I totally reject that any of these dictionaries "imply" anything about mutual agreement, nor is it correct to say they "imply" anything at all. We rely on dictionaries to unambiguously encapsulate the explicit meaning of a word. Claiming the dictionary "implies" something is just a wilful attempt to disregard the dictionary's definition of the word, and should be treated as suspect.
I'll deal with the matters raised explicitly by the dictionary. By your own analysis, "confederate" and "unite" are synonyms, with the exception that confederation is done for a common purpose. To unite something doesn't imply mutual cooperation. When I screw a lid onto a jar, I unite the two, whether they want to or not. As to the common purpose, that is plainly provided in the text of the rule -- "with the intent of forming a single person under this Rule". *This uniting has a purpose, therefore it's a confederation*. The only remaining question for the judge on this part of the matter is whether to recognise the intent of the person when they confederate with an entity, even in the absence of intent from an entity that can't express intent. Note that to rule that "yes, there was intent present and therefore this is a confederation", is compatible with the principle of consent, because the rules only expect and require that in regards to people. Confederating in this way only has effect if all people in the group consent, because consent has meaningful implications in whether the rules can have an effect on people. For me, this is where lies the distinction between intent and consent, as well as where group and individual desires are considered. The confederation and registration process has two requirements: 1. An *individual* *person *expresses their *intent* to unite a group of *entities *to form a single person under R869. 2. *Every person* in that group expresses their *consent* to that unification, giving the rest of the rules effect Only the first step is relevant to this judgement, but the second, which emerges from the clause on consent in 869, is instructive in understanding how the rest of the rules can govern group persons. ------ The question of good faith and customs of honourable play are part of a clause about "Questions of personhood", which is not under question in this CFJ, and to include it in this CFJ would be to again delve into *backwards reasoning*. If the confederation is possible, there can be no question of personhood to raise. --------- > This is "a typical example of I say I do, therefore I do, which has > plagued Agora for a long time". The principle that not all acts are > speech acts is embodied in Rule 2125, even though "confederation" under > Rule 869 is *hopefully* not a regulated action. I'm going to assume that you're using ISIDTID here in the sense that "actions that are successful by mere announcement are only those specifically enumerated in the rules". In the case of "confederation" it's not successful at time of announcement, it's successful at time of confederation, so invoking ISIDTID is irrelevant. Announcing the fact that it happened is still relevant nonetheless, because it affects the gamestate and everybody should know about it. The rules legislate that they recognise confederation for groups of entities. You yourself were part of writing this into law because you thought it was important that players not just be individual entities. It seems like an odd, arguably shortsighted, tactic to now claim "ah, but this clause actually has no meaning, because I never said how it's done". I say shortsighted, because if your argument wins this CFJ, it would be akin to ruling that confederation is not available as an action in the game despite being in the rules, which then jeopardises the status of any other group person. In the case of "a group of entities confederated with the intent of forming a single person under this Rule", the rules clearly purport to *recognise *any case matching the criteria, regardless of how it happened. As far as the mailing list is concerned, a mere report that it happened ought to be sufficient. How do you intend to preserve group persons if merely announcing their existence is insufficient for recognition by the rules? Here is a slightly fanciful example, that is nonetheless explanatory and motivating. Suppose that we decided it would be good if everybody got some physical exercise. If we write a rule to say that "If a player goes to the gym today, they get a spendie", then to post on the mailing list that "I went to the gym today" isn't ISIDTID. It still requires me to go to the gym. I just reported it to the chat in the most convenient way possible. And further, if the rule fails to provide a mechanism for going to the gym, it doesn't suddenly stop me from going to the gym when I go to the gym. I did do it, the rules purport to recognise the case where I do it, I get my hard-earned exercise spendie all the same. So, no, it's not "I say I do, therefore I do", instead it's "I do, therefore I report it publicly". IDTIRIP if you will. On Fri, Apr 18, 2025 at 9:32 PM Janet Cobb via agora-discussion < [email protected]> wrote: > On 4/18/25 02:02, Rowan Evans via agora-discussion wrote: > > I agree with my learned colleague Mischief's observations > > > > I have three things that I want to raise in this post. > > > > Thing 1: > > "1. Whether an inanimate object is capable of consenting to being bound > by > > the rules; " > > > > Is either IRRELEVANT or TRUE. The rules define consent as being important > > for persons, and places various restrictions on a person having eir > actions > > dictated against eir will or without eir consent. There is no restriction > > on non-person entities. In fact, pretty much every game action includes > > acting on objects without consent, it's only when we have to think about > > other persons that we worry about their expressly given consent. > > > > Thing 2: > > Janet says: > >> If I intend to "confederate" with someone, but they don't want anything > >> to do with me, we are not a "confederated" group in any sense. > > and then goes on to make some dismissive comments about people's mental > > states. > > > > But I note that this quote actually makes the same logical problem e is > > trying to reject. It doesn't actually make sense to say "the rock doesn't > > want anything to do with me". > > > > Consent governs a "want to do" vs. "want to not do" distinction that is > > only relevant for entities who have thoughts and feelings, and whose > > thoughts and feelings can be protected by not subjecting them to things > > they would rather not happen. Rocks exist permanently in a state of > absence > > of want (which is different to wanting something not to happen). > > > First, I never said the word "consent". > > Second, a person being deemed to have "consented" to an action, as > defined by Rule 2519, is neither necessary nor sufficient to show that e > desires or intends that action to take place. I can be deemed to consent > to something I very much don't want to happen (e.g. by agreeing to a > contract with a bug, or by writing a promise that is used in a way that > hurts my gameplay) or not be deemed to consent to something I very much > do want to happen (e.g., there is probably not sufficient evidence for > an Agoran to conclude that I have consented to eating lunch today). > > My argument is instead that the natural language meaning of "to > confederate" inherently requires subjective examination of an entity's > intentions. Here's a sample of what some dictionaries think: > > * Google: "bring (states or groups of people) into an alliance" > > * Dictionary.com: "united in a league, alliance, or conspiracy" > > * Merriam-Webster: "united in a league" > > * Wikipedia: "A confederation [...] is a political union of sovereign > states united for purposes of common action." > > All of these definitions consider "alliances" or being "united" in some > way, and, although such an alliance may be memorialized in a document, > the natural language meaning of the term doesn't require that. It does, > however, require some form of actual intention by the parties: > Merriam-Webster's definitions of "united" include "made one", "relating > to or produced by joint action", and "being in agreement". Similarly, > all of these definitions imply that the agreement must be *mutual* to > some extent, as they would apply symmetrically to every member of the > confederation. > > > In other words, it's a fool's errand to apply the logic of consent to a > > rock. They have no true or false value on their consent, only null. > > The fact that we might have trouble applying this definition to a rock > is certainly not evidence that "confederation" with a rock is possible. > The test set forth by Rule 869 is an active one: a group must > affirmatively "confederate". There is no presumption that every group of > entities is "confederating" that must be disproven. > > > > > I would urge the judge to reconsider the basis of this judgement, and > > consider the following central questions: > > 1. Why do the rules read "group of entities confederated" instead of > "group > > of persons confederated"? > > 2. To what extent does the use of "group of entities confederated" imply > > that confederation with entities is possible? > > > > In my opinion, the answers are "a consequential oversight" and "heavily". > > > Even if this reading is possible, there is ambiguity in the meaning of > "confederate". Your reading almost certainly loses the R217 tiebreaks > and is probably disfavored under R869's "good-faith" and "customs of > honorable play" provision. > > > > Leave aside the question of personhood itself. If I simply say, for > example > > { I confederate with a rock, with the intention of creating a person > under > > R869 }, what mechanism, if any, do the rules have to say that this > > confederation is not possible? > > > This is "a typical example of I say I do, therefore I do, which has > plagued Agora for a long time". The principle that not all acts are > speech acts is embodied in Rule 2125, even though "confederation" under > Rule 869 is *hopefully* not a regulated action. > > Confederation is not a speech act (and certainly not a speech act that a > single entity can perform on behalf of a group). I can work together > with a friend without any words having been exchanged or having any > other explicit agreement, or I can falsely report that we're working > together (as I might in, e.g., a game of Diplomacy). Saying it doesn't > make it true. > > -- > Janet Cobb > > Assessor, Rulekeepor > >
