Hi Bas, Thank you for your quick reply. We have updated the document as described, and we noted some followup questions below. Note that we snipped items that have already been resolved.
> On Oct 9, 2025, at 2:21 PM, Bas Westerbaan > <[email protected]> wrote: > > In addition, the first line extends 3 characters beyond the margin. Please > let us know how the line can be broken. > > Current: > AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM-TYPE, ALGORITHM-TYPE:AlgorithmSet} ::= > SEQUENCE { > algorithm ALGORITHM-TYPE.id({AlgorithmSet}), > parameters ALGORITHM-TYPE. > Params({AlgorithmSet}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL > } Note that instead of breaking the line, we outdented — please let us know if you prefer otherwise. > 11) <!-- [rfced] Should "pre-hash" and "prehash" be consistent throughout? > For example: > > Original: > Pre-hash operation: > ... > Figure 2: Computeμ prehash operation > --> > > FIPS 204 uses “pre-hash”. Existing RFCs are not consistent. Let’s go for > “pre-hash”. We updated to use “pre-hash” except in the following: # Referred to as 'Externalμ-ML-DSA.Prehash(pk, M, ctx)' Please let us know if any updates are needed. > 14) <!-- [rfced] Please review <tt> throughout the document for correctness > and consistent use. Please see the list of <tt> use at the following > location: > https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881tt2.txt > > The list has been alphabetized and entries are listed only once (that is, > if <tt> is used multiple times for the same term, it is only listed once). We updated the items noted below based on your reply. However, please note that we did not closely review each item on the list. Please let us know if any additional updates are needed. > > Note that we did not review each item on the list. These are our notes and > questions on the items we checked: > > a) <tt>expanded</tt> - Should instances of <tt>expanded</tt> be > <tt>expandedKey</tt>? > > For example: > For each security level, > we show the seed-only format (using a context-specific <tt>[0]</tt> > primitive > tag with an implicit encoding of <tt>OCTET STRING</tt>), the > <tt>expanded</tt> > format, and <tt>both</tt> formats together.</t> > > Correct. > > b) <tt>seed</tt> - Should occurrences of "seed-only format" be > "<tt>seed</tt> format"? > > No. <t>seed</t> could be confused to include <t>both</t> format. > > For example: > For each security > level, we show the seed-only format (using a context-specific [0] > primitive tag with an implicit encoding of OCTET STRING), the > expanded format, and both formats together. > > b) <tt>OCTET STRING</tt> - seems to be used consistently in <tt> outside of > code > > Yes, that is fine. > > c) <tt>OneAsymmetricKey</tt> - Below are examples where "OneAsymmetricKey" > does not appear in <tt>: > > <t>When encoding an ML-DSA private key in a OneAsymmetricKey > object, any of these three formats may be used, though the seed format is > <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> for storage efficiency.</t> > > Note that these are the sizes of the raw keys, not including > ASN.1 encoding overhead from OneAsymmetricKey and SubjectPublicKeyInfo > Wrappers. > > Occurrences of OneAsymmetricKey can be put in <tt>. > > d) <tt>PUBLIC-KEY</tt> - seems to be used consistently in <tt> outside of > code > > Yes, that is fine. > > --> > 15) <!-- [rfced] Please review each artwork element and let us know if any > should be marked as sourcecode (or another element) instead. > > We updated a number of instances of <artwork> to <sourcecode type="asn.1">. > Please review closely and let us know if any corrections are needed. > > Changes look good. > > Please let us know if any instances of <artwork> should be <sourcecode> and > whether type="" should be set. The current list of types is available at > <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rpc/wiki/doku.php?id=sourcecode-types>. If it > does not contain an applicable type, then feel free to let us know. Note > that it is also acceptable to leave the "type" attribute not set. > --> > > Furthermore, the artwork element in Appendix D can be marked sourcecode with > type pseudocode. > > And the PEM examples in the Appendix C.3 can become type “x509”. We believe we have updated the sourcecode types correctly, but please double check — especially the PEM examples. The current files are available here: https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881.xml https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881.txt https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881.pdf https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881.html AUTH48 diffs: https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881-auth48diff.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881-auth48rfcdiff.html (side by side) Comprehensive diffs: https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881-diff.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881-rfcdiff.html (side by side) Thank you, Sandy Ginoza RFC Production Center > On Thu, Oct 9, 2025 at 3:00 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Authors, > > While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary) > the following questions, which are also in the source file. > > 1) <!-- [rfced] The AlgorithmIdentifier type defined in [RFC5912] includes > an "&" character before "Params". Please review and let us know if the > ampersand should be included in the first block of sourcecode. > > In addition, the first line extends 3 characters beyond the margin. Please > let us know how the line can be broken. > > Current: > AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM-TYPE, ALGORITHM-TYPE:AlgorithmSet} ::= > SEQUENCE { > algorithm ALGORITHM-TYPE.id({AlgorithmSet}), > parameters ALGORITHM-TYPE. > Params({AlgorithmSet}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL > } > > >From [RFC5912]: > AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM-TYPE, ALGORITHM-TYPE:AlgorithmSet} ::= > SEQUENCE { > algorithm ALGORITHM-TYPE.&id({AlgorithmSet}), > parameters ALGORITHM-TYPE. > &Params({AlgorithmSet}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL > } > --> > > > 2) <!-- [rfced] The following sentences makes it seem like this ASN.1 is > copied from [RFC5280], but this exact source code doesn't appear to be in > [RFC5280]. Perhaps the intent is to indicate the use "1988 ASN.1 syntax"? > > Current: > > As shown in the ASN.1 representation from [RFC5280] below, in an X.509 > certificate, a signature is encoded with an algorithm identifier in > the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a signatureValue attribute that > contains the actual signature. > > Certificate ::= SIGNED{ TBSCertificate } > > SIGNED{ToBeSigned} ::= SEQUENCE { > toBeSigned ToBeSigned, > algorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE { > algorithm SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM. > &id({SignatureAlgorithms}), > parameters SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM. > &Params({SignatureAlgorithms} > {@algorithmIdentifier.algorithm}) > OPTIONAL > }, > signature BIT STRING (CONTAINING SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM.&Value( > {SignatureAlgorithms} > {@algorithmIdentifier.algorithm})) > } > > Same issue occurs here: > > Current: > Signatures are also used in the CRL list ASN.1 representation from > [RFC5280] below. In a X.509 CRL, a signature is encoded with an > algorithm identifier in the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a > signatureValue attribute that contains the actual signature. > > CertificateList ::= SIGNED{ TBSCertList } > > --> > > > 3) <!-- [rfced] May we rephrase this as "deliver a secure implementation > with greater ease"? In addition, to what does "it" refer - perhaps it > should be "they"? > > Original: > While deliberate > design decisions such as these can help to deliver a greater ease of > secure implementation - particularly against side-channel attacks - > it does not necessarily provide resistance to more powerful attacks > such as differential power analysis. > --> > > > 4) <!-- [rfced] Should "key pair" be "keypair" here as used elsewhere in > the document? > > Original: > Non-repudiation refers to the assurance that the owner > of a signature key pair that was capable of generating an existing > signature corresponding to certain data cannot convincingly deny > having signed the data, unless its private key was compromised. > --> > > > 5) <!-- [rfced] [FIPS204] FYI: We have updated the date for this reference > from August 2023 to August 2024. We also replaced the original URL > (https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography) with the one > that points to the most recent version of FIPS 204 > (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.204.pdf). > --> > > > 6) <!-- [rfced] [CSOR] FYI: We updated the date for this reference from 20 > August 2024 to 13 June 2025 to match the date provided at the URL. > --> > > > 7) <!-- [rfced] [CDFFJ21] Please review. The original date for this > reference is 2021. The version of this paper in the Cryptology ePrint > Archive was updated in October 2023 (see the "Note" at this > URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1525). > > The 2021 version is available for free from IEEE - > https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9519420 > > Should this reference point to the updated (2023) version at the Cryptology > ePrint Archive or to the 2021 version of this paper? > --> > > > 8) <!-- [rfced] [NIST-PQC] FYI: We have updated the date for this reference > from 20 December 2016 to 28 July 2025 to match the date provided at the URL. > --> > > > 9) <!-- [rfced] Please consider whether "traditional" has a universal > meaning as used here: > > Instead of defining the strength of a quantum algorithm in a > traditional manner using the imprecise notion of bits of security, > NIST has instead elected to define security levels by picking a > reference scheme, which NIST expects to offer notable levels of > resistance to both quantum and classical attack. > --> > > > 10) <!-- [rfced] We are having trouble understanding "then" in this > sentence. Does it indicate a later step or perhaps it should be deleted > altogether? > > Original: > The second and third examples would not be detected by > implementations that do not regenerate the public key from the > private key, or neglect to then check consistency of tr or t_0. > > Perhaps A: > The second and third examples would not be detected by > implementations that do not regenerate the public key from the > private key and then neglect then check consistency of tr or t_0. > > Perhaps B: > The second and third examples would not be detected by > implementations that do not regenerate the public key from the > private key or that neglect to check consistency of tr or t_0. > --> > > > 11) <!-- [rfced] Should "pre-hash" and "prehash" be consistent throughout? > For example: > > Original: > Pre-hash operation: > ... > Figure 2: Computeμ prehash operation > --> > > > 12) <!-- [rfced] The following lines extended beyond 72 characters. We > folded the lines as follows. Please let us know if any corrections are > needed. > > Original: > # The functions `BytesToBits` and `IntegerToBytes` are defined in FIPS 204. > > Current: > # The functions `BytesToBits` and `IntegerToBytes` are defined > # in FIPS 204. > > > Original: > # ... identical to FIPS 204 Algorithm 7, but with Line 6 replaced with > > Current: > # ... identical to FIPS 204 Algorithm 7, but with Line 6 replaced > # with > --> > > > 13) <!-- [rfced] We are having trouble parsing "defaulting is Externalμ to > false". Please review. > > Original: > ML-DSA.Signμ_internal(sk, M', rnd, isExternalμ=false): > # μ can be passed as an argument instead of M' > # defaulting is Externalμ to false means that > # this modified version of Sign_internal can be used > # in place of the original without interfering with > # functioning of pure ML-DSA mode. > --> > > > 14) <!-- [rfced] Please review <tt> throughout the document for correctness > and consistent use. Please see the list of <tt> use at the following > location: > https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881tt2.txt > > The list has been alphabetized and entries are listed only once (that is, > if <tt> is used multiple times for the same term, it is only listed once). > > Note that we did not review each item on the list. These are our notes and > questions on the items we checked: > > a) <tt>expanded</tt> - Should instances of <tt>expanded</tt> be > <tt>expandedKey</tt>? > > For example: > For each security level, > we show the seed-only format (using a context-specific <tt>[0]</tt> > primitive > tag with an implicit encoding of <tt>OCTET STRING</tt>), the > <tt>expanded</tt> > format, and <tt>both</tt> formats together.</t> > > b) <tt>seed</tt> - Should occurrences of "seed-only format" be > "<tt>seed</tt> format"? > > For example: > For each security > level, we show the seed-only format (using a context-specific [0] > primitive tag with an implicit encoding of OCTET STRING), the > expanded format, and both formats together. > > b) <tt>OCTET STRING</tt> - seems to be used consistently in <tt> outside of > code > > c) <tt>OneAsymmetricKey</tt> - Below are examples where "OneAsymmetricKey" > does not appear in <tt>: > > <t>When encoding an ML-DSA private key in a OneAsymmetricKey > object, any of these three formats may be used, though the seed format is > <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> for storage efficiency.</t> > > Note that these are the sizes of the raw keys, not including > ASN.1 encoding overhead from OneAsymmetricKey and SubjectPublicKeyInfo > wrappers. > > d) <tt>PUBLIC-KEY</tt> - seems to be used consistently in <tt> outside of > code > > --> > > > 15) <!-- [rfced] Please review each artwork element and let us know if any > should be marked as sourcecode (or another element) instead. > > We updated a number of instances of <artwork> to <sourcecode type="asn.1">. > Please review closely and let us know if any corrections are needed. > > Please let us know if any instances of <artwork> should be <sourcecode> and > whether type="" should be set. The current list of types is available at > <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rpc/wiki/doku.php?id=sourcecode-types>. If it > does not contain an applicable type, then feel free to let us know. Note > that it is also acceptable to leave the "type" attribute not set. > --> > > > 16) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the online > Style Guide <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language> > and let us know if any changes are needed. Updates of this nature > typically result in more precise language, which is helpful for readers. > > Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this should > still be reviewed as a best practice. > --> > > > Thank you. > > RFC Production Center > > > On Oct 8, 2025, at 5:54 PM, [email protected] wrote: > > *****IMPORTANT***** > > Updated 2025/10/08 > > RFC Author(s): > -------------- > > Instructions for Completing AUTH48 > > Your document has now entered AUTH48. Once it has been reviewed and > approved by you and all coauthors, it will be published as an RFC. > If an author is no longer available, there are several remedies > available as listed in the FAQ (https://www.rfc-editor.org/faq/). > > You and you coauthors are responsible for engaging other parties > (e.g., Contributors or Working Group) as necessary before providing > your approval. > > Planning your review > --------------------- > > Please review the following aspects of your document: > > * RFC Editor questions > > Please review and resolve any questions raised by the RFC Editor > that have been included in the XML file as comments marked as > follows: > > <!-- [rfced] ... --> > > These questions will also be sent in a subsequent email. > > * Changes submitted by coauthors > > Please ensure that you review any changes submitted by your > coauthors. 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Please use ‘REPLY ALL’, > as all the parties CCed on this message need to see your approval. > > > Files > ----- > > The files are available here: > https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881.xml > https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881.html > https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881.pdf > https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881.txt > > Diff file of the text: > https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881-diff.html > https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881-rfcdiff.html (side by side) > > Diff of the XML: > https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9881-xmldiff1.html > > > Tracking progress > ----------------- > > The details of the AUTH48 status of your document are here: > https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9881 > > Please let us know if you have any questions. > > Thank you for your cooperation, > > RFC Editor > > -------------------------------------- > RFC9881 (draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-13) > > Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Algorithm > Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) > Author(s) : J. Massimo, P. Kampanakis, S. Turner, B. Westerbaan > WG Chair(s) : Russ Housley, Tim Hollebeek > Area Director(s) : Deb Cooley, Paul Wouters > > -- auth48archive mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
