On 4/18/25 09:44, Rowan Evans via agora-discussion wrote: > I totally reject that any of these dictionaries "imply" anything about > mutual agreement, nor is it correct to say they "imply" anything at all. We > rely on dictionaries to unambiguously encapsulate the explicit meaning of a > word. Claiming the dictionary "implies" something is just a wilful attempt > to disregard the dictionary's definition of the word, and should be treated > as suspect.
Definitions of natural language terms are not rewrite rules, which is why I offered several definitions and looked for commonalities between them. The observation about the definitions implying mutual agreement was based on noting that all of the definitions are symmetrical: if entities A and B are in an "alliance", then that implies both that A is aligned with B and that B is aligned with A; similarly, a "union" of A and B implies that A is united with B and that B is united with A. None of the definitions seem to contemplate that a "confederation" might be unilateral. > I'll deal with the matters raised explicitly by the dictionary. By your own > analysis, "confederate" and "unite" are synonyms, with the exception that > confederation is done for a common purpose. To unite something doesn't > imply mutual cooperation. When I screw a lid onto a jar, I unite the two, > whether they want to or not. As to the common purpose, that is plainly > provided in the text of the rule -- "with the intent of forming a single > person under this Rule". *This uniting has a purpose, therefore it's a > confederation*. When we're talking about entities with agency, "uniting" does usually imply mutual cooperation. Most English speakers would not read "Alice and Bob are united." to suggest that they are merely in physical contact; instead, it suggests something about their intentions: that they are working together in some capacity. Similarly, in "the United States of America", the States are United with the intention of forming a single country to govern the whole of their territory (despite not being persons). This was even true to some extent under the preceding Articles of Confederation (although the goals were slightly different, and the result was less than ideal). > Note that to rule that "yes, there was intent present and therefore this is > a confederation", is compatible with the principle of consent, because the > rules only expect and require that in regards to people. Confederating in > this way only has effect if all people in the group consent, because > consent has meaningful implications in whether the rules can have an effect > on people. The definition of "person" does not contemplate whether that person will ever become a player or be bound by the rules. > For me, this is where lies the distinction between intent and consent, as > well as where group and individual desires are considered. The > confederation and registration process has two requirements: > 1. An *individual* *person *expresses their *intent* to unite a group > of *entities > *to form a single person under R869. > 2. *Every person* in that group expresses their *consent* to that > unification, giving the rest of the rules effect > > Only the first step is relevant to this judgement, but the second, which > emerges from the clause on consent in 869, is instructive in understanding > how the rest of the rules can govern group persons. If the only thing that matters is whether intent of one member of the proposed group has been "expressed", then I can announce a desire to "confederate" with any other person and thereby create a new group person, regardless of whether e knows that I exist. Additionally, there's no reason to think that registration explicitly requires the consent of every member of a group person. As a trivial example, consider a group governed by a written agreement. Although there's not really any case law here, a representative of that group ought to be able to unilaterally bind the group itself (but not necessarily any other member as an individual person) to the Rules by registering, if e is so authorized by the agreement. Trying to require consent from each member would require circumventing the group's internal governance processes and unduly interrogating its members. In practice, this standard would be rendered unworkable by the fact that group persons do not need to declare whether or not they are groups at any point. > The question of good faith and customs of honourable play are part of a > clause about "Questions of personhood", which is not under question in this > CFJ, and to include it in this CFJ would be to again delve into *backwards > reasoning*. If the confederation is possible, there can be no question of > personhood to raise. The exact meaning of that clause has not yet been litigated; a holding that it only applies to matters of fact would be plausible, but it's far from clear that's the only reading. >> This is "a typical example of I say I do, therefore I do, which has >> plagued Agora for a long time". The principle that not all acts are >> speech acts is embodied in Rule 2125, even though "confederation" under >> Rule 869 is *hopefully* not a regulated action. > I'm going to assume that you're using ISIDTID here in the sense that > "actions that are successful by mere announcement are only those > specifically enumerated in the rules". In the case of "confederation" it's > not successful at time of announcement, it's successful at time of > confederation, so invoking ISIDTID is irrelevant. Announcing the fact that > it happened is still relevant nonetheless, because it affects the gamestate > and everybody should know about it. No! Far from it; the concept of speech act exists outside the game. For instance, a person can "publicly acknowledge[]" Agora's birthday (for a Magenta ribbon) even though the Rules provide no explicit mechanism to do so. That saying "I acknowledge Agora's birthday" *by itself* accomplishes the action is what makes it a speech act. I argue that "confederation" with another entity is not a speech act because it requires more than speech to accomplish. Walking up to someone and saying "I confederate with you" doesn't make it true. > The rules legislate that they recognise confederation for groups of > entities. You yourself were part of writing this into law because you > thought it was important that players not just be individual entities. It > seems like an odd, arguably shortsighted, tactic to now claim "ah, but this > clause actually has no meaning, because I never said how it's done". I say > shortsighted, because if your argument wins this CFJ, it would be akin to > ruling that confederation is not available as an action in the game despite > being in the rules, which then jeopardises the status of any other group > person. I don't see how anything I've suggested would result in confederation being impossible *in general*; I've only proposed specific cases where it would not have happened. > In the case of "a group of entities confederated with the intent of forming > a single person under this Rule", the rules clearly purport to *recognise *any > case matching the criteria, regardless of how it happened. As far as the > mailing list is concerned, a mere report that it happened ought to be > sufficient. How do you intend to preserve group persons if merely > announcing their existence is insufficient for recognition by the rules? > > Here is a slightly fanciful example, that is nonetheless explanatory and > motivating. Suppose that we decided it would be good if everybody got some > physical exercise. If we write a rule to say that "If a player goes to the > gym today, they get a spendie", then to post on the mailing list that "I > went to the gym today" isn't ISIDTID. It still requires me to go to the > gym. I just reported it to the chat in the most convenient way possible. > > And further, if the rule fails to provide a mechanism for going to the gym, > it doesn't suddenly stop me from going to the gym when I go to the gym. I > did do it, the rules purport to recognise the case where I do it, I get my > hard-earned exercise spendie all the same. > > So, no, it's not "I say I do, therefore I do", instead it's "I do, > therefore I report it publicly". IDTIRIP if you will. As for your specific example, Rule 2125 arguably *would* make "going to the gym" a regulated action, since it would "modify information" (balances of spendies) "for which some player is required to be a recordkeepor" (the Spendor). In any event, yes, a player posting to the public forum that e went to the gym would be evidence that e did do so (particularly given R2471). That doesn't mean that such a claim is beyond contradiction: doubt could be cast on eir claim for evidence from some other source, or an argument could be raised that the location e went to was not, in fact, "a gym" for the purpose of the rule. Similarly, an announcement that a confederation exists is prima facie evidence of several facts. It's certainly prima facie evidence that the sender *intends* for it to exist. It's probably even prima facie evidence that any other members of the group also intend for it to exist, on the basis that lying to the public forum is illegal. It's not dispositive, though; announcing that "I have confederated with Hillary Rodham Clinton with the intent of forming a single person" might rightfully be looked on with suspicion. Alternatively, an explicit contradiction of the fact from another member of the purported group would be convincing evidence that no confederation ever actually occurred, and thus that the group never actually existed. In any event, certainly an announcement of a fact is not dispositive as to matters of law. "I announce that I have confederated with this rock with the intent of forming a single person", although evidence of my intent and mental state, is not conclusive evidence that I have met the legal standard for "confederation". That is for a court to decide (taking into account the clause providing that the question be "resolved equitably"). -- Janet Cobb Assessor, Rulekeepor
