Posted by Randy Barnett:
(Almost) Live Blogging From AALS Contracts Conference:  
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_06_12-2005_06_18.shtml#1118846518


   I am in Montreal at the Association of American Law Schools (AALS)
   Mid-Year Meeting. This year the topic is Exploring the Boundaries of
   Contract Law. These sessions are being held at the same time as an
   AALS Conference on Commercial Law at the Crossroads. This morning we
   are welcomed by Bill Hines, the AALS President followed by an
   introduction by Clay Gillette of NYU and Dan Keating of Wash U. Both
   are on the planning committee for the conferences.
   I have never live-blogged a conference before, so I may lose interest
   and stop. The question is whether the readers of this blog lose
   interest in a conference on contract law before I lose interest in
   blogging about it. Because I could not access the wireless network in
   the meeting room, I am uploading this post from my hotel room during
   the break. For this reason I do not have time to correct any typos or
   add links.
   We start with a joint session between the contracts and commercial law
   groups. Bob Hillmanâa contracts professor--starts by saying he did not
   realize he was going to be addressing the commercial law group when he
   wrote his introduction, so he welcomes those of use who teach the
   first and second most interesting courses in the curriculum. I agree
   that contracts is a wonderful course to teach. It is chocked full of
   classic cases with wonderful fact patternsâpregnant cows, carbolic
   smoke balls, hairy handsâhard but discernable rules of law, and the
   challenge to theoretically understand them. It invokes important moral
   issues such as whether surrogacy contracts should be enforced, and
   whether the specific enforcement of labor contracts amount to slavery.
   Now Dan Keating is doing his welcome. He mentions that the last time
   we had such a meeting on contracts was 15 years ago. He remembers
   rubbing shoulders with the greats, like E. Allan Farnsworth who,
   sadly, died this year. For me, Allan was not only an intellectual
   giant, he was a charismatic person whose absence at this conference
   will be missed.
   The first panel is on âModern Adhesion Contracts: Clickwrap,
   Browsewrap and Shrinkwrap.â The panelists are Bill Whitford
   (Wisconsin), Clay Gillette (NYU) and Juliet Moringiello (Widener). I
   have known both Bill and Clay for many years, so I am particularly
   interested in hearing what Juliet has to say, as I have never heard
   her speak before. [Click show to read rest of post.]

   ([1]show)

   Bill Whitfordâs talk is about the ProCD v. Zeidenberg (86 F.2d 1447
   (7th Cir. 1996). This case involved the enforceability of a shrink
   wrap agreement that limited the use of the Pro-CD database to
   noncommercial uses. Pro-CD made a program in which you could look up
   anyoneâs phone number and address in the US. This was a valuable
   program to have before lookup services on the internet. I bought one
   myself. ProCD priced the program very low for personal use and much
   higher for those who would use it commercially. Zeidenberg bought the
   program for the low price and used the program commercially. When sued
   by ProCD, he questioned the existence of his assent to the form terms
   in the contract that was included in the box. In an opinion by Frank
   Easterbrook, the 7th Circuit found that the form terms were
   enforceable. (At least these are the facts as I recall them. Whitford
   did not summarize the case as he assumed we all knew it.)
   Whitfordâs claim is that the decision on ProCD is âjudicial activism.â
   He considers âjudicial activismâ to be law-making by judges and he
   starts by saying that sometimes it is proper and other times not so
   the issue is when there ought to be activism and when there should not
   be. He starts with the claim (assumption) that contract law rules
   should ordinarily be made by legislatures. But often there is
   legislative inertia against acting. His claim is that the goal of
   judicial action ought to be to get legislatures to act to address a
   problem. As the problems of âdelayed termâ transactions was already
   being addressed by the legislature, there was no need for the courts
   to get involved. Because it gave business a victory in ProCD, it had
   the effect of moving business to oppose new legislation to handle the
   problem rather than support legislation so it had the effect of
   shutting down the legislative process, What it should have been doing
   was protect the one-shot players (consumers) from repeat players
   (businesses). Here it did the reverse. My reaction: So âactivismâ is
   OK if it spurs legislation that assists consumers, and not when it
   serves to assist business (and thereby block consumer protection
   legislation). This is the general attitude of left-liberal law
   professors about âjudicial activism.â When it leads to results they
   want, it is cool. When it goes against them, it is not cool.
   Clay Gillette is up now discussing form contracts. He questions the
   underlying assumption that unregulated markets will necessarily
   exploit consumers by using one-sided form contracts. He notes that the
   inability of business to distinguish between those who read form
   contracts (like the buyers from NYU) from nonreaders (like him), will
   lead them to give more favorable terms to him so as not to lose the
   business of NYU.
   On the other hand, readers of form contracts may not share the same
   interest as nonreaders, so the terms they get wonât serve the
   interests of nonreading buyers. For example a large buyer might have
   enough economic clout to get after-warranty service not included in
   the form terms when an individual buyer would be out of luck. Even if
   there are pro-seller terms, however, does not mean that contracts are
   pro-seller on balance. The real issue is whether the contract as a
   whole is on balance pro-seller. What matters for fairness is that the
   contract as a whole be sufficiently balanced.
   He also notes that proseller contracts allow sellers to give breaks to
   deservingbuyersâthe way businesses give refunds to deserving consumers
   when reserving the right not to, while being empowered to deny refunds
   to customers who they think are abusing the process in some way. This
   was a point made by Lisa Bernstein of the University of Chicago (and
   my former collegue at BU) is her contracts scholarship.
   His plea is not to say that standard form contracts are good or bad,
   but to be more sensitive and to exactly who is really benefitted or
   harmed by form contracts. With respect to the form contracts in which
   the terms come later, he notes a study that in an industry in which
   some offer their terms in advance and others offer them later, the
   âterms laterâ contracts are no more pro-seller than those in which the
   terms were supplied earlier.
   He closes by asking whether courts are in a good position to tell the
   difference between good terms and bad terms, much less good overall
   contracts from bad ones. If they cannot, then we should be wary of
   courts intervening to alter the terms of a contractâeven form
   contracts. Note that Gilletteâs use of judicial activism differs from
   Whitfordâs. For him judicial activism is interfering with individual
   contractual agreements, For Whitford, it was interfering with the
   legislative process.
   Juliet Moringiello is next and she is using a powerpoint presentation.
   She is focussing her talk on teaching form contracts. That was
   apparently supposed to be what the panel was supposed to be about, but
   both Whitford and Gilletteâs talks were more about the merits of form
   contracts.
   Moringiello uses the teaching of on-line form contracts as
   illustrating the objective theory of contracts. This is the theory by
   which people are held to be bound by what other reasonably believed
   they meant, as opposed to what they subjectively may have intended.
   (Think the difference between original public meaning and the original
   intentions of the framers.)
   She is now illustrating how a âclick wrapâ agreement works by using
   slides of a transaction on USAir website. She is showing how the USAir
   website makes you click that you agree to its terms before letting you
   finish the transaction. She is now illustrating âbrowse wrapâ
   agreement on a hotel reservations website. At the bottom of the page
   is a link to a different page that contains the terms of use of the
   site and that says that by using the site you are agreeing to the
   terms. Unlike the USAir website, there is not need to affirmatively
   indicate your assent before purporting to enter into a binding
   agreement. She then goes on to very cursorily describe how courts
   treat clickwrap v. browsewrap agreements. Apart from the slides she
   uses, there is not too much that is helpful here for teaching this
   material.
   As someone who teaches contracts, I found all three presentations to
   be remarkably superficial. To be sure, each discussed insights that we
   do and should teach our students, but all this should have been old
   news to an audience consisting of contracts professors. (This is all
   covered, for example, in the latest edition of my contracts casebook
   so any professor using the casebook would be well aware of these
   issues.) Although all three presentations were engaging, and each
   presented a view worth considering, so far at least anyone familiar
   with the basic contract theory literature would have learned nothing
   new. Perhaps this is a conference for professors not so familiar, but
   why would such unengaged professors come all the way to Montreal
   during the summer. And had anyone been unfamiliar with these ideas
   would have had a hard time grasping the very brief summary of these
   ideas in these presentations.
   In short, all that was said was thoughtful, but too truncated for
   anyone completely unfamiliar with them and also too superficial for
   anyone who is already familiar with the underlying positions they
   summarize.
   During a brief interaction among speakers, Clay questions the use of
   âjudicial activismâ to describe when courts are enforcing the parties
   agreement. He also questions the theory that judges should adopt rules
   that operate as a check on organized interests. He notes that consumer
   groups are pretty organized and it is hard to see that their interests
   were not represented in the political process governing form
   contracts. He thinks that courts should focus on enforcing contracts
   rather than putting the thumb on the scale of the legislative process.
   All this makes me wonder about the value of these sorts of academic
   conferences. While undoubtedly beneficial for networking with others
   in your field. Yet even in this program with excellent speakers on an
   interesting topic, I think little is accomplished. Hopefully, however,
   this summary of the session will be of interest to nonlegal readers
   who are unfamiliar with these sorts of issues of contract law. And for
   law students, you have a better idea of where some of your professors
   are this week.
   Now itâs time for discussion from the floor. Mark Lemley of Stanford
   asks the panel what is left of assent under the cases allowing the
   enforcement of click wrap and especially browsewrap agreements.
   Juliette agrees entirely with browsewrap agreements. (I tend to agree
   as well that there is a difference between clickwrap and browsewrap
   agreements. The formality of being made to click assent is
   significant, even if one is assenting to standard form contracts. With
   browsewrap agreements, no such formality exists.)
   Peggy Radin, also of Stanford, says she preaches damage control by
   telling people that the ProCD case is not the law everywhere in the
   US. She also distinguishes the case from situations where when there
   is no price discrimination between consumer and commercial uses, a
   factor that Judge Easterbrook emphasizes in his opinion in ProCD.
   Jean Braucher, of the University of Arizona, make a point concerning
   another form contract case, Hill v. Gateway, in which the 7th Circuit
   upheld the enforceability of a form contract shipped with a computer
   ordered over the phone. Jean notes that Gateway now charges a 15%
   restocking fee for returning the computer if you reject the terms in
   the form contact included in the box when you buy it. What is left of
   assent? Left-contracts professors have made the rolling contract a big
   issue. For professors who style themselves to be âantiformalistsâ they
   put an amazing weight on the offer-acceptance model of mutual assent
   in objecting to the terms later approach.
   Next up is a panel on Contract and Intellectual Property.
   ([2]hide)

References

   1. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/volokh/posts/1118846518.html
   2. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/volokh/posts/1118846518.html

_______________________________________________
Volokh mailing list
Volokh@lists.powerblogs.com
http://highsorcery.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/volokh

Reply via email to