Some of these curves are considered much better than the NIST curves (well, 
that’s what I’ve read anyway). With how many new curves there are (many with an 
international flavor), it’d be nice if Mozilla considered some of the new 
curves and added them if appropriate. Brainpool is supported in RFCs, HSMs, and 
in applications.

 

From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: Wednesday, February 1, 2017 3:34 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Other Curves

 

That seems altogether a bad idea for the ecosystem.

 

Current (and presently proposed) Mozilla policy does not allow them. Nor are 
they supported in Mozilla NSS anymore (and their previous support was not one 
you should use for security-critical purposes). Nor are they supported in other 
UAs.

 

I'm sympathetic to the argument that "If they're not used for server certs, 
what's the matter" - but I think there's a reasonable concern for anything a CA 
signs/issues and avoiding ambiguity/risk, and that's something that requires 
considerable amounts of energy.

 

On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 2:26 PM, Jeremy Rowley <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

I know the use of other ECC curves comes up often, but I couldn't recall
where Mozilla landed on using other ECC curves. Requests for secp256k1 and
brainpool curves are increasing rapidly. If Mozilla updated its policy, we
could start using these curves for client certs, even if the baseline
requirements still prohibit them in TLS certs.



Jeremy


_______________________________________________
dev-security-policy mailing list
[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> 
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

 

Attachment: smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature

_______________________________________________
dev-security-policy mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Reply via email to