On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 11:18 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> On 04/04/2017 05:03, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > >> On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 7:18 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >> I see it as part of the underlying reasoning. Mozilla et al wants >>> disclosure in order to take action if the disclosed facts are deemed >>> unacceptable (under policy or otherwise). Upon receiving the >>> disclosure, the root program gains the ability to take counteractions, >>> such as protesting to the issuing CA, or manually blocking the unwanted >>> SubCA cert via mechanisms such as OneCRL. The rules don't make the CAs >>> wait for the root programs to get upset, but must allow at least zero >>> time for this time to happen. >>> >> >> >> That's not correct. >> >> > So why does Mozilla want disclosure and not just a blanket X on a form > stating that all SubCAs are adequately audited, follow BRs etc.? > > What use does Mozilla have for any of that information if not to act on > it in relation to trust decisions? > The incorrect part is that you're assuming it's a blocking process. It's not - it's entirely asynchronous. Us folks who actually review CP/CPSes are barely handling it at the root layer, let alone the intermediate. That's why the CCADB - and the automation being developed by Microsoft and the standardization I've been pushing - is key and useful. The tradeoff has always been that CAs are granted the flexibility to delegate, which intentionally allows them to bypass any blocking browser dependencies, but at the risk to the issuing CA that the issuing CA may be suspended if they do an insufficient job. It's a distribution of workload, in which the issuing CA accepts the liability to be "as rigorous" as the browser programs in return for the non-blocking flexibility of the subscriber CA. In turn, that risk proposition (of the issuing CA) is offset by the cost they impose on the subscriber CA. The goal is not to manually approve every Sub-CA. > Yes, across all root programs, that is the key point, see #0. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> You're still incorrect here. >> >> > Not an argument. > I already presented the argument demonstrating why the goal - of explicitly having every CA aligned - is not part of the goals. The goal is not to introduce conflicting requirements, but you've demonstrated no such conflicting requirements beyond the abstract hypothetical (and non-participant and unknown) browser. No one is requesting what you're proposing they are. It's a strawman. > I have highlight how the goals that I perceive must underlie the > disclosure requirement, combined with the general imperative of the > Golden Rule ("do onto others..." or "You must love thy neighbor as > thyself") leads to a logical conclusion through a number of logical > steps. > I understand that, but you're misguided and incorrect in its application, which I've tried several ways to highlight for you. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

