On Tue, 1 Apr 2008, Ian Kelly wrote: > I submit that if comex and woggle had at some point indicated that > they had silently agreed to Wooble's attempted judgement in that case, > then the appropriate judgement in CFJ 1908 would have been TRUE, not > FALSE.
This is where the epistemology comes in, on our state of knowledge. I disagree with you here. Agreement is a state, but how is it entered into? By R101(v), we cannot assume that any state of agreement existed "ahead of time" (e.g. prior to the case being raised). By R101(iv), we need evidence of "explicit, willful consent" to consider that an agreement had been made. I would argue that if concrete, non-retroactive evidence for an agreement cannot be produced in response to a challenge, then we can't accept that an agreement has been made, even if comex indicates (after the fact) that e silently agreed. Silent agreement couldn't have been known to Wooble due to R101(iv), so by our law, a silent agreement isn't legal agreement at all. (To forestall discussion on another detail, I assume that type of "agreement" referred to in R101 is the same as "agreements made" by judicial panels, as there is no qualifying text to the contrary). -Goethe
