Peter is right, but the problem is similar to what's in the Identrust thread mentioned by Richard. "Cross-certifying a subordinated CA has been standard practice by not only IdenTrust, but other large CAs such as Symantec for more than a decade ..."
Trouble is, I can't tell by looking at https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures who it was that cross-certified the Federal Bridge. If I could, then I could reach out to them and have them update the CA hierarchy in Salesforce. I am taking Richard's comment ,"I would be willing to make an exception for this specific case, since the Federal Bridge is a known issue," as an indication that I do not need to disclose the DigiCert Federated ID CA-1 in the Salesforce database. -----Original Message----- From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzbo...@gmail.com] Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2016 3:35 PM To: Eric Mill <e...@konklone.com> Cc: Ben Wilson <ben.wil...@digicert.com>; Kurt Roeckx <k...@roeckx.be>; Richard Barnes <rbar...@mozilla.com>; Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>; Steve <steve.me...@gmail.com>; mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org; Kathleen Wilson <kwil...@mozilla.com>; Rob Stradling <rob.stradl...@comodo.com> Subject: Re: Intermediate certificate disclosure deadline in 2 weeks DigiCert didn't cross-sign the Federal PKI with their Mozilla trusted CAs. I'm sure Ben will tell me I have my terminology wrong, but DigiCert basically operates two PKIs: - DigiCert Public WebPKI - DigiCert Shared FederatedPKI The first is a set of CAs that are in the Mozilla program and CAs signed by the Mozilla program. The second is a set of CAs that are signed by the US Federal PKI; they are not in the Mozilla program. The problem is that some non-DigiCert CA int he Mozilla program signed the US Federal PKI. The DigiCert Shared FederatedPKI is now brought in via that signature, with which they had nothing to do. On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Eric Mill <e...@konklone.com> wrote: > Peter, I think I get what you're saying about this being a different > category of cross-sign, but could you spell out explicitly how this > differs from e.g. the Identrust cross-sign issue that Richard linked to? > > -- Eric > > On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 4:39 PM, Ben Wilson <ben.wil...@digicert.com> wrote: >> >> That's correct. >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzbo...@gmail.com] >> Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2016 2:39 PM >> To: Ben Wilson <ben.wil...@digicert.com> >> Cc: Eric Mill <e...@konklone.com>; Kurt Roeckx <k...@roeckx.be>; >> Richard Barnes <rbar...@mozilla.com>; Jeremy Rowley >> <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>; Steve <steve.me...@gmail.com>; >> mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org; Kathleen Wilson >> <kwil...@mozilla.com>; Rob Stradling <rob.stradl...@comodo.com> >> Subject: Re: Intermediate certificate disclosure deadline in 2 weeks >> >> On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 11:45 AM, Ben Wilson >> <ben.wil...@digicert.com> >> wrote: >> > Another issue that needs to be resolved involves the Federal >> > Bridge CA 2013 (“Federal Bridge”). When a publicly trusted sub CA >> > cross-certifies the Federal Bridge, then all of the CAs >> > cross-certified by the Federal Bridge >> > are trusted. The chart (https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures) then >> > captures >> > all “non-publicly-trusted” sub CAs. For instance, the following >> > CAs are now caught up in the database, but there is no way to >> > input them (or CAs subordinate to them) into Salesforce because >> > only the CA that cross-certified the Federal Bridge has access to >> > that certificate chain in Salesforce. In otherwords, I don’t have >> > access to input the DigiCert Federated ID CA-1 or its sub CAs. >> >> Ben, >> >> Correct me if I'm wrong, but the DigiCert CA you mention is part of a >> different PKI from the DigiCert public roots in Mozilla, right? The >> only reason that it is showing in the list is because a non-DigiCert >> CA cross-signed the Federal PKI and the Federal PKI cross-signed the >> DigiCert CA in question, correct? >> >> Thanks, >> Peter > > > > > -- > konklone.com | @konklone
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
_______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
