On Wed, Mar 1, 2017 at 12:12 PM, douglas.beattie--- via dev-security-policy
<[email protected]> wrote:

> On Wednesday, March 1, 2017 at 8:26:34 AM UTC-5, Peter Kurrasch wrote:
> > Would it be possible to get a more precise answer other than "in
> accordance with"? I am left to assume that in fact no verification was
> performed because the previous verification was in the 39 month window.
>
> For this SSL product, customers place orders which are vetted to the OV
> level with normally just a single SAN.  Once the order has been approved
> they can add SANs by verifying domain control via DNS or File based
> verificaton options.  Over time they add and remove SANs as their customer
> base changes.  They can re-issue the certificate which keeps the expiration
> date and the subject DN the same, but they add and remove SANs.
>
> In this case they did not remove SAN which are clearly not functional and
> are for domains which have expired. The reissueance process does not
> require the re-verification of the domain control, thus the certificate was
> reissued with these SANs.
>
> Subscribers are required to tell us when the certificate contents is
> no-longer accurate so appropriate action can be taken, but clearly this
> customer did not inform us.  We'll be talking with them about this to find
> out why.
>

Doug,

A few follow-ups:

This description is somewhat concerning in its omission - namely, whether
or not GlobalSign revalidates this information on the 39 month period
required by the Baseline Requirements.
Q1) Can you confirm that this system ensures that all domains are
revalidated if the validation occurred more than 39 months prior, as per
the Baseline Requirements, v1.4.2, Section 4.2.1
Q2) If, in the process of confirming a, deficiencies are noted in the
enforcement of this, can you provide details as to how many certificates
this issue might affect?

The Baseline Requirements, v1.4.2, Section 9.6.3 details obligations with
respect to the Subscriber Agreements that CAs SHALL require. As part of
this, Item 5, (b) notes that the Subscriber Agreement includes "An
obligation and warranty to: ... (b) promptly request revocation of the
Certificate, and cease using it, if any information in the Certificate is
or becomes incorrect or inaccurate." Per Section 4.9.1.1 of the Baseline
Requirements, "The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if one or
more of the following occurs:" ... "The CA is made aware that a Subscriber
has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber
Agreement or Terms of Use".

Given that GlobalSign has acknowledged that the Subscriber has failed to
abide by the required Subscriber Agreement, and given that GlobalSign
acknowledged this at Tue, 28 Feb 2017 04:46:25 -0800 (PST), it would appear
that this certificate is not revoked, however, my attempts at confirming
with your OCSP server seem to at least produce issues on the several
Windows devices I tried.

Q3) Can you confirm that this certificate (and all related certificates)
are revoked, as per Section 4.9.1.1 of the Baseline Requirements?
Q4) Can you confirm that your OCSP responder is properly available? For
your ease of diagnostic, the Windows command is "certutil -f -urlfetch
-verify [certificatefile]", which other CAs' revoked and unrevoked
certificates are working fine with.
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