Sure, I checked 10 unique origins (skipping duplicate pu707ev.com subdomains which make up half of the sampled domains) listed in https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4448.
4 of them reference: https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/cffgnu/qhdd/asset/responsive.min.js. I won't post all the code here, but you can see it querying a list of permissions, with a .catch() shortly after. Evidence of fingerprinting, but does handle exceptions. 1 on the root page <https://app.webscrapingapi.com/login> listed all permissions (and specifically referenced third_party/blink/renderer/modules/permissions/permission_descriptor.idl); Looks like fingerprinting. It has a catch following the navigator.permissions.query call. 1 had a library <https://klempner-verband.de/assets/js/app.js?id=a58e3fa4bf16bb1db6a6.js>checking every permission with navigator.permissions.query with a corresponding catch handler. 2 referenced https://fs.pudaf.com/fp.js. This was a little more obfuscated and I can't tell if exceptions are handled, but looking at the code, there is a ton of evidence suggesting fingerprinting (iterating over every permission, navigator properties, etc.). I tried in Firefox, and didn't observe any unhandled exceptions even though the debugger did pass that point in the code. 2 used a similar highly obfuscated library <https://ebarter.pro/app/js/dd.js> which contains the "window-placement string" but I did not see any corresponding permissions.query call, so results are inconclusive, but the sites did load in firefox with no unhandled exceptions on the missing window-placement permission. Out of 10 sampled origins, 8 were obvious fingerprinting, 8 had exception handling, 2 were too obfuscated to be conclusive. Regards, Brad On Tue, Feb 20, 2024 at 11:01 PM Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) < yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote: > > > On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 8:32:33 PM UTC+1 Brad Triebwasser wrote: > > [Premature Send. Full message below] > > We are tracking UMA for when the permission name "window-placement" is > parsed (e.g all calls to navigator.permissions.query({name: > 'window-placement'}) increment the counter. That function will throw an > exception *"The provided value 'window-placement' is not a valid enum > value of type PermissionName." *once we remove the permission. So based > on the metrics, 0.006% of page loads that aren't handling the exception > could break. I strongly suspect most sites would have exception handling > since no other browser has implemented this permission string. > > > Would it be possible to manually inspect a few samples to see how many of > these sites properly handle the exception? > https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4448 seems > to have a list of 100+ origins > > > We are also tracking UMA for window-placement permission policy. So > everytime the browser parcels "window-placement" in a header (e.g. > Permissions-Policy: > window-placement=(self)) or in an iframe (e.g. <iframe src=" > https://example.com"; allow="window-placement"></iframe>), the counter is > incremented. So ~0.015% of page loads are parsing the window-placement > policy. This scenario would not explicitly break a page, but the policy > would silently be ignored and the corresponding permission denied if the > site did not also have window-management specified. Again, no other browser > has implemented this string, so I suspect sites legitimately using this > would have some kind of fallback for non-chromium browsers anyway. > > Regards, > Brad > > > On Tue, Feb 20, 2024 at 11:24 AM Brad Triebwasser <btri...@chromium.org> > wrote: > > Certainly. > > We are tracking UMA both for when the permission name "window-placement" > is parsed (e.g all calls to navigator.permissions.query({name: > 'window-placement'}) increment the counter. That function will throw an > exception *"The provided value 'window-placement' is not a valid enum > value of type PermissionName."* > > On Mon, Feb 19, 2024 at 12:10 PM Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) < > yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote: > > > > On Fri, Feb 16, 2024 at 8:19 PM Brad Triebwasser <btri...@chromium.org> > wrote: > > Usage for the legacy permission and permission policy are ~0.006 > <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4448> and > ~0.015 <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4450> > > > Can you detail what these two different counters represent? > Our typical threshold is about half of the lower one (~0.0003%), but that > varies based on the potential breakage. > > What would breakage here look like? > > > (% page loads) while the new variants are ~1.166 > <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4447> and > ~3.066 <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4449> (% > page loads) respectively, so the main metric for potential breakage here is > 0.006% of page loads. 0.006% seems low in my opinion, but I'm curious if > there is any guidance on a lower target % we should be aiming for prior to > removing this feature. > > I separately calculated that the 200 origins make up about 0.0058% of > total origins tracked by UKM (if that's what you're asking), which aligns > with the UMA figures. I also want to note that 50 of those origins are > likely the same (spam?) website (e.g. https://aaaa123.com, > https://aaaa124.com, https://aaaa125.com). You can see examples of this > in the UMA sample data > <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4448>. > > Regards, > Brad > > On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 12:42 AM Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) < > yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote: > > 200 origins sounds like a lot. Do you know what %age of page views those > origins would represent? > > On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 11:32 PM Brad Triebwasser <btri...@chromium.org> > wrote: > > *tl;dr:* We expect at most 200 origins could break, and only ~30 of those > may be legitimately using the API. > > We do track UMA/UKM for the primary API entrypoint function ( > GetScreenDetails > <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Window/getScreenDetails>) > which we expect nearly all legitimate usage of the API to use. We see 60 > unique origins invoking GetScreenDetails, dominated by a handful of > origins (which align with the partners we know are using the API). > > For reference, 2500 unique origins are checking the window-management > permission, and 200 unique origins checking the old window-placement > permission (82% of those origins are *not *logging any GetScreenDetails > calls). > > As Mike mentioned, the only breakage here would be a site using > navigator.permissions.query({name: 'window-placement'}) without error > handling which according to UKM data would be roughly 200 origins (at most > 18% of those may be legitimately using the API). > > I believe 200 unique origins is a relatively low number of potential > breakages, especially considering our data strongly suggests a majority of > that is fingerprinting. > > Regards, > Brad > > > On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 6:27 AM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> > wrote: > > Agree that the risk feels low... one thing to perhaps check for (if you > have UKM or use counters) is to see if there is any legit usage on sites of > `navigator.permissions.query()` that isn't catching errors, since that > will throw a TypeError and can break a page. > On 2/12/24 9:16 AM, Rick Byers wrote: > > Presumably the risk of legitimate breakage here is bounded by the use of > the Window Management API, right? Are there any UseCounters for the various > Window Management operations? I couldn't find any at a quick glance. I > imagine legitimate usage is dominated by a few sites with an obvious need > (do we have UKM data?), and such sites should always degrade gracefully > without window management capabilities, right? > > My intuition is that the compat risk here should be extremely low, but I > hope we have some data to validate that which isn't tainted by the > fingerprinting usage. > > Rick > > > On Wed, Feb 7, 2024 at 1:59 PM Brad Triebwasser <btri...@chromium.org> > wrote: > > +blink-dev@chromium.org <blink-dev@chromium.org> / Reply All > > Thanks for your feedback, Mike! Recipes inline: > > On Tue, Feb 6, 2024 at 9:36 PM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> wrote: > > Hi Brad, > On 2/6/24 3:49 PM, Brad Triebwasser wrote: > > Contact emails > > btri...@chromium.org > > Explainer > > https://github.com/w3c/window-management/blob/main/ > EXPLAINER_spec_and_permission_rename.md > > Specification > > https://w3c.github.io/window-management/#api-permission-api-integration > > Summary > > Removes the legacy "window-placement" alias for permission and permission > policy "window-management". This is a follow-up to > https://chromestatus.com/feature/5146352391028736 and corresponding > blink-dev PSA > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/Hf2b1-S39Uw/m/YAEC_0DSBQAJ>. > The "window-placement" alias has been showing console deprecation warnings > since M113 > <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/13204be718225ae09c8ba7e36b055a369c36c878>. > We will disable WindowPlacementPermissionAlias > <https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:third_party/blink/renderer/platform/runtime_enabled_features.json5?q=-f:gen%2F%20AND%20-f:out%2F%20WindowPlacementPermissionAlias> > by default, and remove the flag and legacy code shortly thereafter. > > I'm a little bit confused here - it seems like the PSA of the alias is > being treated as the beginning of a deprecation, is that correct? My > interpretation of "will lead to a deprecation and removal" from the > original message was that it would be followed with an Intent to Deprecate > and Remove (per https://www.chromium.org/blink/launching-features/# > deprecate), but it seems like that step of the process was skipped. > > Yes, I never sent out a separate "Intent to Deprecate" in this case. The > original PSA > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/Hf2b1-S39Uw/m/YAEC_0DSBQAJ> > was > intended to be a hybrid of the introduction of the new names and > deprecation of the old ones so we also landed deprecation code (DevTools > deprecation warnings etc.) during that time. Since these have already been > "deprecated" since M113, I wasn't sure if a separate "intent to deprecate" > was appropriate in this case since we already deprecated them and monitored > usage to be sufficiently low, but I can back-up and send an I2D if > recommended here. > > > Blink component > > Blink>Screen>MultiScreen > <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3EScreen%3EMultiScreen> > > TAG review > > No feedback was specifically requested for the permission rename, however > related TAG reviews have been requested with both the old (1 > <https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/413>, 2 > <https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/602>) and new > terminology (3 <https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/840>). > > TAG review status > > Not applicable > > Risks > Interoperability and Compatibility > > There are low compatibility risks. Usage for the legacy permission and > permission policy are ~0.006 > <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4448> and > ~0.015 <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4450> > (% page loads) while the new variants are ~1.166 > <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4447> and > ~3.066 <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4449> > (% page loads) respectively, indicating most usage has already migrated. > > These percentages are still relatively high, especially for the > permissions policy variant. Besides the obvious fingerprint.js usage (which > shouldn't break pages... I would hope), can you describe what the failure > mode is after the proposed removal is? Have you dug into the remaining > usage to verify? > Yes, I dug into the remaining usage quite extensively via Web Archive > queries and UKM and couldn't find any usages other than what looked like > fingerprinting. After removal, the permission API will produce an error due > to an unknown permission, and the permission policy will silently fail > (e.g. iframes with allow='window-placement' will not have access to the > features). I beleive that the numbers shifting several orders of magnitude > in favor of the new strings seems to indicate legitamite usage has > migrated, and the remainig usage likely fingerprinting. > > Gecko: No signal > > Firefox has not implemented the API and corresponding permission yet. The > original API signal request is here > <https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/542>. > > WebKit: No signal > > Safari has not implemented the API and corresponding permission yet. The > original API signal request is here > <https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/117>. > > Mind linking to the original API position requests here in this thread? > Added links above to the original API signal request. FWIW, we have since > filed additional requests for functionality related to window management, > not necessarily window *placement* related (hence motivation for renaming > the API): eg 1 <https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/96> 2 > <https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/712> > > > Web developers: We have communicated internally with partners using the > API who have expressed commitment to updating the permission strings in > their code. > > Other signals: Positive comment > <https://github.com/w3c/window-placement/pull/115#pullrequestreview-1159676614> > from W3C WG Chair > > WebView application risks > > This is considered low risk. It removes an alias without any change in > behavior of the underlying API. > > Does this permission do anything on WebView? I would have guessed no. > Your correct, this window management API doesn't apply to WebView so there > is no impact there. > > > Debuggability > > Disabling WindowPlacementPermissionAlias > <https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:third_party/blink/renderer/platform/runtime_enabled_features.json5?q=-f:gen%2F%20AND%20-f:out%2F%20WindowPlacementPermissionAlias> > will stop DevTools deprecation warnings for usage of the legacy strings and > instead will act as if they did not exist at all (e.g. Permission API will > produce an error when using "window-placement"). > > > Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, Mac, > Linux, ChromeOS, Android, and Android WebView)? > > No. This feature is not supported on Android. > > Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests > <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> > ? > > Yes. Web Platform tests have already been migrated to the new alias: > > https://github.com/web-platform-tests/wpt/tree/master/window-management > > Flag name on chrome://flags > > None > > Finch feature name > > WindowPlacementPermissionAlias > > Requires code in //chrome? > > False > > Tracking bug > > https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1328581 > > Estimated milestones > > M123 (flag disable) M125 (flag/code removal) > > Anticipated spec changes > > None > > Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status > > https://chromestatus.com/feature/5137018030391296 > > This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status > <https://chromestatus.com/>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "blink-dev" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ > chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUCdqsmmEhBROkinxbzTULFPX > nC8goANs6-_O8n3%2B%3D47hQ%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUCdqsmmEhBROkinxbzTULFPXnC8goANs6-_O8n3%2B%3D47hQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "blink-dev" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ > chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUBYrF50-%3Dp8umAxQLaEttR- > jW4WRfWyF5AATV2p29w17w%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUBYrF50-%3Dp8umAxQLaEttR-jW4WRfWyF5AATV2p29w17w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "blink-dev" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ > chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUDd9YoriLSXG3h7usjpyJThZ > 4W3%2BixTCdVK2PhS0p9_Rw%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALEeEUDd9YoriLSXG3h7usjpyJThZ4W3%2BixTCdVK2PhS0p9_Rw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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