Thank you Sean. I will update the document and upload it. On Sat, Oct 6, 2018 at 5:53 AM Sean Turner <[email protected]> wrote: > > Mostly just nits/style comments assuming that this moves as fast as > ID.tls-oldversions-deprectate. > > 0) Add updates header “Updates: RFC8314” > > 1) Title > > TLS is now in the RFC editor’s abbreviations list so the title can now be: > Use of TLS for Email Submission and Access > > 1) Introduction > > r/recommended for/recommended version for > > r/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/[ID.tls-oldversions-deprectate] > and add normative reference to: > [ID.tls-oldversions-deprectate] Moriarty, Farrell > > 2) If I were doing this I would do and OLD/NEW style as below. For the > shorter changes, you don’t need it but for the s5 and s5.1 changes I was like > what one earth are they changing. E.g.: > > Table of Contents > > OLD: > > 4.1. Deprecation of Services Using Cleartext and TLS Versions Less > Than 1.1 > > NEW: > > 4.1. Deprecation of Services Using Cleartext and TLS > Versions Less Than 1.2 > > Section 4 > > OLD: > > As soon as practicable, MSPs currently supporting Secure Sockets Layer > (SSL) > 2.x, SSL 3.0, or TLS 1.0 SHOULD transition their users to TLS 1.1 or > later and discontinue support for those earlier versions of SSL and > TLS.” > > NEW: > > As soon as practicable, MSPs currently supporting Secure > Sockets Layer (SSL) 2.x, SSL 3.0, or TLS 1.0 SHOULD transition their > users to TLS 1.2 or later and discontinue support for those earlier > versions of SSL and TLS. > > etc. > > 3) s5 changes > > I’d just change the sentences: > > OLD: > > If, however, an MUA > provides such an indication, it MUST NOT indicate confidentiality for > any connection that does not at least use TLS 1.1 with certificate > verification and also meet the minimum confidentiality requirements > associated with that account. > > NEW: > > If, however, an MUA > provides such an indication, it MUST NOT indicate confidentiality for > any connection that does not at least use TLS 1.2 with certificate > verification and also meet the minimum confidentiality requirements > associated with that account. > > 4) Terminology Section > > Since you do have 2119 language and you want to avoid the ID-nits you > probably need a “Terminology Section” with the following text: > > The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", > "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and > "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in > BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all > capitals, as shown here. > > 5) A little love for tls1.3 > > So like we published 1.3 so it can’t hurt to add the reference: > > r/MUAs MUST implement TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or later/MUAs MUST > implement TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or later, e.g., TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] > > 6) References > > Since you’re downgrading 1.1 should we move it to an informative reference? > > Again to avoid ID-nits I guess add 1.1 as an informative and TLS 1.2 and 1.3 > as normative? > > 7) Sec Cons > > I’d probably add something like see [ID.tls-oldversions-deprectate] for why > 1.1 is being deprecated. > > spt > > > > On Oct 2, 2018, at 06:24, Loganaden Velvindron <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 3:12 PM Loganaden Velvindron > > <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > >> Dear UTA folks, > >> > >> Please find the link here > >> (https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-lvelvindron-tls-for-email-00.txt) for > >> the draft for Switching the minimum requirement for TLS in mail from > >> TLS 1.1 to TLS 1.2. This is inline with what is happening here: > >> https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/blob/master/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate.txt > >> where TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are deprecated. > >> > >> > >> Feedback welcome. > >> > > > > ping. > > > >> Kind regards, > >> //Logan > >> C-x-C-c > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Uta mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta >
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