> On Oct 29, 2016, at 2:23 PM, Han Yuwei <[email protected]> wrote: > > 在 2016年10月28日星期五 UTC+8下午9:23:01,[email protected]写道: >> We are not intended to cover-up anything since we had disclosed every change >> to the Chinese version CP/CPS at once after the auditor reviewed. >> The “ROOTCA(SM2)” CA in $1.1.3 of CPS ver4.3 is equivalent to the “SM2 ROOT >> Certificate” CA in $1.1.3 of CPS ver4.1. The “Guangdong Certificate >> Authority(SM2) ” CA in $1.1.3 of CPS ver4.3 is equivalent to the “SM2 CA >> Certificate” CA in $1.1.3 of CPS ver4.1. We change these names in diagram in >> this revision in order to show the actual CN of these certificates. >> Furthermore, we only issue SM2 subscriber certificates from the subCA of >> “ROOTCA(SM2)” CA. > > Is SM2 acceptable in publicy-trusted CAs? I don't think so. > > Maybe Gerv could explain more about this. And I am wondering what can CA do > if government requirement conflicts with Mozilla's policy?
It is acceptable to have a single CPS that covers CAs that are included the Mozilla list of trust anchors and CAs that are not trusted by Mozilla. The CPS should make clear which portions apply to which CA when there are portions that do not apply to all CAs. In this case, I would expect that the ROOTCA(SM2) CA is not proposed for inclusion in Mozilla. As long as the CPS does not allow issuance of SM2 signed certificates or certificates with SM2 subject public keys from the CAs proposed for inclusion in Mozilla, I do not seen an issue. Thanks, Peter _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

