Not at all. You made a vague and unsubstantiated claim about security (which has generally been refuted, as Hanno, Kurt, and Richard point out), and then backed it up with encouraging more diversity.
I focused on pointing out that diversity for diversity sake, at least within crypto, is not necessarily an intrinsic good. There's much more than could be said about the nuance of that, but in general, "we add more because there's more" is not a good position. The security arguments (at least with the curves you requested) are also largely inaccurate. So that leaves the set of curves which do have desirable security properties - EdDSA/Curve25519/Curve448 (well, more aptly, their variants). And that work's proceeding in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix/ but is otherwise not ready, and certainly not yet well-supported by HSMs. On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 2:47 PM, Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]> wrote: > That’s a pretty vague argument against adding some curves. With that > logic, we’d never have moved away from MD5 hash as moving away would have > disrupted the ecosystem… > > > > *From:* Ryan Sleevi [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* Wednesday, February 1, 2017 3:46 PM > *To:* Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]> > *Cc:* [email protected]; [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: Other Curves > > > > > > > > On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Some of these curves are considered much better than the NIST curves > (well, that’s what I’ve read anyway). With how many new curves there are > (many with an international flavor), it’d be nice if Mozilla considered > some of the new curves and added them if appropriate. Brainpool is > supported in RFCs, HSMs, and in applications. > > > > That's more of a compelling argument against than for; similar to the > discussions for algorithms like SM2 or IDEA or Camellia in TLS. > > > > As Adam Langley eloquently captured in https://bugs.chromium.org/ > p/chromium/issues/detail?id=442572#c5 "Cipher suites are not like > Pokémon: the aim isn't to enable every single one." > > > > The same applies to curves > > > > The question inevitably is not necessarily one about enforcing Mozilla's > view of curve strength (or of Google's), but one of considering the > ecosystem and security impact to their users by promoting/allowing such > things. > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

