On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 9:23 AM, Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> > This is why I'm suggesting, from an audit scope, they're functionally > > equivalent approach, except one avoids the whole complexity of > identifying > > where or not a DTP is something different-than a sub-CA, since the > _intent_ > > is true in both, which is that 100% of the capabilities related to > issuance > > are appropriately audited - either by the DTP/sub-CA or by the issuing > > CA/managed CA provided > > > > Does this make it clearer the point I was trying to make, which is that > > they're functionally equivalent - due to the fact that both DTPs and > sub-CAs > > have the issue of multi-party audit scopes? > > I agree that you suggest an approach that is probably functionally > equivalent, but what you describe is not how WebTrust audits work. > Peter, does my recent clarification help align this? I think we are in violent agreement with respect to sub-CAs that you don't get to "pick and choose" the principles and criteria, but for the specific case of DTPs and their capabilities, was trying to describe how it could fit within the 'site visit' examination, due to the inability to rely on / use third-party audits as evidence for the basis of opinion forming. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

