On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 11:03 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:
>
> But is this stated explicitly, or simply an interpretation?
>

Yes. Section 4.2.1


> As this seems to be a multi-SAN certificate for some kind of hosting
> provider (based on the descriptions of the how the "product" works),
> quickly and suddenly revoking the certificate for all the currently
> hosted domains because the hosting provider was late in reporting that
> some other domain names should be removed from the shared certificate
> would be disruptive to those other domains.
>

That's explicitly what the Baseline Requirements require. Multiple
different ways. Within 24 hours.

I can understand the desire to "not be disruptive". The Baseline
Requirements have instead optimized for "Be accurate representations of the
domain binding".

Hence my suggestion that a more cooperative (but slower) procedure for
> replacing the certificate with one that contains only currently
> permitted domains might be acceptable.


It is not acceptable. It's explicitly prohibited multiple ways to allow
more than 24 hours when such situations are brought to the CAs' attention.
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