On 4/18/25 02:02, Rowan Evans via agora-discussion wrote:
> I agree with my learned colleague Mischief's observations
>
> I have three things that I want to raise in this post.
>
> Thing 1:
> "1. Whether an inanimate object is capable of consenting to being bound by
> the rules; "
>
> Is either IRRELEVANT or TRUE. The rules define consent as being important
> for persons, and places various restrictions on a person having eir actions
> dictated against eir will or without eir consent. There is no restriction
> on non-person entities. In fact, pretty much every game action includes
> acting on objects without consent, it's only when we have to think about
> other persons that we worry about their expressly given consent.
>
> Thing 2:
> Janet says:
>> If I intend to "confederate" with someone, but they don't want anything
>> to do with me, we are not a "confederated" group in any sense.
> and then goes on to make some dismissive comments about people's mental
> states.
>
> But I note that this quote actually makes the same logical problem e is
> trying to reject. It doesn't actually make sense to say "the rock doesn't
> want anything to do with me".
>
> Consent governs a "want to do" vs. "want to not do" distinction that is
> only relevant for entities who have thoughts and feelings, and whose
> thoughts and feelings can be protected by not subjecting them to things
> they would rather not happen. Rocks exist permanently in a state of absence
> of want (which is different to wanting something not to happen).
First, I never said the word "consent".
Second, a person being deemed to have "consented" to an action, as
defined by Rule 2519, is neither necessary nor sufficient to show that e
desires or intends that action to take place. I can be deemed to consent
to something I very much don't want to happen (e.g. by agreeing to a
contract with a bug, or by writing a promise that is used in a way that
hurts my gameplay) or not be deemed to consent to something I very much
do want to happen (e.g., there is probably not sufficient evidence for
an Agoran to conclude that I have consented to eating lunch today).
My argument is instead that the natural language meaning of "to
confederate" inherently requires subjective examination of an entity's
intentions. Here's a sample of what some dictionaries think:
* Google: "bring (states or groups of people) into an alliance"
* Dictionary.com: "united in a league, alliance, or conspiracy"
* Merriam-Webster: "united in a league"
* Wikipedia: "A confederation [...] is a political union of sovereign
states united for purposes of common action."
All of these definitions consider "alliances" or being "united" in some
way, and, although such an alliance may be memorialized in a document,
the natural language meaning of the term doesn't require that. It does,
however, require some form of actual intention by the parties:
Merriam-Webster's definitions of "united" include "made one", "relating
to or produced by joint action", and "being in agreement". Similarly,
all of these definitions imply that the agreement must be *mutual* to
some extent, as they would apply symmetrically to every member of the
confederation.
> In other words, it's a fool's errand to apply the logic of consent to a
> rock. They have no true or false value on their consent, only null.
The fact that we might have trouble applying this definition to a rock
is certainly not evidence that "confederation" with a rock is possible.
The test set forth by Rule 869 is an active one: a group must
affirmatively "confederate". There is no presumption that every group of
entities is "confederating" that must be disproven.
> I would urge the judge to reconsider the basis of this judgement, and
> consider the following central questions:
> 1. Why do the rules read "group of entities confederated" instead of "group
> of persons confederated"?
> 2. To what extent does the use of "group of entities confederated" imply
> that confederation with entities is possible?
>
> In my opinion, the answers are "a consequential oversight" and "heavily".
Even if this reading is possible, there is ambiguity in the meaning of
"confederate". Your reading almost certainly loses the R217 tiebreaks
and is probably disfavored under R869's "good-faith" and "customs of
honorable play" provision.
> Leave aside the question of personhood itself. If I simply say, for example
> { I confederate with a rock, with the intention of creating a person under
> R869 }, what mechanism, if any, do the rules have to say that this
> confederation is not possible?
This is "a typical example of I say I do, therefore I do, which has
plagued Agora for a long time". The principle that not all acts are
speech acts is embodied in Rule 2125, even though "confederation" under
Rule 869 is *hopefully* not a regulated action.
Confederation is not a speech act (and certainly not a speech act that a
single entity can perform on behalf of a group). I can work together
with a friend without any words having been exchanged or having any
other explicit agreement, or I can falsely report that we're working
together (as I might in, e.g., a game of Diplomacy). Saying it doesn't
make it true.
--
Janet Cobb
Assessor, Rulekeepor
