Sorry for posting so many comments. The question, 'What is the test for qualia so that I can know it is real' is ontologically flawed because the mystery of qualia is a profound mystery. There is no simple test for it because we only know about it through the reports of subjective experience. The question of whether or not we can test for qualia is a well formed question because it does not presuppose a categorical dismissal of the event based on an inability to initially find an answer. The development of experiments for a profound mystery that seems to be commonly observed is part of the process of developing theories about mysterious events. But a categorical dismissal of a mystery because you cannot find a way to test it is naïve. Jim Bromer
On Sat, Sep 22, 2018 at 9:02 AM Jim Bromer <jimbro...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Let's say that someone says that quantum effects can explain qualia. I > might respond by saying that sort of speculation is not related to > contemporary computer science. Then I get the reply, What do you > mean?!! Computers are used heavily in quantum science!!!! Yes, so > computers are used to make quantum calculations (or whatever they are > called) but that does not mean the theory that quantum effects can be > used to explain qualia is something that can be calculated or > simulated with contemporary computers. There is a redefinition of what > I was referring to when I said, "that sort of speculation," and the > field of making calculations of quantum effect. Now suppose someone > comes up with a way to use calculated wave particle duality as a way > to explain some aspects of consciousness. Does that mean that the new > research now explains qualia? Of course not. Even if there was some > sort of breakthrough it still does not mean that sort of speculation > (qe can explain qualia) is now relevant to contemporary computer > science. > Jim Bromer > > On Sat, Sep 22, 2018 at 8:38 AM Jim Bromer <jimbro...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > But you are still missing the definition of qualia. Wikipedia has a > > thing on it and I am sure SEP does as well. Because there are reports > > of subjective experience we know that we share something of the nature > > of experience. Common sense can tell us that computers do not. How do > > we know that computers do not share the nature of conscious experience > > (Chalmer's hard problem of consciousness: > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness)? It is > > not an ontologically salient question for a group focused on > > technology. So it is relevant to the philosophical issues of > > intelligence, but once you get it you have to move on. It is not a > > fruitful discussion unless you can derive something interesting from > > it. There is no test for qualia because there is no explanation for > > it. A profound mystery cannot be reduced to a contrived technological > > test or else just be dismissed. That kind of thinking is not good > > science and it is not good philosophy. > > So John's attempt to create a definition of compression of something > > complicated so that it can be communicated might be the start of the > > development of something related to contemporary AI but the attempt to > > claim that it defines qualia is so naïve that it is not really > > relevant to the subject of AGI. > > When you have a profound mystery you have to create ways to examine > > it. This is related to AGI. How do you fit it in to other knowledge. > > What are the observations that you have to work with. What are the > > theories that you have that you can use to work with it. Can you > > measure it. Are there indirect ways to measure it. During these > > initial stages you have to expect that many of your initial ideas are > > going to be wrong or poorly constructed. The major motivation then > > should not to be to salvage some initial primitive theories but to > > reshape them completely. To test a hypothesis about a radical theory > > of a profound mystery you have to first create theories of how you > > might conduct your experiment. If your initial theories lead you to > > enact major redefinitions so that you change the subject of the > > theory, then that is a good sign that you are not ready to test the > > theory. > > Jim > > On Sat, Sep 22, 2018 at 8:11 AM John Rose <johnr...@polyplexic.com> wrote: > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: Nanograte Knowledge Technologies via AGI <agi@agi.topicbox.com> > > > > > > > > That's according to John's definition thereof. The rest of us do not > > > > necessarily > > > > agree with such a limited view. At this stage, it cannot be absolutely > > > > stated > > > > what qualia is. For example, mine is a lot more fuzzy and abstract in > > > > terms of > > > > autonomous, identifier signalling . And that is but one view of many > > > > regarding > > > > a feature of biology, which I contend could ultimately be transposed > > > > into a > > > > synthetically-framed platform as its own, unique version. > > > > > > > > > > "autonomous, identifier signaling" > > > > > > We are on a similar wavelength :) Compression is a big word. I've not > > > talked about consciousness topology and kernels yet... > > > > > > > > > > One needs to define a term first, before trying to apply > > > > it to the collective consciousness of AGI. > > > > > > > > > > I disagree. Many AGI researchers have two overwhelming biases: > > > > > > One person is a general intelligence. > > > One person is a general consciousness. > > > > > > Both I believe are false. > > > > > > Seeing the forest when you are a tree requires an outside view. > > > > > > John > > > ------------------------------------------ Artificial General Intelligence List: AGI Permalink: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/T9c94dabb0436859d-M1ba47a6dbf70c2bf0618a84c Delivery options: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/subscription
