All right, Pei: I'm going to turn the question back on you and ask more
questions, by way of an answer.
Suppose I had a computational system that consisted of large numbers of
small units, each of which was approximately like a conventional
processor, but with some of its activities governed by real-world noise
sources, to make the overall behavior not-quite-turing. (In other
words, a neuron! Or in other words again, a turing machine plus noisy
inputs that were ultimately governed by quantum-scale noise).
Now, suppose that the thing was best modelled and understood by us as an
almost-turing-machine, because it was so close.
Suppose further that this was part of an intelligent system, in which
these processing units were playing a role down at a very low level
(roughly equivalent to the neural level in our brain), and that there
was a higher level (roughly equivalent to the conceptual or logical
reasoning level in our brain) where there was once again an
almost-turing level of description.
Now, to an outside observer, there is a choice. They could go right
down to the quantum-turing level (as David Deutsch did) and declare that
the system is functionally equivalent to a Turing machine. Or they
could go up to the unit level and say, well, it is almost a turing
machine there. Or they could go up further and say that it is almsot
turing there too.
My point is: what conclusions does one want to draw from the turingness
of something? If I can (in Ben's words) take my cappuccino here and say
that it can be "approximated arbitrarily closely by a quantum Turing
machine", the currency has been debased so much that I don't see it
being any use.
Richard Loosemore
Pei Wang wrote:
Sergio,
I'm asking about your (b).
Put it in different words, my question is whether there is fundamental
difference between a robot and a conventional computer, such as my
laptop. I see that both you and Charles think there is a difference
(the sensorimotor capability), while Ben thinks there is no
theoretical difference, as far as the current discussion goes.
My own answer is the same as Ben's, though for a different reason ---
I'd rather not involve concepts like quantum Turing machine. Before
arguing for my position, I'd like to see what arguments are out there.
;-)
Pei
On 10/2/06, Sergio Navega <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
From: "Pei Wang" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> We all know that, in a sense, every computer system (hardware plus
> software) can be abstractly described as a Turing machine.
>
> Can we say the same for every robot? Why?
>
> Reference to previous publications are also welcome.
>
That's a quite interesting question. Unfortunately, I don't
remember of any particular references (but I guess they might
exist). I classify this question in three steps:
a) The computational component of the robot
This is as close as one may get to a turing machine, of course
without enforcing the physically impossible infinite tape.
b) The computational plus the bodily component
(or just the bodily). Here we are not talking about turing-like
devices. Physical idiosyncrasies of the mechanical components
cannot be computed (it's a too complex problem).
c) The system robot plus its environment
This is as far of turing formalisms as one can get. And this is
the situation most AI systems will have to face.
Sergio Navega.
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