On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 11:03 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote: > > But is this stated explicitly, or simply an interpretation? >
Yes. Section 4.2.1 > As this seems to be a multi-SAN certificate for some kind of hosting > provider (based on the descriptions of the how the "product" works), > quickly and suddenly revoking the certificate for all the currently > hosted domains because the hosting provider was late in reporting that > some other domain names should be removed from the shared certificate > would be disruptive to those other domains. > That's explicitly what the Baseline Requirements require. Multiple different ways. Within 24 hours. I can understand the desire to "not be disruptive". The Baseline Requirements have instead optimized for "Be accurate representations of the domain binding". Hence my suggestion that a more cooperative (but slower) procedure for > replacing the certificate with one that contains only currently > permitted domains might be acceptable. It is not acceptable. It's explicitly prohibited multiple ways to allow more than 24 hours when such situations are brought to the CAs' attention. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

