Thanks for sharing this correspondence, Richard. I'm not sure the committee 
fully appreciates the scope of the problem but it's good to see them make an 
effort. I was actually surprised that the committee seems to understand as much 
as they do so perhaps this will be just a first step in a process. 

Regarding the specific questions asked and answered I would have liked to see 
the idea of compatibility addressed in a more straightforward fashion. (I'm 
assuming this is what the letter had in mind when talking about stability?)

As you know, the root store is a fixed component with the browser and the only 
way to change it is to update your browser. Not everyone updates his or her 
browser, for reasons good, bad, understandable, and so forth. This situation 
creates certain challenges for website owners when an important behavioral 
difference appears between versions.

If the different browser versions also contain contradictory information in 
terms of the trusted roots, the software which validates certs, and compliance 
with government regulations, the potential exists for "good" websites to become 
inaccessible. It certainly doesn't benefit anyone when that happens.

Obviously this stuff comes up all the time when we discuss the roots and such, 
but the committee might not have considered it. The extent to which the 
committee might like to implement regulations or make changes to them over 
time, they should keep this in mind. I'm not sure it's a technical limitation 
but it is a limitation nonetheless.

Just some thoughts....


  Original Message  
From: Richard Barnes
Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2015 1:37 PM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Letter from US House of Representatives
‎
Dear dev.security.policy,

I wanted to let you all know of some correspondence that happened recently
between Mozilla and the US Congress.

On June 9, the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce
sent a letter [1] to Mozilla asking for our opinion on the "restricting CAs
run by governments to issuing certificates for their own properties within
their ccTLDs".

Mozilla security and policy staff wrote a reply [2] to this letter,
highlighting the importance of our open process, and outlining some of the
arguments on both sides of the question that were raised in earlier threads
on this mailing list. Our reply was delivered June 23.

Obviously, we can't change the letter now, but if you have any thoughts or
concerns about this interaction, please feel free to reply in this thread.

--Richard

[1]
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/114/Letters/20150609Mozilla.pdf
[2]
http://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/files/2015/06/Mozilla-Response-to-Congressional-letter-on-CAs-signed.pdf
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