scala:79) at kafka.producer.SyncProducer.kafka$producer$SyncProducer$$doSend(SyncProducer.scala:76) at kafka.producer.SyncProducer.send(SyncProducer.scala:117) at kafka.client.ClientUtils$.fetchTopicMetadata(ClientUtils.scala:58) at kafka.producer.BrokerPartitionInfo.updateInfo(BrokerPartitionInfo.scala:82) at kafka.producer.async.DefaultEventHandler$$anonfun$handle$1.apply$mcV$sp(DefaultEventHandler.scala:67) at kafka.utils.Utils$.swallow(Utils.scala:172) at kafka.utils.Logging$class.swallowError(Logging.scala:106) at kafka.utils.Utils$.swallowError(Utils.scala:45) at kafka.producer.async.DefaultEventHandler.handle(DefaultEventHandler.scala:67) at kafka.producer.async.ProducerSendThread.tryToHandle(ProducerSendThread.scala:104) at kafka.producer.async.ProducerSendThread$$anonfun$processEvents$3.apply(ProducerSendThread.scala:87) at kafka.producer.async.ProducerSendThread$$anonfun$processEvents$3.apply(ProducerSendThread.scala:67) at scala.collection.immutable.Stream.foreach(Stream.scala:526) at kafka.producer.async.ProducerSendThread.processEvents(ProducerSendThread.scala:66) at kafka.producer.async.ProducerSendThread.run(ProducerSendThread.scala:44) On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 6:07 PM, Rajasekar Elango <rela...@salesforce.com> wrote: > Pramod, > > > I presented secure kafka configuration and usage at last meet up. So hope > this > video recording <http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/48396701>would help. You > can skip to about 59 min to jump to security talk. > > Thanks, > Raja. > > > On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 5:57 PM, Pramod Deshmukh <dpram...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > Hello Joe, > > > > Is there a configuration or example to test Kafka security piece? > > > > Thanks, > > > > Pramod > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 5:20 PM, Pramod Deshmukh <dpram...@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > > > Thanks Joe, > > > > > > This branch works. I was able to proceed. I still had to set scala > > version > > > to 2.9.2 in kafka-run-class.sh. > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 3:57 PM, Joe Stein <joe.st...@stealth.ly> > wrote: > > > > > >> That is a very old branch. > > >> > > >> Here is a more up to date one > > >> https://github.com/stealthly/kafka/tree/v0.8.2_KAFKA-1477 (needs to > be > > >> updated to latest trunk might have a chance to-do that next week). > > >> > > >> You should be using gradle now as per the README. > > >> > > >> /******************************************* > > >> Joe Stein > > >> Founder, Principal Consultant > > >> Big Data Open Source Security LLC > > >> http://www.stealth.ly > > >> Twitter: @allthingshadoop <http://www.twitter.com/allthingshadoop> > > >> ********************************************/ > > >> > > >> > > >> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 3:49 PM, Pramod Deshmukh <dpram...@gmail.com> > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> > Thanks Joe for this, > > >> > > > >> > I cloned this branch and tried to run zookeeper but I get > > >> > > > >> > Error: Could not find or load main class > > >> > org.apache.zookeeper.server.quorum.QuorumPeerMain > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > I see scala version is still set to 2.8.0 > > >> > > > >> > if [ -z "$SCALA_VERSION" ]; then > > >> > > > >> > SCALA_VERSION=2.8.0 > > >> > > > >> > fi > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > Then I installed sbt and scala and followed your instructions for > > >> different > > >> > scala versions. I was able to bring zookeeper up but brokers fail to > > >> start > > >> > with error > > >> > > > >> > Error: Could not find or load main class kafka.Kafka > > >> > > > >> > I think I am doing something wrong. Can you please help me? > > >> > > > >> > Our current production setup is with 2.8.0 and want to stick to it. > > >> > > > >> > Thanks, > > >> > > > >> > Pramod > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > On Tue, Jun 3, 2014 at 3:57 PM, Joe Stein <joe.st...@stealth.ly> > > wrote: > > >> > > > >> > > Hi,I wanted to re-ignite the discussion around Apache Kafka > > Security. > > >> > This > > >> > > is a huge bottleneck (non-starter in some cases) for a lot of > > >> > organizations > > >> > > (due to regulatory, compliance and other requirements). Below are > my > > >> > > suggestions for specific changes in Kafka to accommodate security > > >> > > requirements. This comes from what folks are doing "in the wild" > to > > >> > > workaround and implement security with Kafka as it is today and > also > > >> > what I > > >> > > have discovered from organizations about their blockers. It also > > >> picks up > > >> > > from the wiki (which I should have time to update later in the > week > > >> based > > >> > > on the below and feedback from the thread). > > >> > > > > >> > > 1) Transport Layer Security (i.e. SSL) > > >> > > > > >> > > This also includes client authentication in addition to in-transit > > >> > security > > >> > > layer. This work has been picked up here > > >> > > https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KAFKA-1477 and do > appreciate > > >> any > > >> > > thoughts, comments, feedback, tomatoes, whatever for this patch. > It > > >> is a > > >> > > pickup from the fork of the work first done here > > >> > > https://github.com/relango/kafka/tree/kafka_security. > > >> > > > > >> > > 2) Data encryption at rest. > > >> > > > > >> > > This is very important and something that can be facilitated > within > > >> the > > >> > > wire protocol. It requires an additional map data structure for > the > > >> > > "encrypted [data encryption key]". With this map (either in your > > >> object > > >> > or > > >> > > in the wire protocol) you can store the dynamically generated > > >> symmetric > > >> > key > > >> > > (for each message) and then encrypt the data using that > dynamically > > >> > > generated key. You then encrypt the encryption key using each > > public > > >> key > > >> > > for whom is expected to be able to decrypt the encryption key to > > then > > >> > > decrypt the message. For each public key encrypted symmetric key > > >> (which > > >> > is > > >> > > now the "encrypted [data encryption key]" along with which public > > key > > >> it > > >> > > was encrypted with for (so a map of [publicKey] = > > >> > > encryptedDataEncryptionKey) as a chain. Other patterns can be > > >> > implemented > > >> > > but this is a pretty standard digital enveloping [0] pattern with > > >> only 1 > > >> > > field added. Other patterns should be able to use that field to-do > > >> their > > >> > > implementation too. > > >> > > > > >> > > 3) Non-repudiation and long term non-repudiation. > > >> > > > > >> > > Non-repudiation is proving data hasn't changed. This is often (if > > not > > >> > > always) done with x509 public certificates (chained to a > certificate > > >> > > authority). > > >> > > > > >> > > Long term non-repudiation is what happens when the certificates of > > the > > >> > > certificate authority are expired (or revoked) and everything ever > > >> signed > > >> > > (ever) with that certificate's public key then becomes "no longer > > >> > provable > > >> > > as ever being authentic". That is where RFC3126 [1] and RFC3161 > [2] > > >> come > > >> > > in (or worm drives [hardware], etc). > > >> > > > > >> > > For either (or both) of these it is an operation of the encryptor > to > > >> > > sign/hash the data (with or without third party trusted timestap > of > > >> the > > >> > > signing event) and encrypt that with their own private key and > > >> distribute > > >> > > the results (before and after encrypting if required) along with > > their > > >> > > public key. This structure is a bit more complex but feasible, it > > is a > > >> > map > > >> > > of digital signature formats and the chain of dig sig > attestations. > > >> The > > >> > > map's key being the method (i.e. CRC32, PKCS7 [3], XmlDigSig [4]) > > and > > >> > then > > >> > > a list of map where that key is "purpose" of signature (what your > > >> > attesting > > >> > > too). As a sibling field to the list another field for "the > > >> attester" as > > >> > > bytes (e.g. their PKCS12 [5] for the map of PKCS7 signatures). > > >> > > > > >> > > 4) Authorization > > >> > > > > >> > > We should have a policy of "404" for data, topics, partitions > (etc) > > if > > >> > > authenticated connections do not have access. In "secure mode" > any > > >> non > > >> > > authenticated connections should get a "404" type message on > > >> everything. > > >> > > Knowing "something is there" is a security risk in many uses > cases. > > >> So > > >> > if > > >> > > you don't have access you don't even see it. Baking "that" into > > Kafka > > >> > > along with some interface for entitlement (access management) > > systems > > >> > > (pretty standard) is all that I think needs to be done to the core > > >> > project. > > >> > > I want to tackle item later in the year after summer after the > > other > > >> > three > > >> > > are complete. > > >> > > > > >> > > I look forward to thoughts on this and anyone else interested in > > >> working > > >> > > with us on these items. > > >> > > > > >> > > [0] > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/what-is-a-digital-envelope.htm > > >> > > [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3126 > > >> > > [2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3161 > > >> > > [3] > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/pkcs-7-cryptographic-message-syntax-standar.htm > > >> > > [4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XML_Signature > > >> > > [5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12 > > >> > > > > >> > > /******************************************* > > >> > > Joe Stein > > >> > > Founder, Principal Consultant > > >> > > Big Data Open Source Security LLC > > >> > > http://www.stealth.ly > > >> > > Twitter: @allthingshadoop < > http://www.twitter.com/allthingshadoop> > > >> > > ********************************************/ > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Thanks, > Raja. >
