Fixing Japan's banking system
The slogan ‘no growth without reform’ has never been more appropriate.

Yuko Kawamoto

http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article_page.aspx?ar=1446&L2=10&L3=51

Ever since Junichiro Koizumi became prime minister of Japan, in 2001, he has 
argued that structural reform of the country's financial system is vital for 
long-term national economic growth. His approach seems to contrast favorably 
with that of past administrations, which failed to tackle this issue in 
earnest, fearing the political consequences of the pain brought about by 
change. Koizumi is absolutely right to seek new directions in fiscal policy, 
the privatization of state-owned entities, and regulatory reform, but he has 
gone neither fast nor far enough. Indeed, structural changes have yet to get 
under way, and now the question is whether the momentum for reform will 
continue.

Some progress has been made. Big Japanese banks are at last shedding bad loans, 
and the balance of nonperforming ones is down by 13 percent compared with March 
2003. All of the major banks, with the exception of Resona, posted positive 
interim results on a consolidated basis last September, and the share prices of 
some big banks are recovering. The government has stiffened the accounting 
requirements for calculating deferred tax assets, making it harder for Japanese 
banks to book them as equity capital. And banks have reduced their holdings of 
these questionable assets to 6.5 trillion yen ($60 billion), down 18 percent 
from the level in March 2003 to September 2003.

Furthermore, last year the government gave 15 banks (including 3 mega-banks) 
that have received injections of public funds a business-improvement order 
calling on them to increase their earnings sharply or face financial penalties. 
A more practical and fact-based system for determining the value of assets has 
been developed, and the clarification of the rules on converting 
government-owned preferred shares into ordinary shares has made the financial 
impact of these regulations more transparent.

But banks remain in a critical state: their earning power at all levels is 
weak, and nonperforming loans are still a huge burden. Japan faces three major 
issues in the overhaul of the financial sector, and government intrusion lies 
at the heart of all of them.
Too many banks
The government should resist bailing out any more unsustainable 
institutions—overcapacity is one reason Japanese banks have trouble improving 
their profitability. Risk-appropriate lending rates are needed, but banks fear 
that their numerous rivals will undercut them, so they continue to provide 
financing even if it isn't profitable. By contrast, when excess capacity leads 
to dumping in manufactures, money-losing companies accumulate debt and are 
ultimately driven from the market. Attrition of this kind is the only way for 
Japan's private-sector economy to advance to a new stage of efficiency and 
competition.

When the government 'saves' a bank, that may sound good to the public, yet 
bailouts make the financial system less sustainable

But instead of allowing failing financial institutions to go bankrupt, the 
Japanese government props them up with taxpayer money. The case of the Resona 
Bank, the fifth largest in Japan, is typical. In May 2003 the government put 
1.96 trillion yen into Resona to maintain the value of its shares, in effect 
nationalizing it. Because banks, even if they are failing, never withdraw from 
the scene but instead continue to lend unprofitably, Japan has too many of 
them, and resources are wasted. When the government "saves" a bank, that may 
sound good to the public, but such bailouts definitely make the financial 
system less sustainable. Last year, however, the government took a step in the 
right direction by forcing shareholders, not taxpayers, to bear the burden when 
it rescued the smaller regional Ashikaga Bank without sustaining the value of 
that institution's shares.

The Diet (Japan's national legislature) is now considering a potentially 
problematic bill that aims to let banks receive preventive injections of public 
funds, which under current law can be used only in exceptional circumstances to 
maintain credit order. The new system, if enacted, would enable the state to 
provide capital to financial institutions, with the aim of enhancing their 
profitability and accelerating their realignment. Should this bill pass, 
Japan's financial institutions—sound or struggling—will be eligible to request 
infusions of public funds.

As it happens, the persistent funding of institutions with unsound management 
practices simply prolongs the problem and keeps regional economies weak. The 
government must encourage failing financial institutions to withdraw or 
restructure. 
Unlimited deposit guarantees
Current law calls for the introduction of a deposit-guarantee cap on demand 
deposits—money that can be withdrawn at any time—by April 2005. Over the past 
ten years, however, the government has repeatedly delayed the implementation of 
a ten-million-yen limit on the amount that the authorities could reimburse any 
depositor at a failed bank. (In the United States, the limit is $100,000.) A 
ten-million-yen cap already exists for term deposits.

What little trust the Japanese people have in the financial system might 
evaporate completely if the government fails to implement the cap next year. 
Some politicians argue that the measure shouldn't take effect until existing 
financial institutions are deemed sound. This approach, however, puts the cart 
before the horse: the government must commit itself to the deposit-guarantee 
cap and then prompt the private sector to prepare for the new system. After 
all, the cap is a problem of bank-management discipline, not an issue that 
ordinary depositors should be worrying about.
An omnivorous state bank
Moreover, public and private financial institutions should be placed on an 
equal footing. A major structural factor preventing the private sector from 
standing on its own feet is the mammoth state bank: the Fiscal Investment and 
Loan Program (FILP). Its 400 trillion yen in assets is more than the total of 
Japan's four largest private banks. This relic of the socialist economic 
model—discredited by the collapse of the Soviet Union and increasingly 
abandoned by China—remains at the core of the Japanese economy and deserves 
closer scrutiny. Under a program created half a century ago, funds are gathered 
from asset-rich sources (such as the state-run postal savings system and 
pension reserves) for use in public projects. Many have wasted huge amounts of 
money.

The postal savings system holds an unfair advantage over private banks and 
absorbs a huge amount of household assets 

The government has claimed success in reforming the FILP, arguing that its 
investments and loans have been halved in the past ten years—from about 40 
trillion yen in 1995 to 20 trillion yen in 2004. In fact, that decline is the 
result of different accounting rules; the actual sum hasn't changed as 
dramatically. What's more, the government uses fiscal year 1995 as its 
benchmark even though the FILP's investments and loans have increased 
drastically from the 27 trillion yen of fiscal year 1990. At a minimum, the 
government needs to show exactly how much money is actually being invested, to 
come clean with the public about the amount of the FILP's bad assets, and to 
write them off.

More compromising to the integrity of the financial system, however, is the 
fact that the state-run postal savings system receives preferential treatment 
from the government: unlike private banks, it is exempt from corporate taxes 
and pays no risk premium to the deposit insurance fund. Although both the 
postal savings system and private banks now enjoy an unlimited government 
guarantee on most deposits, only the private banks are scheduled to lose it 
next year. The postal savings system thus holds an unfair advantage over 
private banks and absorbs a huge amount of household assets. As the public's 
confidence in private banks has eroded, the postal savings system's assets have 
steadily increased. 

Prime Minister Koizumi is a strong advocate of privatizing the postal savings 
system, and a plan to do so is scheduled to be completed this autumn. Some 
economists argue that privatization will help level the playing field for the 
postal savings system and private banks. But will privatization go far enough? 
The best solution may be to reduce dramatically or even abolish the postal 
savings system to achieve true balance. Talk of such a radical move is taboo 
because so many people in Japan benefit from the status quo. At a minimum, 
then, the preferential treatment of the system must end. It also should be 
required to disclose the profit-and-loss statements of its three main 
businesses—postal savings, insurance, and the post office—and details of its 
profitability by region.

Further reform of financial supervision and bank governance in Japan is 
essential. For one thing, the state shouldn't remain the largest shareholder in 
most of the biggest institutions. Banks are under constant government pressure 
to lend to small and midsize companies, even when such lending is unprofitable; 
the government also controls the number of employees and branches of banks in 
which it has injected money. Without autonomy, banks can't allocate credit in 
an optimal way and the financial sector won't be capable of supporting economic 
growth. In the absence of a clear strategy, issues will persist and a 
sustainable financial system will remain elusive.

Real economic growth will come only well down the road to structural change. 
Prime Minister Koizumi's slogan—"no growth without reform"—is now more 
appropriate than ever. 
About the AuthorsYuko Kawamoto is a senior adviser to McKinsey's Tokyo office. 








                
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