On Wed, Mar 1, 2017 at 12:12 PM, douglas.beattie--- via dev-security-policy <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Wednesday, March 1, 2017 at 8:26:34 AM UTC-5, Peter Kurrasch wrote: > > Would it be possible to get a more precise answer other than "in > accordance with"? I am left to assume that in fact no verification was > performed because the previous verification was in the 39 month window. > > For this SSL product, customers place orders which are vetted to the OV > level with normally just a single SAN. Once the order has been approved > they can add SANs by verifying domain control via DNS or File based > verificaton options. Over time they add and remove SANs as their customer > base changes. They can re-issue the certificate which keeps the expiration > date and the subject DN the same, but they add and remove SANs. > > In this case they did not remove SAN which are clearly not functional and > are for domains which have expired. The reissueance process does not > require the re-verification of the domain control, thus the certificate was > reissued with these SANs. > > Subscribers are required to tell us when the certificate contents is > no-longer accurate so appropriate action can be taken, but clearly this > customer did not inform us. We'll be talking with them about this to find > out why. > Doug, A few follow-ups: This description is somewhat concerning in its omission - namely, whether or not GlobalSign revalidates this information on the 39 month period required by the Baseline Requirements. Q1) Can you confirm that this system ensures that all domains are revalidated if the validation occurred more than 39 months prior, as per the Baseline Requirements, v1.4.2, Section 4.2.1 Q2) If, in the process of confirming a, deficiencies are noted in the enforcement of this, can you provide details as to how many certificates this issue might affect? The Baseline Requirements, v1.4.2, Section 9.6.3 details obligations with respect to the Subscriber Agreements that CAs SHALL require. As part of this, Item 5, (b) notes that the Subscriber Agreement includes "An obligation and warranty to: ... (b) promptly request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it, if any information in the Certificate is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate." Per Section 4.9.1.1 of the Baseline Requirements, "The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if one or more of the following occurs:" ... "The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use". Given that GlobalSign has acknowledged that the Subscriber has failed to abide by the required Subscriber Agreement, and given that GlobalSign acknowledged this at Tue, 28 Feb 2017 04:46:25 -0800 (PST), it would appear that this certificate is not revoked, however, my attempts at confirming with your OCSP server seem to at least produce issues on the several Windows devices I tried. Q3) Can you confirm that this certificate (and all related certificates) are revoked, as per Section 4.9.1.1 of the Baseline Requirements? Q4) Can you confirm that your OCSP responder is properly available? For your ease of diagnostic, the Windows command is "certutil -f -urlfetch -verify [certificatefile]", which other CAs' revoked and unrevoked certificates are working fine with. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

