That seems altogether a bad idea for the ecosystem.

Current (and presently proposed) Mozilla policy does not allow them. Nor
are they supported in Mozilla NSS anymore (and their previous support was
not one you should use for security-critical purposes). Nor are they
supported in other UAs.

I'm sympathetic to the argument that "If they're not used for server certs,
what's the matter" - but I think there's a reasonable concern for anything
a CA signs/issues and avoiding ambiguity/risk, and that's something that
requires considerable amounts of energy.

On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 2:26 PM, Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>
wrote:

> I know the use of other ECC curves comes up often, but I couldn't recall
> where Mozilla landed on using other ECC curves. Requests for secp256k1 and
> brainpool curves are increasing rapidly. If Mozilla updated its policy, we
> could start using these curves for client certs, even if the baseline
> requirements still prohibit them in TLS certs.
>
>
>
> Jeremy
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> dev-security-policy mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
>
>
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