Thanks for this Peter, really helpful. > It is a much more fundamental standard than Ordinals or Taproot Assets, in the sense that transaction replacement is expected to be used by essentially all wallets as all wallets have to deal with fee-rate fluctuations; I do not think that Ordinals or Taproot assets are appropriate BIP material due to their niche use-case.
Yes I'd personally lean towards this view too. Certainly when you go into alternative asset territory (e.g. Counterparty, Liquid (Network) assets, Taproot assets) it is moving away from what you can do with the Bitcoin asset/currency and into building a new ecosystem with a different asset/currency. I would agree that that should probably be out of scope for *Bitcoin* Improvement Proposals without having any particular opinion on the utility of any of those ecosystems. > just the other day I ran into someone that didn't know RBF Rule #6 existed, which Core added on top of BIP-125, and had made a mistake in their safety analysis of a protocol due to that. I suspected this might be the case but to actually have a data point to back that up (beyond I personally find it unnecessarily confusing and hard to follow) is helpful, thanks. > Finally, I think the lesson to be learned here is that mempool policy is > better served by *living* documentation that gets updated to reflect the real world. There's no easy way for someone to get up to speed on what mempool policy is actually implemented, and more importantly, *why* it is implemented and what trade-offs were made to get there. It's quite possible that this "living documentation" requirement rules out the BIP process. I get the "living", evolving point. Policy proposals are definitely different to say consensus proposals where assuming they are ever activated you'd expect them to stay static for the rest of Bitcoin's existence barring minor cleanups, clarifications etc. However, one possible addition in a new BIP 3 process would be the introduction of versioning for a particular BIP e.g. BIP 789 version 2 which would be more conducive to these evolving proposals such as policy proposals. You could then update a BIP without needing a new BIP number for every material update. I'll wait to hear what Luke thinks on this. Beyond the friction concern I think improving the BIP process for consensus and policy proposals would be the biggest potential win for a BIP 3 update. Thanks also to Kalle too for his 18 month stint as a BIP editor :) -- Michael Folkson Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin On Thursday, 18 January 2024 at 18:00, Peter Todd <p...@petertodd.org> wrote: > On Wed, Jan 17, 2024 at 05:29:48PM +0000, Michael Folkson via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > > Hey Luke > > > > I'd be happy to pick up working on BIP 3 again ([0], [1]) in light of this > > issue and others that are repeatedly cropping up (e.g. confusion on the > > recommended flow for working on proposed consensus changes, when to open a > > pull request to bitcoin-inquisition, when to open a pull request to Core, > > when to include/exclude activation params etc). > > > > I don't think there is much I personally disagree with you on with regards > > to BIPs but one issue where I do think there is disagreement is on whether > > proposed default policy changes can/should be BIPed. > > > > I previously drafted this on proposed default policy changes [2]: > > > > "To address problems such as pinning attacks on Lightning and multiparty > > protocols (e.g. vaults) there are and will continue to be draft proposals > > on changing the default policy rules in Bitcoin Core and/or alternative > > implementations. As these proposals are for default policy rules and not > > consensus rules there is absolutely no obligation for Bitcoin Core and/or > > alternative implementations to change their default policy rules nor users > > to run any particular policy rules (default or otherwise). The authors of > > these draft proposals are clearly recommending what they think the default > > policy rules should be and what policy rules users should run but it is > > merely a recommendation. There are a lot of moving parts, subtleties and > > complexities involved in designing default policy rules so any > > recommendation(s) to significantly upgrade default policy rules would > > benefit from being subject to a spec process. This would also aid the > > review of any policy related pull requests in Bitcoin Co re and/or alternative implementations. An interesting recent case study washttps://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/22665and Bitcoin Core not implementing the exact wording of BIP 125 RBF. In this case (for various reasons) as a response Bitcoin Core just removed references to BIP 125 and started documenting the replacement to BIP 125 rules in the Bitcoin Core repo instead. However, it is my view that recommendations for default policy rules should be recommendations to all implementations, reviewed by Lightning and multiparty protocol developers (not just Bitcoin Core) and hence they would benefit from being standardized and being subject to a specification process. I will reiterate once again though that policy rules are not consensus rules. Consensus rules are much closer to an obligation as divergences from consensus rules risk the user being forked off the blockchain and could ultimately end up in network splits. This does not apply to policy rules." > > > > Are you open to adjusting your stance on proposed policy changes being > > BIPed? I do think it really stunts work on proposed default policy changes > > and people's ability to follow work on these proposals when the > > specifications for them are littered all over the place. I've certainly > > struggled to follow the latest state of V3 policy proposals without clear > > reference points for the latest state of these proposals e.g. [3]. In > > addition some proposed consensus change BIPs are starting to want to > > include sections on policy (e.g. BIP345, OP_VAULT [4]) where it would be > > much better if they could just refer to a separate policy BIP rather than > > including proposals for both policy and consensus in the same BIP. > > > BIP-125 is I think an interesting case study. It is a much more fundamental > standard than Ordinals or Taproot Assets, in the sense that transaction > replacement is expected to be used by essentially all wallets as all wallets > have to deal with fee-rate fluctuations; I do not think that Ordinals or > Taproot assets are appropriate BIP material due to their niche use-case. > > The V3 proposal, and ephemeral anchors, would be expected to be used by a wide > range of contracting protocols, most notably lightning. This isn't quite as > broad usage as BIP-124 RBF. But it is close. And yes, Core making changes to > what is essentially BIP125 has an impact: just the other day I ran into > someone > that didn't know RBF Rule #6 existed, which Core added on top of BIP-125, and > had made a mistake in their safety analysis of a protocol due to that. > > Meanwhile, engineering documentation on V3 is extremely lacking, with basics > like worked through use-case examples not being available. We don't even have > solid agreement let alone documentation on how Lightning channels are meant to > use V3 transactions and what the trade-offs are. And that has lead to mistaken > claims, such as overstating(1) the benefit V3 transactions in their current > form have for transaction pinning. > > I don't think V3 necessarily needs a formal BIP. But it would benefit from a > proper engineering process where use-cases are actually worked out and > analyzed > properly. > > Finally, I think the lesson to be learned here is that mempool policy is > better > served by living documentation that gets updated to reflect the real world. > There's no easy way for someone to get up to speed on what mempool policy is > actually implemented, and more importantly, why it is implemented and what > trade-offs were made to get there. It's quite possible that this "living > documentation" requirement rules out the BIP process. > > 1) https://petertodd.org/2023/v3-txs-pinning-vulnerability > > -- > https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
