In my view the error in Frances' argument is that she compares the methods of scientific investigation to art judgment. Science is tested objectively, according to observable and repeatable process. In scientific proofs, the question is: Can separate investigators arrive at identical results by the same methods? It's ridiculous to think art can be "proven" in the same way by simply having a bunch of different people look at it. There's nothing objective in that.
WC --- "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Re: 'The process of determination is not about > imposing > arbitrary conventional standards or dogmatic > regulatory > rules by some overall judicial authority, but rather > is > about collaboratively agreeing by a consensus of > tentative > opinion.' > > as the interrogator said to his victim. > > DA > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Frances Kelly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <[email protected]> > Subject: RE: Junking the Louvre? > Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2008 11:30:15 -0400 > > > Frances to Derek and others... > > > > > > > > My main point about the need of a relevant > governing group > > to make reasonable tentative determinations about > works of > > art or works of nonart in tech and science was > that the > > sole individual alone is not reliable enough to > control > > determinations, and must therefore succumb to the > communal > > collective for assurance of their conformity to > the norm. > > Relevance need not necessarily require > "learnedness" in > > say ordinary common situations, but it does > require > > normality. The main thrust here is normative > > reasonableness. If "learnedness" however is usable > in a > > broad manner, rather than only in specific > academic > > situations, then it might be aligned with some > "collateral > > experience" needed about knowing the object of > > determination on the part of all members in the > group. > > > > > > > > The process of determination is not about imposing > > arbitrary conventional standards or dogmatic > regulatory > > rules by some overall judicial authority, but > rather is > > about collaboratively agreeing by a consensus of > tentative > > opinion. There may be dissent among members of the > group, > > but the agreed determination will evolve, which is > why the > > determination is contingent and conditional and > > provisional. The philosophic support for the > probability > > of determinations is fallibility. The > determination > > further is not a cause or origin, but rather is a > limit > > and ground. To determine a forecasted outcome > therefore is > > to agree on setting the boundaries as might be > related to > > the situation at issue. > > > > > > > > A communal act to determine the status of an > object in a > > limited ground is not necessarily an act of > critical > > judgment or analytic review or empirical inquiry > or > > scientific research, although it very well can be > and > > ought to be in situations warranting it. At its > simplest > > it need only be a means for the individual person > to avoid > > uncontrolled abnormality and assure controlled > conformity. > > The most that an individual might however be for > example > > is a whole single institute or nation of persons > and > > peoples. > > > > > > > > The issue then turns to the object and criteria of > a group > > determination. In the case of art and under > pragmatism the > > form of a work must be agreed as empowered to > reflect > > worthy values and to evoke warranted responses. > The values > > and responses in turn will determine the kind of > art the > > work might be. This realist approach seems to be > the best > > available at the present.
