Usage for the legacy permission and permission policy are ~0.006 <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4448> and ~0.015 <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4450> (% page loads) while the new variants are ~1.166 <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4447> and ~3.066 <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4449> (% page loads) respectively, so the main metric for potential breakage here is 0.006% of page loads. 0.006% seems low in my opinion, but I'm curious if there is any guidance on a lower target % we should be aiming for prior to removing this feature.
I separately calculated that the 200 origins make up about 0.0058% of total origins tracked by UKM (if that's what you're asking), which aligns with the UMA figures. I also want to note that 50 of those origins are likely the same (spam?) website (e.g. https://aaaa123.com, https://aaaa124.com, https://aaaa125.com). You can see examples of this in the UMA sample data <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4448>. Regards, Brad On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 12:42 AM Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) < yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote: > 200 origins sounds like a lot. Do you know what %age of page views those > origins would represent? > > On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 11:32 PM Brad Triebwasser <btri...@chromium.org> > wrote: > >> *tl;dr:* We expect at most 200 origins could break, and only ~30 of >> those may be legitimately using the API. >> >> We do track UMA/UKM for the primary API entrypoint function ( >> GetScreenDetails >> <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Window/getScreenDetails>) >> which we expect nearly all legitimate usage of the API to use. We see 60 >> unique origins invoking GetScreenDetails, dominated by a handful of >> origins (which align with the partners we know are using the API). >> >> For reference, 2500 unique origins are checking the window-management >> permission, and 200 unique origins checking the old window-placement >> permission (82% of those origins are *not *logging any GetScreenDetails >> calls). >> >> As Mike mentioned, the only breakage here would be a site using >> navigator.permissions.query({name: >> 'window-placement'}) without error handling which according to UKM data >> would be roughly 200 origins (at most 18% of those may be >> legitimately using the API). >> >> I believe 200 unique origins is a relatively low number of potential >> breakages, especially considering our data strongly suggests a majority of >> that is fingerprinting. >> >> Regards, >> Brad >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 6:27 AM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> >> wrote: >> >>> Agree that the risk feels low... one thing to perhaps check for (if you >>> have UKM or use counters) is to see if there is any legit usage on sites of >>> `navigator.permissions.query()` that isn't catching errors, since that will >>> throw a TypeError and can break a page. >>> On 2/12/24 9:16 AM, Rick Byers wrote: >>> >>> Presumably the risk of legitimate breakage here is bounded by the use of >>> the Window Management API, right? Are there any UseCounters for the various >>> Window Management operations? I couldn't find any at a quick glance. I >>> imagine legitimate usage is dominated by a few sites with an obvious need >>> (do we have UKM data?), and such sites should always degrade gracefully >>> without window management capabilities, right? >>> >>> My intuition is that the compat risk here should be extremely low, but I >>> hope we have some data to validate that which isn't tainted by the >>> fingerprinting usage. >>> >>> Rick >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Feb 7, 2024 at 1:59 PM Brad Triebwasser <btri...@chromium.org> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> +blink-dev@chromium.org <blink-dev@chromium.org> / Reply All >>>> >>>> Thanks for your feedback, Mike! Recipes inline: >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Feb 6, 2024 at 9:36 PM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Brad, >>>>>> On 2/6/24 3:49 PM, Brad Triebwasser wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Contact emails >>>>>> >>>>>> btri...@chromium.org >>>>>> >>>>>> Explainer >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://github.com/w3c/window-management/blob/main/EXPLAINER_spec_and_permission_rename.md >>>>>> >>>>>> Specification >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://w3c.github.io/window-management/#api-permission-api-integration >>>>>> >>>>>> Summary >>>>>> >>>>>> Removes the legacy "window-placement" alias for permission and >>>>>> permission policy "window-management". This is a follow-up to >>>>>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5146352391028736 and corresponding >>>>>> blink-dev PSA >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/Hf2b1-S39Uw/m/YAEC_0DSBQAJ>. >>>>>> The "window-placement" alias has been showing console deprecation >>>>>> warnings >>>>>> since M113 >>>>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/13204be718225ae09c8ba7e36b055a369c36c878>. >>>>>> We will disable WindowPlacementPermissionAlias >>>>>> <https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:third_party/blink/renderer/platform/runtime_enabled_features.json5?q=-f:gen%2F%20AND%20-f:out%2F%20WindowPlacementPermissionAlias> >>>>>> by default, and remove the flag and legacy code shortly thereafter. >>>>>> >>>>>> I'm a little bit confused here - it seems like the PSA of the alias >>>>>> is being treated as the beginning of a deprecation, is that correct? My >>>>>> interpretation of "will lead to a deprecation and removal" from the >>>>>> original message was that it would be followed with an Intent to >>>>>> Deprecate >>>>>> and Remove (per >>>>>> https://www.chromium.org/blink/launching-features/#deprecate), but >>>>>> it seems like that step of the process was skipped. >>>>>> >>>>> Yes, I never sent out a separate "Intent to Deprecate" in this case. >>>>> The original PSA >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/Hf2b1-S39Uw/m/YAEC_0DSBQAJ> >>>>> was >>>>> intended to be a hybrid of the introduction of the new names and >>>>> deprecation of the old ones so we also landed deprecation code (DevTools >>>>> deprecation warnings etc.) during that time. Since these have already been >>>>> "deprecated" since M113, I wasn't sure if a separate "intent to deprecate" >>>>> was appropriate in this case since we already deprecated them and >>>>> monitored >>>>> usage to be sufficiently low, but I can back-up and send an I2D if >>>>> recommended here. >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Blink component >>>>>> >>>>>> Blink>Screen>MultiScreen >>>>>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3EScreen%3EMultiScreen> >>>>>> >>>>>> TAG review >>>>>> >>>>>> No feedback was specifically requested for the permission rename, >>>>>> however related TAG reviews have been requested with both the old (1 >>>>>> <https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/413>, 2 >>>>>> <https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/602>) and new >>>>>> terminology (3 <https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/840> >>>>>> ). >>>>>> >>>>>> TAG review status >>>>>> >>>>>> Not applicable >>>>>> >>>>>> Risks >>>>>> Interoperability and Compatibility >>>>>> >>>>>> There are low compatibility risks. Usage for the legacy permission >>>>>> and permission policy are ~0.006 >>>>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4448> >>>>>> and ~0.015 >>>>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4450> >>>>>> (% page loads) while the new variants are ~1.166 >>>>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4447> >>>>>> and ~3.066 >>>>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4449> >>>>>> (% page loads) respectively, indicating most usage has already migrated. >>>>>> >>>>>> These percentages are still relatively high, especially for the >>>>>> permissions policy variant. Besides the obvious fingerprint.js usage >>>>>> (which >>>>>> shouldn't break pages... I would hope), can you describe what the failure >>>>>> mode is after the proposed removal is? Have you dug into the remaining >>>>>> usage to verify? >>>>>> Yes, I dug into the remaining usage quite extensively via Web Archive >>>>>> queries and UKM and couldn't find any usages other than what looked like >>>>>> fingerprinting. After removal, the permission API will produce an error >>>>>> due >>>>>> to an unknown permission, and the permission policy will silently fail >>>>>> (e.g. iframes with allow='window-placement' will not have access to the >>>>>> features). I beleive that the numbers shifting several orders of >>>>>> magnitude >>>>>> in favor of the new strings seems to indicate legitamite usage has >>>>>> migrated, and the remainig usage likely fingerprinting. >>>>>> >>>>>> Gecko: No signal >>>>>> >>>>>> Firefox has not implemented the API and corresponding permission yet. >>>>>> The original API signal request is here >>>>>> <https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/542>. >>>>>> >>>>>> WebKit: No signal >>>>>> >>>>>> Safari has not implemented the API and corresponding permission yet. >>>>>> The original API signal request is here >>>>>> <https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/117>. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mind linking to the original API position requests here in this >>>>>> thread? >>>>>> Added links above to the original API signal request. FWIW, we have >>>>>> since filed additional requests for functionality related to window >>>>>> management, not necessarily window *placement* related (hence >>>>>> motivation for renaming the API): eg 1 >>>>>> <https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/96> 2 >>>>>> <https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/712> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Web developers: We have communicated internally with partners using >>>>>> the API who have expressed commitment to updating the permission strings >>>>>> in >>>>>> their code. >>>>>> >>>>>> Other signals: Positive comment >>>>>> <https://github.com/w3c/window-placement/pull/115#pullrequestreview-1159676614> >>>>>> from W3C WG Chair >>>>>> >>>>>> WebView application risks >>>>>> >>>>>> This is considered low risk. It removes an alias without any change >>>>>> in behavior of the underlying API. >>>>>> >>>>>> Does this permission do anything on WebView? I would have guessed no. >>>>>> Your correct, this window management API doesn't apply to WebView so >>>>>> there is no impact there. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Debuggability >>>>>> >>>>>> Disabling WindowPlacementPermissionAlias >>>>>> <https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:third_party/blink/renderer/platform/runtime_enabled_features.json5?q=-f:gen%2F%20AND%20-f:out%2F%20WindowPlacementPermissionAlias> >>>>>> will stop DevTools deprecation warnings for usage of the legacy strings >>>>>> and >>>>>> instead will act as if they did not exist at all (e.g. Permission API >>>>>> will >>>>>> produce an error when using "window-placement"). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, >>>>>> Mac, Linux, ChromeOS, Android, and Android WebView)? >>>>>> >>>>>> No. This feature is not supported on Android. >>>>>> >>>>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >>>>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> >>>>>> ? >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes. Web Platform tests have already been migrated to the new alias: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://github.com/web-platform-tests/wpt/tree/master/window-management >>>>>> >>>>>> Flag name on chrome://flags >>>>>> >>>>>> None >>>>>> >>>>>> Finch feature name >>>>>> >>>>>> WindowPlacementPermissionAlias >>>>>> >>>>>> Requires code in //chrome? >>>>>> >>>>>> False >>>>>> >>>>>> Tracking bug >>>>>> >>>>>> https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1328581 >>>>>> >>>>>> Estimated milestones >>>>>> >>>>>> M123 (flag disable) M125 (flag/code removal) >>>>>> >>>>>> Anticipated spec changes >>>>>> >>>>>> None >>>>>> >>>>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status >>>>>> >>>>>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5137018030391296 >>>>>> >>>>>> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status >>>>>> <https://chromestatus.com/>. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUCdqsmmEhBROkinxbzTULFPXnC8goANs6-_O8n3%2B%3D47hQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUCdqsmmEhBROkinxbzTULFPXnC8goANs6-_O8n3%2B%3D47hQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>> . >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUBYrF50-%3Dp8umAxQLaEttR-jW4WRfWyF5AATV2p29w17w%40mail.gmail.com >>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUBYrF50-%3Dp8umAxQLaEttR-jW4WRfWyF5AATV2p29w17w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>> . >>>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "blink-dev" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUDd9YoriLSXG3h7usjpyJThZ4W3%2BixTCdVK2PhS0p9_Rw%40mail.gmail.com >> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUDd9YoriLSXG3h7usjpyJThZ4W3%2BixTCdVK2PhS0p9_Rw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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