I think that enough has been bandied about the relationship between science and knowledge that it would be worthwhile to discuss this topic directly. I'll put forth, once again, viewpoints that I hold.
The purpose of science is to model and predict phenomenon. It also allows us to manipulate phenomenon. Ideally, the model should be as simple as possible (but no simpler). Different models that make the same predictions but have different model elements are equally valid. The purpose of science is not to help us understand reality; it is not about the truth. Indeed, one of my favorite statements about science is "the most important development in the history of science is when it was decided that it wasn't about the truth." Indeed, you find in a working group of scientists, a wide variety of metaphysical positions. To first order, they are all perfectly consistant with science. I've noticed that it is very easy for scientists to happily argue metaphysics over coffee and then drop their differences when they actually work. The reason for this is that there is a general acceptance of the proposition that science is not about knowing what is real and true. Since it is simply about modeling phenomenon, one need not worry about differences over understandings of truth while doing science. Let me give an example of this by answering a question that Erik asked Debby. What's the difference between believing in astrology and believing in inner experiences. When I posed the question, and my answer to a non-theist colleague, he agreed that the following answer was obvious. One is a statement that makes testable predictions: one's nature and behavior is correlated with birth date and time. The other makes a statement that is neither confirmed nor denied by observation. The obvious question arises, why believe things, why not just limit oneself to observables? The answer, which is the reasons that logical positivism self desctrued as a philosophical movement, is that very little can actually be derivable from observations alone. One has to add reasonable presuppositions; which are not knowledge but belief. With this understanding, one can see how one can use analytical technique to criticize statements that are testable by experiments while still holding positions that are not testable, oneself. The criterion is very simple, IMHO. One requires that beliefs are consistant with observation of phenomenon, but need not require that they be reducible to observation. Dan M. _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
