Hi,
On Mon, 9 Sep 2019, Jacob Slater wrote:
All,
If it's *your* table, you should be able.
Again, I disagree. Just because you have a copy of the routing table doesn't
automatically put you in a position to know what is going on with each entry
present in that table.
Sure, but stat.ripe.net, bgp.he.net, rpki, and many other sources are free
for everyone to access. :-)
But please keep in mind than one event or a handful of events shouldn't
justify an investigation, or handing a case to "experts".
The current policy proposal doesn't have text to support this.
Honestly, i handed it back in late April. The IA and publishing took some
time... :-)
What i think supports what i wrote above is in Section 7.0, clause 1:
"The RIPE NCC will verify that a report contains sufficient information
before assigning it to a group of experts. If this is not the case, the
report will be dismissed."
Maybe it could be a bit clearer, or we could textually add "one event or a
handful of events is not enough".
If the issue is fixed and the issue originator isn't always the same, then
no real need for an investigation. Maybe the amount of text on the current
version fades a bit the two main concepts of "persistent" and
"intentional".
I am in agreement with you on this.
There should be enough "trail" to justify starting an investigation...
If the person submitting a report isn't in an authoritative position to say whether or
not an announcement was a hijack, there isn't a good enough "trail" to justify
starting an investigation.
Hence Section 7.0, clause 1 :-)
The "proposal". It's just a proposal...! :-)
I agree that there isn't a way to measure how many people around the
world would not resort to hijacking if this proposal was in place today
My apologies for misspeaking on that one. Any references I may have made to 2019-3 as a
"policy" should read as "policy proposal".
No harm done :-)
Just because a policy proposal has the chance to discourage bad actors doesn't
mean we should ignore the potential consequences of implementing the proposal.
Sure. And i have already read the IA. All of it.
Regards,
Carlos
Jacob Slater
On Mon, Sep 9, 2019 at 5:25 PM Carlos Friaças <cfria...@fccn.pt> wrote:
Hi,
On Mon, 9 Sep 2019, Jacob Slater wrote:
> All,
> If that happens, then potentially everyone can be a victim, yes.
> Then they should be able to place a report.
>
>
> I disagree. Just because you see what you think is a hijack in the full
table doesn't mean you have enough information to justify a full investigation
that is likely to consume valuable time and resources.
If it's *your* table, you should be able.
But please keep in mind than one event or a handful of events shouldn't
justify an investigation, or handing a case to "experts".
> Afaik, this is possible within LACNIC (i.e. through
warp.lacnic.net). When
> the same proposal was discussed there, the yearly number of
reports (if
> i'm not mistaken) was on the scale of dozens -- and they have a
very high
> degree of helping stop/mitigate the incidents, almost close to
100%, which
> is fantastic!
>
>
> Being asked to fix an issue is very different from getting investigated
for an issue with the potential for termination of membership.
If the issue is fixed and the issue originator isn't always the same, then
no real need for an investigation. Maybe the amount of text on the current
version fades a bit the two main concepts of "persistent" and
"intentional".
> While I haven't seen a proposal for establishing a system like LACNIC's
WARP under RIPE, I'd be
> open to the idea.
Great. Does anyone think this is a bad idea?
That would probably fall under the ncc-services-wg, so we'll have to see
:-)
> I fail to identify exactly were the proposal describes such a
need.
> Even so, the experts should be binded to NDAs... :-)
>
>
> While having the experts under NDA is a step in the right direction, it
still involves effectively being required to turn information over to external
parties due to the suspicions of some random AS. My concern isn't so
much that the
> information will be leaked; my concern is that, fundamentally, being
required to turn information over to a third party on someone's unsupported
suspicions seems wrong.
There should be enough "trail" to justify starting an investigation...
> Right now, the policy seems to pull a large amount of resources and
risk (per the impact analysis) without enough of a return.
The "proposal". It's just a proposal...! :-)
I agree that there isn't a way to measure how many people around the
world would not resort to hijacking if this proposal was in place today
:-)
Regards,
Carlos
> Jacob Slater
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Sep 9, 2019 at 3:45 PM Carlos Friaças <cfria...@fccn.pt> wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, 5 Sep 2019, Jacob Slater wrote:
>
> > All,
>
> Hi Jacob, All,
>
>
> > Given the number of people who may submit a report (anyone
receiving a
> > full table from their upstream(s), assuming the accused hijack
makes it
> > into the DFZ),
>
> If that happens, then potentially everyone can be a victim, yes.
> Then they should be able to place a report.
> But that's a fundamental part of why some changes are needed:
it's not
> only the legitimate address space owner who is the victim of an
hijack.
> People/networks whose packets are diverted by an hijack are also
victims
> of traffic interception.
>
> Afaik, this is possible within LACNIC (i.e. through
warp.lacnic.net). When
> the same proposal was discussed there, the yearly number of
reports (if
> i'm not mistaken) was on the scale of dozens -- and they have a
very high
> degree of helping stop/mitigate the incidents, almost close to
100%, which
> is fantastic!
>
>
> > I'm still concerned that the proposed policy would cause more
harm than
> > good. A random AS that happens to receive the announcement
isn't in an
> > authoritative position to know if a given announcement was
unauthorized.
>
> I can fully agree that a system based on (possibly forged) LOAs,
and
> unauthenticated IRR created the huge mess we are submerged in
today...
> :(((
>
>
> > Putting them through a reporting process that might well
require the
> > disclosure of internal information because of an unrelated
> > individual/group being suspicious is a problem.
>
> I fail to identify exactly were the proposal describes such a
need.
> Even so, the experts should be binded to NDAs... :-)
>
>
> Regards,
> Carlos
>
>
>
> > Combined with the issues detailed in the Impact Analysis, I'm
opposed to the policy as written.
> >
> > Jacob Slater
> >
> > On Thu, Sep 5, 2019 at 9:24 AM Marco Schmidt
<mschm...@ripe.net> wrote:
> > Dear colleagues,
> >
> > Policy proposal 2019-03, "Resource Hijacking is a RIPE Policy
Violation"
> > is now in the Review Phase.
> >
> > The goal of this proposal is to define that BGP hijacking
is not
> > accepted as normal practice within the RIPE NCC service
region.
> >
> > The proposal has been updated following the last round of
discussion and
> > is now at version v2.0. Some of the changes made to
version v1.0 include:
> > - Includes procedural steps for reporting and evaluation
of potential
> > hijacks
> > - Provides guidelines for external experts
> > - Adjusted title
> >
> > The RIPE NCC has prepared an impact analysis on this
latest proposal
> > version to support the community?s discussion. You can
find the full
> > proposal and impact analysis at:
> >
https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03
> >
https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03#impact-analysis
> >
> > And the draft documents at:
> >
https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03/draft
> >
> > As per the RIPE Policy Development Process (PDP), the
purpose of this
> > four week Review Phase is to continue discussion of the
proposal, taking
> > the impact analysis into consideration, and to review the
full draft
> > RIPE Policy Document.
> >
> > At the end of the Review Phase, the Working Group (WG)
Chairs will
> > determine whether the WG has reached rough consensus. It
is therefore
> > important to provide your opinion, even if it is simply a
restatement of
> > your input from the previous phase.
> >
> > We encourage you to read the proposal, impact analysis
and draft
> > document and send any comments to
<anti-abuse-wg@ripe.net> before 4
> > October 2019.
> >
> >
> > Kind regards,
> >
> > Marco Schmidt
> > Policy Officer
> > RIPE NCC
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>
