Eric Mill, on 03 October 2016 03:14, said.. > On Sun, Oct 2, 2016 at 9:23 PM, Nick Lamb <tialara...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Sunday, 2 October 2016 20:53:15 UTC+1, Peter Bowen wrote: > > > There is some good news. The CA/Browser Forum has already addressed > > > this, even prior to the current discussions. Ballot 169 > > > (https://cabforum.org/2016/08/05/ballot-169-revised- > > validation-requirements/) > > > revises 3.2.2.4 considerably. > > > > I'm aware of Ballot 169 > > > > > Under the new rules, which should be in > > > effect as of 1 March 2017, validating www.<domain> will not be a valid > > > method of showing control of <domain>. The name is true for any valid > > > hostname under <domain>. The only note is that names in the form > > > _<something>.<domain> (that is starting with an underscore) can be > > > used to validate <domain>. > > > > I wish I shared your confidence. My expectation is that if we leave this > > as it is, in April 2017 subscribers will still be able to get a certificate > > issued using this lackadaisical validation, and the issuing CA will say > > they feel it's not "really" disobeying the rules, that it's just a > > "technicality" and anyway what's the harm, it's so much more convenient > for > > their customers this way? > > > > Comodo's document never actually says that they're abolishing this "rule" > > as a result of Ballot 169. It lets you choose to draw that implication, by > > specifying that their current practices pre-date Ballot 169's changes, but > > it never says as much. Hence I think Mozilla's rep should take this to > > CA/B, or it should go in one of the bulk CA communications, to find out at > > least how widespread the crazy is and whether it's even consistent in how > > it works from one CA to the next. > > > > It would be nice for Comodo to make it explicit that this practice will > cease when Ballot 169 takes effect, and the lack of an explicit update > jumped out at me immediately when I read it. But the BRs post-169 seem > crystal clear on this, and I don't think CAs would be able to write off > this practice as a technicality or misinterpretation. > > -- Eric
I'm happy to state definitively that this practice will cease when Ballot 169 takes effect. To avoid suggestions of weasel-words around the CA/B forum's struggle with their IP policy my understanding is that at least Microsoft, and I hope other browsers too, will incorporate the Ballot 169 wording into their policy regardless of whether the CA/B has ratified it by then. Comodo will have implemented some or all of the new validation methods described in Ballot 169 before 1 March 2017. Comodo will be withdrawing any and all validation methods which do not conform with Ballot 169, and/or which rely on the pre-Ballot 169 3.2.2.4.7 'any-other-equivalent method' rule before 1 March 2017. Regards Robin Alden Comodo _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
