On 04/04/2017 05:03, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 7:18 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:
I see it as part of the underlying reasoning. Mozilla et al wants
disclosure in order to take action if the disclosed facts are deemed
unacceptable (under policy or otherwise). Upon receiving the
disclosure, the root program gains the ability to take counteractions,
such as protesting to the issuing CA, or manually blocking the unwanted
SubCA cert via mechanisms such as OneCRL. The rules don't make the CAs
wait for the root programs to get upset, but must allow at least zero
time for this time to happen.
That's not correct.
So why does Mozilla want disclosure and not just a blanket X on a form
stating that all SubCAs are adequately audited, follow BRs etc.?
What use does Mozilla have for any of that information if not to act on
it in relation to trust decisions?
I believe you're suggesting simultaneously across all root programs, is
that correct? But that's not a requirement (and perhaps based on the
incorrect and incomplete understanding of point 1)
Yes, across all root programs, that is the key point, see #0.
You're still incorrect here.
Not an argument.
Also, it is argued as a logical consequence of #3, #2, #0, i.e.
assume another root program enacts similar rules. Once the SubCA cert
is disclosed on the CCADB for Mozilla and Chrome, the SubCA operator
can download the SubCA cert from the CCADB and use it to make users of
that other root program trust issued certificates before that other
root program received the disclosure.
I see zero problem with the SubCA receiving the certificate
immediately from the issuing CA, even prior to disclosure in the
CCADB. The proposed requirement is that the SubCA not issue prior to
confirming the disclosure has been made.
I agree with Peter here.
Not receiving the certificate prevents a rogue or rookie SubCA from
meaningfully issuing prematurely. After all, SubCA operators are only
humans, and usually less experienced in all this than long time major
CA operators.
That's not a problem we're trying to solve here. That's great that you
care, but you've also highlighted the many problems with your proposal, so
perhaps it is a bad goal no longer worth discussing?
I have highlight how the goals that I perceive must underlie the
disclosure requirement, combined with the general imperative of the
Golden Rule ("do onto others..." or "You must love thy neighbor as
thyself") leads to a logical conclusion through a number of logical
steps.
By symmetry, if Mozilla has to shut down the CCADB for maintenance for
2 days, another root program might receive and publish the disclosure
first, causing the same problem for users of Mozilla and Chrome
products.
I'm not sure where you see the "problem for users" here. This is no
different than what happens today for many CAs.
The problem for users is that their Browser/client trusts a certificate
from a SubCA that their trusted root program has never seen, and thus
not even had a chance to form an opinion about.
That's great. That's not the goal. The rest logically shakes out as
irrelevant.
So what is the goal?
Enjoy
Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10
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WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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