Orie <[email protected]> wrote: > Consider this small fragment of cypher:
> MATCH (p:Person)-[r:WORKS_AT {since: 2021}]->(c:Company)
> RETURN p.name AS Employee, c.name AS Company, r.role AS Role
> For a query like this, you might want to know which events contribute to
> the result, who signed them, and for how long should the information be
> considered valid.
.. yes.
> People create map keys as they need them, and they like putting "title"
> before "description" even though that's not how they sort
lexicographically.
> Canonicalization eliminates ways that data can exist.
> Cryptography preserves data as it exists.
There is some kind of archeology slant to this difference.
> If you want to embed the identifiers for the resource and make them hash
> based, another layer of application specific rules.
> Ohh but we want redaction too, let's add salted hashes to all the
> predicates.
It seems like it all ought to fall into selective disclosure mechanisms, for
the the observed counter signature.
> You basically end with event sourced progressively disclosable attribute
> cert derived labeled property graphs.
> As soon as you're done making this system, somebody will want to simply
> sign data without making any changes to it, and you'll be back to
enveloped
> signatures.
--
Michael Richardson <[email protected]> . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
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