I've just updated https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures.
There's now a separate grouping for undisclosed intermediates for which
all observed paths to a trusted root have been "revoked".
A path is considered to be "revoked" if at least one intermediate in the
path has been 1) disclosed to Salesforce AND 2) marked as Revoked in
Salesforce and/or OneCRL.
I'm working on the problem of how to uncover which trust paths exist but
have not (yet) been revoked...
On 23/06/16 22:42, Ben Wilson wrote:
Peter is right, but the problem is similar to what's in the Identrust thread mentioned
by Richard. "Cross-certifying a subordinated CA has been standard practice by not
only IdenTrust, but other large CAs such as Symantec for more than a decade ..."
Trouble is, I can't tell by looking at https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures who
it was that cross-certified the Federal Bridge. If I could, then I could
reach out to them and have them update the CA hierarchy in Salesforce.
I am taking Richard's comment ,"I would be willing to make an exception for this
specific case, since the Federal Bridge is a known issue," as an indication that I
do not need to disclose the DigiCert Federated ID CA-1 in the Salesforce database.
-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzbo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2016 3:35 PM
To: Eric Mill <e...@konklone.com>
Cc: Ben Wilson <ben.wil...@digicert.com>; Kurt Roeckx <k...@roeckx.be>; Richard Barnes
<rbar...@mozilla.com>; Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>; Steve <steve.me...@gmail.com>;
mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org; Kathleen Wilson <kwil...@mozilla.com>; Rob Stradling
<rob.stradl...@comodo.com>
Subject: Re: Intermediate certificate disclosure deadline in 2 weeks
DigiCert didn't cross-sign the Federal PKI with their Mozilla trusted CAs.
I'm sure Ben will tell me I have my terminology wrong, but DigiCert basically
operates two PKIs:
- DigiCert Public WebPKI
- DigiCert Shared FederatedPKI
The first is a set of CAs that are in the Mozilla program and CAs signed by the
Mozilla program. The second is a set of CAs that are signed by the US Federal
PKI; they are not in the Mozilla program.
The problem is that some non-DigiCert CA int he Mozilla program signed the US
Federal PKI. The DigiCert Shared FederatedPKI is now brought in via that
signature, with which they had nothing to do.
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Eric Mill <e...@konklone.com> wrote:
Peter, I think I get what you're saying about this being a different
category of cross-sign, but could you spell out explicitly how this
differs from e.g. the Identrust cross-sign issue that Richard linked to?
-- Eric
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 4:39 PM, Ben Wilson <ben.wil...@digicert.com> wrote:
That's correct.
-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzbo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2016 2:39 PM
To: Ben Wilson <ben.wil...@digicert.com>
Cc: Eric Mill <e...@konklone.com>; Kurt Roeckx <k...@roeckx.be>;
Richard Barnes <rbar...@mozilla.com>; Jeremy Rowley
<jeremy.row...@digicert.com>; Steve <steve.me...@gmail.com>;
mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org; Kathleen Wilson
<kwil...@mozilla.com>; Rob Stradling <rob.stradl...@comodo.com>
Subject: Re: Intermediate certificate disclosure deadline in 2 weeks
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 11:45 AM, Ben Wilson
<ben.wil...@digicert.com>
wrote:
Another issue that needs to be resolved involves the Federal
Bridge CA 2013 (“Federal Bridge”). When a publicly trusted sub CA
cross-certifies the Federal Bridge, then all of the CAs
cross-certified by the Federal Bridge
are trusted. The chart (https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures) then
captures
all “non-publicly-trusted” sub CAs. For instance, the following
CAs are now caught up in the database, but there is no way to
input them (or CAs subordinate to them) into Salesforce because
only the CA that cross-certified the Federal Bridge has access to
that certificate chain in Salesforce. In otherwords, I don’t have
access to input the DigiCert Federated ID CA-1 or its sub CAs.
Ben,
Correct me if I'm wrong, but the DigiCert CA you mention is part of a
different PKI from the DigiCert public roots in Mozilla, right? The
only reason that it is showing in the list is because a non-DigiCert
CA cross-signed the Federal PKI and the Federal PKI cross-signed the
DigiCert CA in question, correct?
Thanks,
Peter
--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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