Richard, I re-read your paper and I'm afraid I really don't grok why you think it solves Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness...
It really seems to me like what you're suggesting is a "cognitive correlate of consciousness", to morph the common phrase "neural correlate of consciousness" ... You seem to be stating that when X is an unanalyzable, pure atomic sensation from the perspective of cognitive system C, then C will perceive X as a raw quale ... unanalyzable and not explicable by ordinary methods of explication, yet, still subjectively real... But, I don't see how the hypothesis "Conscious experience is **identified with** unanalyzable mind-atoms" could be distinguished empirically from "Conscious experience is **correlated with** unanalyzable mind-atoms" I think finding cognitive correlates of consciousness is interesting, but I don't think it constitutes solving the hard problem in Chalmers' sense... I grok that you're saying "consciousness feels inexplicable because it has to do with atoms that the system can't explain, due to their role as its primitive atoms" ... and this is a good idea, but, I don't see how it bridges the gap btw subjective experience and empirical data ... What it does is explain why, even if there *were* no hard problem, cognitive systems might feel like there is one, in regard to their unanalyzable atoms Another worry I have is: I feel like I can be conscious of my son, even though he is not an unanalyzable atom. I feel like I can be conscious of the unique impression he makes ... in the same way that I'm conscious of redness ... and, yeah, I feel like I can't fully explain the conscious impression he makes on me, even though I can explain a lot of things about him... So I'm not convinced that atomic sensor input is the only source of raw, unanalyzable consciousness... -- Ben G On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 5:14 PM, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote: > Harry Chesley wrote: > >> Richard Loosemore wrote: >> >>> Harry Chesley wrote: >>> >>>> Richard Loosemore wrote: >>>> >>>>> I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness >>>>> the other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it >>>>> can be found at: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://susaro.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf >>>>> >>>>> One other point: Although this is a possible explanation for our >>>> subjective experience of qualia like "red" or "soft," I don't see >>>> it explaining "pain" or "happy" quite so easily. You can >>>> hypothesize a sort of mechanism-level explanation of those by >>>> relegating them to the older or "lower" parts of the brain (i.e., >>>> they're atomic at the conscious level, but have more effects at the >>>> physiological level (like releasing chemicals into the system)), >>>> but that doesn't satisfactorily cover the subjective side for me. >>>> >>> I do have a quick answer to that one. >>> >>> Remember that the core of the model is the *scope* of the analysis >>> mechanism. If there is a sharp boundary (as well there might be), >>> then this defines the point where the qualia kick in. Pain receptors >>> are fairly easy: they are primitive signal lines. Emotions are, I >>> believe, caused by clusters of lower brain structures, so the >>> interface between "lower brain" and "foreground" is the place where >>> the foreground sees a limit to the analysis mechanisms. >>> >>> More generally, the significance of the "foreground" is that it sets >>> a boundary on how far the analysis mechanisms can reach. >>> >>> I am not sure why that would seem less satisfactory as an explanation >>> of the subjectivity. It is a "raw feel", and that is the key idea, >>> no? >>> >> >> My problem is if qualia are atomic, with no differentiable details, why >> do some "feel" different than others -- shouldn't they all be separate >> but equal? "Red" is relatively neutral, while "searing hot" is not. Part >> of that is certainly lower brain function, below the level of >> consciousness, but that doesn't explain to me why it "feels" >> qualitatively different. If it was just something like increased >> activity (franticness) in response to "searing hot," then fine, that >> could just be something like adrenaline being pumped into the system, >> but there is a subjective feeling that goes beyond that. >> > > There is more than one question wrapped up inside this question, I think. > > First: all qualia feel "different", of course. You seem to be pointing to > a sense in which pain is "more different than most" .... ? But is that > really a valid idea? > > Does pain have "differentiable details"? Well, there are different types > of pain .... but that is to be expected, like different colors. But that is > arelatively trivial point. Within one single pain there can be several > *effects* of that pain, including some strange ones that do not have > counterparts in the vision-color case. > > For example, suppose that a "searing hot" pain caused a simultaneous > triggering of the motivational system, forcing you to suddenly want to do > something (like pulling your body part away from the pain). The feeling of > "wanting" (wanting to pull away) is a quale of its own, in a sense, so it > would not be impossible for one quale (searing hot) to always be associated > with another (wanting to pull away). If those always occurred together, it > might seem that there was structure to the pain experience, where in fact > there is a pair of things happening. > > It is probably more than a pair of things, but perhaps you get my drift. > > Remember that having associations to a pain is not part of what we consider > to be the essence of the subjective experience; the bit that is most > mysterious and needs to be explained. > > Another thing we have to keep in mind here is that the exact details of how > each subjective experience feels are certainly going to seem different, and > some can seem like each other and not like others .... colors are like other > colors, but not like pains. > > That is to be expected: we can say that colors happen in a certain place > in our sensorium (vision) while pains are associated with the body > (usually), but these differences are not inconsistent with the account I > have given. If concept-atoms encoding [red] always attach to all the othe > concept-atoms involving visual experiences, that would make them very > different than pains like [searing hot], but all of this could be true at > the same time that [red] would do what it does to the analysis mechanism > (when we try to think the thought "Was is the essence of redness?"). So the > problem with the analysis mechanism would happen with both pains and colors, > even though the two different atom types played games with different sets of > other concept-atoms. > > > > Richard Loosemore > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------- > agi > Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ > Modify Your Subscription: > https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects." -- Robert Heinlein ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
