It seems to me that requiring the registration of these subordinate CAs bloats 
the Salesforce database unnecessarily.

-----Original Message-----
From: dev-security-policy 
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+ben=digicert....@lists.mozilla.org] On 
Behalf Of Rob Stradling
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2016 4:00 AM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Intermediate certificate disclosure deadline in 2 weeks

On 21/06/16 17:56, Nick Lamb wrote:
> On Tuesday, 21 June 2016 17:10:43 UTC+1, Peter Bowen  wrote:
>> If all paths from a trusted root to a given intermediate are revoked 
>> or expired, then I don't think it "directly or transitively chain[s] 
>> to a certificate included in Mozilla’s CA Certificate Program".  It 
>> would be no different than a private CA which isn't part of the 
>> WebPKI graph.
>
> It is actually different, but whether each case is different in an 
> _important_ way is a matter for Mozilla to decide.
<snip>

+1

If certificate A's signature can be verified by certificate B's public key, and 
if certificate B has basicConstraints.CA=TRUE, then certificate B chains to 
certificate A.  Revocation, expiration, name constraints, EKU "constraints", 
etc, may affect whether or not that chain of certificates is trusted by 
Mozilla's software, but these things do not cause that chain of certificates to 
cease to be a chain a certificates.

Kathleen's "CAs should not add records for:" list [1] includes expired 
intermediates but does not include all-paths-revoked intermediates.


[1] 
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:SalesforceCommunity#Which_intermediate_certificate_data_should_CAs_add_to_Salesforce.3F

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

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