LGTM3 On Wed, Feb 21, 2024 at 9:01 PM Domenic Denicola <dome...@chromium.org> wrote:
> LGTM2 > > On Thu, Feb 22, 2024 at 5:20 AM Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) < > yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote: > >> LGTM1 >> >> Thanks for diving into the samples. Sounds like the breakage risk here is >> indeed low. >> >> On Wed, Feb 21, 2024 at 8:15 PM Brad Triebwasser <btri...@chromium.org> >> wrote: >> >>> Sure, I checked 10 unique origins (skipping duplicate pu707ev.com >>> subdomains which make up half of the sampled domains) listed in >>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4448. >>> >>> 4 of them reference: >>> https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/cffgnu/qhdd/asset/responsive.min.js. I >>> won't post all the code here, but you can see it querying a list of >>> permissions, with a .catch() shortly after. Evidence of fingerprinting, >>> but does handle exceptions. >>> 1 on the root page <https://app.webscrapingapi.com/login> listed all >>> permissions (and specifically >>> referenced >>> third_party/blink/renderer/modules/permissions/permission_descriptor.idl); >>> Looks like fingerprinting. It has a catch following the >>> navigator.permissions.query call. >>> 1 had a library >>> <https://klempner-verband.de/assets/js/app.js?id=a58e3fa4bf16bb1db6a6.js>checking >>> every permission with navigator.permissions.query with a corresponding >>> catch handler. >>> 2 referenced https://fs.pudaf.com/fp.js. This was a little more >>> obfuscated and I can't tell if exceptions are handled, but looking at the >>> code, there is a ton of evidence suggesting fingerprinting (iterating over >>> every permission, navigator properties, etc.). I tried in Firefox, and >>> didn't observe any unhandled exceptions even though the debugger did pass >>> that point in the code. >>> 2 used a similar highly obfuscated library >>> <https://ebarter.pro/app/js/dd.js> which contains the "window-placement >>> string" but I did not see any corresponding permissions.query call, so >>> results are inconclusive, but the sites did load in firefox with no >>> unhandled exceptions on the missing window-placement permission. >>> >>> Out of 10 sampled origins, 8 were obvious fingerprinting, 8 had >>> exception handling, 2 were too obfuscated to be conclusive. >>> >>> Regards, >>> Brad >>> >>> On Tue, Feb 20, 2024 at 11:01 PM Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) < >>> yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 8:32:33 PM UTC+1 Brad Triebwasser >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> [Premature Send. Full message below] >>>> >>>> We are tracking UMA for when the permission name "window-placement" is >>>> parsed (e.g all calls to navigator.permissions.query({name: >>>> 'window-placement'}) increment the counter. That function will throw >>>> an exception *"The provided value 'window-placement' is not a valid >>>> enum value of type PermissionName." *once we remove the permission. So >>>> based on the metrics, 0.006% of page loads that aren't handling the >>>> exception could break. I strongly suspect most sites would have exception >>>> handling since no other browser has implemented this permission string. >>>> >>>> >>>> Would it be possible to manually inspect a few samples to see how many >>>> of these sites properly handle the exception? >>>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4448 >>>> seems to have a list of 100+ origins >>>> >>>> >>>> We are also tracking UMA for window-placement permission policy. So >>>> everytime the browser parcels "window-placement" in a header (e.g. >>>> Permissions-Policy: >>>> window-placement=(self)) or in an iframe (e.g. <iframe src=" >>>> https://example.com"; allow="window-placement"></iframe>), the counter >>>> is incremented. So ~0.015% of page loads are parsing the window-placement >>>> policy. This scenario would not explicitly break a page, but the policy >>>> would silently be ignored and the corresponding permission denied if the >>>> site did not also have window-management specified. Again, no other browser >>>> has implemented this string, so I suspect sites legitimately using this >>>> would have some kind of fallback for non-chromium browsers anyway. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> Brad >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Feb 20, 2024 at 11:24 AM Brad Triebwasser <btri...@chromium.org> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Certainly. >>>> >>>> We are tracking UMA both for when the permission name >>>> "window-placement" is parsed (e.g all calls to navigator.permissions. >>>> query({name: 'window-placement'}) increment the counter. That function >>>> will throw an exception *"The provided value 'window-placement' is not >>>> a valid enum value of type PermissionName."* >>>> >>>> On Mon, Feb 19, 2024 at 12:10 PM Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) < >>>> yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Feb 16, 2024 at 8:19 PM Brad Triebwasser <btri...@chromium.org> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Usage for the legacy permission and permission policy are ~0.006 >>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4448> >>>> and ~0.015 >>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4450> >>>> >>>> >>>> Can you detail what these two different counters represent? >>>> Our typical threshold is about half of the lower one (~0.0003%), but >>>> that varies based on the potential breakage. >>>> >>>> What would breakage here look like? >>>> >>>> >>>> (% page loads) while the new variants are ~1.166 >>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4447> >>>> and ~3.066 >>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4449> (% >>>> page loads) respectively, so the main metric for potential breakage here is >>>> 0.006% of page loads. 0.006% seems low in my opinion, but I'm curious if >>>> there is any guidance on a lower target % we should be aiming for prior to >>>> removing this feature. >>>> >>>> I separately calculated that the 200 origins make up about 0.0058% of >>>> total origins tracked by UKM (if that's what you're asking), which aligns >>>> with the UMA figures. I also want to note that 50 of those origins are >>>> likely the same (spam?) website (e.g. https://aaaa123.com, >>>> https://aaaa124.com, https://aaaa125.com). You can see examples of >>>> this in the UMA sample data >>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4448>. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> Brad >>>> >>>> On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 12:42 AM Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) < >>>> yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>> >>>> 200 origins sounds like a lot. Do you know what %age of page views >>>> those origins would represent? >>>> >>>> On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 11:32 PM Brad Triebwasser <btri...@chromium.org> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> *tl;dr:* We expect at most 200 origins could break, and only ~30 of >>>> those may be legitimately using the API. >>>> >>>> We do track UMA/UKM for the primary API entrypoint function ( >>>> GetScreenDetails >>>> <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Window/getScreenDetails>) >>>> which we expect nearly all legitimate usage of the API to use. We see 60 >>>> unique origins invoking GetScreenDetails, dominated by a handful of >>>> origins (which align with the partners we know are using the API). >>>> >>>> For reference, 2500 unique origins are checking the window-management >>>> permission, and 200 unique origins checking the old window-placement >>>> permission (82% of those origins are *not *logging any GetScreenDetails >>>> calls). >>>> >>>> As Mike mentioned, the only breakage here would be a site using >>>> navigator.permissions.query({name: 'window-placement'}) without error >>>> handling which according to UKM data would be roughly 200 origins (at most >>>> 18% of those may be legitimately using the API). >>>> >>>> I believe 200 unique origins is a relatively low number of potential >>>> breakages, especially considering our data strongly suggests a majority of >>>> that is fingerprinting. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> Brad >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 6:27 AM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Agree that the risk feels low... one thing to perhaps check for (if you >>>> have UKM or use counters) is to see if there is any legit usage on sites of >>>> `navigator.permissions.query()` that isn't catching errors, since that >>>> will throw a TypeError and can break a page. >>>> On 2/12/24 9:16 AM, Rick Byers wrote: >>>> >>>> Presumably the risk of legitimate breakage here is bounded by the use >>>> of the Window Management API, right? Are there any UseCounters for the >>>> various Window Management operations? I couldn't find any at a quick >>>> glance. I imagine legitimate usage is dominated by a few sites with an >>>> obvious need (do we have UKM data?), and such sites should always degrade >>>> gracefully without window management capabilities, right? >>>> >>>> My intuition is that the compat risk here should be extremely low, but >>>> I hope we have some data to validate that which isn't tainted by the >>>> fingerprinting usage. >>>> >>>> Rick >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Feb 7, 2024 at 1:59 PM Brad Triebwasser <btri...@chromium.org> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> +blink-dev@chromium.org <blink-dev@chromium.org> / Reply All >>>> >>>> Thanks for your feedback, Mike! Recipes inline: >>>> >>>> On Tue, Feb 6, 2024 at 9:36 PM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Brad, >>>> On 2/6/24 3:49 PM, Brad Triebwasser wrote: >>>> >>>> Contact emails >>>> >>>> btri...@chromium.org >>>> >>>> Explainer >>>> >>>> https://github.com/w3c/window-management/blob/main/ >>>> EXPLAINER_spec_and_permission_rename.md >>>> >>>> Specification >>>> >>>> https://w3c.github.io/window-management/#api-permission-api-integration >>>> >>>> Summary >>>> >>>> Removes the legacy "window-placement" alias for permission and >>>> permission policy "window-management". This is a follow-up to >>>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5146352391028736 and corresponding >>>> blink-dev PSA >>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/Hf2b1-S39Uw/m/YAEC_0DSBQAJ>. >>>> The "window-placement" alias has been showing console deprecation warnings >>>> since M113 >>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/13204be718225ae09c8ba7e36b055a369c36c878>. >>>> We will disable WindowPlacementPermissionAlias >>>> <https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:third_party/blink/renderer/platform/runtime_enabled_features.json5?q=-f:gen%2F%20AND%20-f:out%2F%20WindowPlacementPermissionAlias> >>>> by default, and remove the flag and legacy code shortly thereafter. >>>> >>>> I'm a little bit confused here - it seems like the PSA of the alias is >>>> being treated as the beginning of a deprecation, is that correct? My >>>> interpretation of "will lead to a deprecation and removal" from the >>>> original message was that it would be followed with an Intent to Deprecate >>>> and Remove (per https://www.chromium.org/blink/launching-features/# >>>> deprecate), but it seems like that step of the process was skipped. >>>> >>>> Yes, I never sent out a separate "Intent to Deprecate" in this case. >>>> The original PSA >>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/Hf2b1-S39Uw/m/YAEC_0DSBQAJ> >>>> was >>>> intended to be a hybrid of the introduction of the new names and >>>> deprecation of the old ones so we also landed deprecation code (DevTools >>>> deprecation warnings etc.) during that time. Since these have already been >>>> "deprecated" since M113, I wasn't sure if a separate "intent to deprecate" >>>> was appropriate in this case since we already deprecated them and monitored >>>> usage to be sufficiently low, but I can back-up and send an I2D if >>>> recommended here. >>>> >>>> >>>> Blink component >>>> >>>> Blink>Screen>MultiScreen >>>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3EScreen%3EMultiScreen> >>>> >>>> TAG review >>>> >>>> No feedback was specifically requested for the permission rename, >>>> however related TAG reviews have been requested with both the old (1 >>>> <https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/413>, 2 >>>> <https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/602>) and new >>>> terminology (3 <https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/840>). >>>> >>>> TAG review status >>>> >>>> Not applicable >>>> >>>> Risks >>>> Interoperability and Compatibility >>>> >>>> There are low compatibility risks. Usage for the legacy permission and >>>> permission policy are ~0.006 >>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4448> >>>> and ~0.015 >>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4450> (% >>>> page loads) while the new variants are ~1.166 >>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4447> >>>> and ~3.066 >>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4449> (% >>>> page loads) respectively, indicating most usage has already migrated. >>>> >>>> These percentages are still relatively high, especially for the >>>> permissions policy variant. Besides the obvious fingerprint.js usage (which >>>> shouldn't break pages... I would hope), can you describe what the failure >>>> mode is after the proposed removal is? Have you dug into the remaining >>>> usage to verify? >>>> Yes, I dug into the remaining usage quite extensively via Web Archive >>>> queries and UKM and couldn't find any usages other than what looked like >>>> fingerprinting. After removal, the permission API will produce an error due >>>> to an unknown permission, and the permission policy will silently fail >>>> (e.g. iframes with allow='window-placement' will not have access to the >>>> features). I beleive that the numbers shifting several orders of magnitude >>>> in favor of the new strings seems to indicate legitamite usage has >>>> migrated, and the remainig usage likely fingerprinting. >>>> >>>> Gecko: No signal >>>> >>>> Firefox has not implemented the API and corresponding permission yet. >>>> The original API signal request is here >>>> <https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/542>. >>>> >>>> WebKit: No signal >>>> >>>> Safari has not implemented the API and corresponding permission yet. >>>> The original API signal request is here >>>> <https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/117>. >>>> >>>> Mind linking to the original API position requests here in this thread? >>>> Added links above to the original API signal request. FWIW, we have >>>> since filed additional requests for functionality related to window >>>> management, not necessarily window *placement* related (hence >>>> motivation for renaming the API): eg 1 >>>> <https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/96> 2 >>>> <https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/712> >>>> >>>> >>>> Web developers: We have communicated internally with partners using >>>> the API who have expressed commitment to updating the permission strings in >>>> their code. >>>> >>>> Other signals: Positive comment >>>> <https://github.com/w3c/window-placement/pull/115#pullrequestreview-1159676614> >>>> from W3C WG Chair >>>> >>>> WebView application risks >>>> >>>> This is considered low risk. It removes an alias without any change in >>>> behavior of the underlying API. >>>> >>>> Does this permission do anything on WebView? I would have guessed no. >>>> Your correct, this window management API doesn't apply to WebView so >>>> there is no impact there. >>>> >>>> >>>> Debuggability >>>> >>>> Disabling WindowPlacementPermissionAlias >>>> <https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:third_party/blink/renderer/platform/runtime_enabled_features.json5?q=-f:gen%2F%20AND%20-f:out%2F%20WindowPlacementPermissionAlias> >>>> will stop DevTools deprecation warnings for usage of the legacy strings and >>>> instead will act as if they did not exist at all (e.g. Permission API will >>>> produce an error when using "window-placement"). >>>> >>>> >>>> Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, >>>> Mac, Linux, ChromeOS, Android, and Android WebView)? >>>> >>>> No. This feature is not supported on Android. >>>> >>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> >>>> ? >>>> >>>> Yes. Web Platform tests have already been migrated to the new alias: >>>> >>>> https://github.com/web-platform-tests/wpt/tree/master/window-management >>>> >>>> Flag name on chrome://flags >>>> >>>> None >>>> >>>> Finch feature name >>>> >>>> WindowPlacementPermissionAlias >>>> >>>> Requires code in //chrome? >>>> >>>> False >>>> >>>> Tracking bug >>>> >>>> https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1328581 >>>> >>>> Estimated milestones >>>> >>>> M123 (flag disable) M125 (flag/code removal) >>>> >>>> Anticipated spec changes >>>> >>>> None >>>> >>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status >>>> >>>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5137018030391296 >>>> >>>> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status >>>> <https://chromestatus.com/>. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ >>>> chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUCdqsmmEhBROkinxbzTULFPX >>>> nC8goANs6-_O8n3%2B%3D47hQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUCdqsmmEhBROkinxbzTULFPXnC8goANs6-_O8n3%2B%3D47hQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>> . >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ >>>> chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUBYrF50-%3Dp8umAxQLaEttR- >>>> jW4WRfWyF5AATV2p29w17w%40mail.gmail.com >>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUBYrF50-%3Dp8umAxQLaEttR-jW4WRfWyF5AATV2p29w17w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>> . >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ >>>> chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUDd9YoriLSXG3h7usjpyJThZ >>>> 4W3%2BixTCdVK2PhS0p9_Rw%40mail.gmail.com >>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUDd9YoriLSXG3h7usjpyJThZ4W3%2BixTCdVK2PhS0p9_Rw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>> . >>>> >>>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "blink-dev" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAOmohS%2BkYoJShdaKKonG1pZasT4vg7enXWdh%2BU8FNeVTmyPKWw%40mail.gmail.com >> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAOmohS%2BkYoJShdaKKonG1pZasT4vg7enXWdh%2BU8FNeVTmyPKWw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "blink-dev" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAM0wra8E3Fct43ED1Se82h3CE3x2oNahe9xOkztC%3DFEAV7XTpg%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAM0wra8E3Fct43ED1Se82h3CE3x2oNahe9xOkztC%3DFEAV7XTpg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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