On 08/03/2017 14:18, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 1:36 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

I am simply going by the wording in Gervs posting not stating what you
stated.  I presume that if Gerv wanted to complete eliminate the DTP
concept for Mozilla trusted CAs, then that's what he would have written.


Jakob,

This is a frustrating excerise, and I hope you can appreciate. You are
again ascribing an intent, one of which you explicitly stated, to Gerv,
without evidence or support. When challenged on this, you acknowledge
support for this conclusion isn't present - but now you're trying to again
suggest the presumption/wording.

Can we at least agree - for the sake of productive discussion - that
there's no explicit statement that removing DTPs is off the table, so that
we can discuss the substance of that, and you can acknowledge that there's
no provided evidence to support your claim that removing DTPs was not
intended? Can you imagine the possibility that Gerv just simply didn't word
it as such?


Having not fully studied the exact wording of the BRs, I operate under
the assumption that the longer phrasing "... an audit report, issued
under the auditing standards that underlie the accepted audit schemes
found in Section 8.1 ..." as quoted from section 8.4 in earlier
discussion of the Symantec case was intentionally so phrased to
indicate that the audit of a DTP would not be the same as a full
WebTrust CA audit, but would only cover those aspects of those criteria
which would be applicable to the performance of the particular DTP role.




If that quote is indeed from the relevant part of the BRs, then I
would posit that if the BR authors had wanted all kinds of DTPs to be
subject to a full WebTrust audit, they would not have used this more
complex phrase.


The BR authors are terribly flawed (I'm one of them, or at least
maintainers), and the wording complexity and confusion is more often
confusing than intentional.

I hope you consider my reply to Peter on this topic, in which I try to
highlight how the point upon which you're stuck on 'full audit', is a
practical matter that, when applied, is indistinguishable from an DTP audit.

I think you can readily agree that the 'intent' is that the fullness of
capabilities relative to causing issuance are desired to be audited.
Namely, whether we're talking a DTP audit or a CA audit, the intent is that
all CA functions outlined in the Baseilne Requirements can have Principles
and/or Criteria attached to / derived from them, and that every party who
performs some role within it is audited according to that role.

If you can agree to that - which is, I think, the point you're trying to
make with DTP audits - then what we have is a scenario where some functions
are performed by Company A, some functions are performed by Company B.
Whether it's a DTP performing 3.2 validation (Company B) or an entity
performing 3.2 validation for an externally operated sub-CA (Company B), I
think we're in violent agreement that we want to ensure that Company B is
audited according to its role.

Before I introduce any more complexity - can you agree to that as the goal?
Then everything else is just semantics that we can hammer out.


Yes, I agree they should be functionally equivalent, in the sense that
all aspects of the operation and issuance are validated, and that one
entity is ultimately responsible for the actions of the others.

The distinction I am making is that the entity named as ultimately
responsible ("the CA") needs an audit report that covers all the
requirements with some requirements possibly audited in the form of
auditing the presence of valid audit report from the other entities
involved.

The entities ("DTPs") that are not "the CA" need audit reports covering
only that which is delegated by "the CA" (and for which an audit report
is thus needed as documentation that "the CA" must provide to auditors
and root programs).

In other words where the audit report for "the CA" would contain
statements such as "managing HSM safety: Performed by delegated entity
X, as confirmed by audit report Y", the audit report for the others
entities ("DTPs") can simply condider their non-jobs as explicitly out
of scope for the audit.  It is part of the duty for the auditors of
"the CA" and the relying parties/root programs looking at paperwork
presented by "the CA" to check that all the tasks outsourced by "the
CA" are covered as "in scope" by audit reports for the "DTPs" that
those tasks are outsourced to.

It is this distinction between auditors who only check that which is
requested and auditors who checks that all mandatory aspect are audited
by someone, somewhere which I believe would result in a difference in
cost and effort.


Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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