I agree with my learned colleague Mischief's observations
I have three things that I want to raise in this post.
Thing 1:
"1. Whether an inanimate object is capable of consenting to being bound by
the rules; "
Is either IRRELEVANT or TRUE. The rules define consent as being important
for persons, and places various restrictions on a person having eir actions
dictated against eir will or without eir consent. There is no restriction
on non-person entities. In fact, pretty much every game action includes
acting on objects without consent, it's only when we have to think about
other persons that we worry about their expressly given consent.
Thing 2:
Janet says:
> If I intend to "confederate" with someone, but they don't want anything
> to do with me, we are not a "confederated" group in any sense.
and then goes on to make some dismissive comments about people's mental
states.
But I note that this quote actually makes the same logical problem e is
trying to reject. It doesn't actually make sense to say "the rock doesn't
want anything to do with me".
Consent governs a "want to do" vs. "want to not do" distinction that is
only relevant for entities who have thoughts and feelings, and whose
thoughts and feelings can be protected by not subjecting them to things
they would rather not happen. Rocks exist permanently in a state of absence
of want (which is different to wanting something not to happen).
In other words, it's a fool's errand to apply the logic of consent to a
rock. They have no true or false value on their consent, only null.
Consent is an important principle in harm minimisation and empowerment.
Neither of these are relevant to rocks.
Thing 3:
Finally, I think the judge is erring too much in favour of ruling on a
statement that was never provided by the CFJ. The judgement effectively
asks us to ignore the statement as put, and substitutes in a second
statement that is directly implied by the CFJ'd statement being true,
attempts to prove the substituted statement as false, and then works
backwards to say that the first statement must therefore be false. In my
opinion, this is dangerously at risk of running afoul of R217:
Definitions and prescriptions in the rules are only to be applied
using direct, forward reasoning; in particular, an absurdity that
can be concluded from the assumption that a statement about
rule-defined concepts is false does not constitute proof that it
is true.
It remains the case that the rules define a "confederation of entities" and
not a "confederation of persons", *despite *the intentions of some drafters
to use the latter recursive definition.
It remains true that if a confederation of entities is possible, then it is
a person.
The judge has erred by reading in the question of personhood and working
backwards, instead of limiting emself to starting with a "confederation of
entities" and working forwards.
I would urge the judge to reconsider the basis of this judgement, and
consider the following central questions:
1. Why do the rules read "group of entities confederated" instead of "group
of persons confederated"?
2. To what extent does the use of "group of entities confederated" imply
that confederation with entities is possible?
In my opinion, the answers are "a consequential oversight" and "heavily".
Leave aside the question of personhood itself. If I simply say, for example
{ I confederate with a rock, with the intention of creating a person under
R869 }, what mechanism, if any, do the rules have to say that this
confederation is not possible?
It is extremely important not to read the CFJ as being something other than
what was actually CFJ'd, or you can just start legislating from the
judiciary.
On Fri, Apr 18, 2025 at 6:28 AM Janet Cobb via agora-discussion <
[email protected]> wrote:
> On 4/17/25 16:04, Mischief via agora-discussion wrote:
> >> * Those people performing such action must have done so with the intent
> of forming a single person as defined by R869.
> > R869 is interestingly unclear as to whose intent it must be. Can that
> intent
> > be an emergent property? In other words, am I a confederation of my
> > constituent atoms at any given moment?
> >
> > Also, R869 only tests "able to willingly communicate original ideas" at
> the
> > aggregate level, not the constituent level.
> >
> >
> > Here's one possible interpretation of things...
> >
> > Person + person = person
> > Person + non-person = person
> > Non-person + non-person = ??? (can be person or non-person)
> >
>
> If I intend to "confederate" with someone, but they don't want anything
> to do with me, we are not a "confederated" group in any sense.
> Similarly, if I intend to confederate with a rock, but the rock is a
> rock, then the "group" of me + the rock is not "confederated"; I'm just
> having strange thoughts about a rock.
>
> "Confederation" should, at a minimum, require a meeting of the minds
> with common mutual intent. The "intent of forming a single person under
> this Rule" clause modifies "confederated" and restricts what kinds of
> mutual intent count.
>
> --
> Janet Cobb
>
> Assessor, Rulekeepor
>
