-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 05/17/2017 05:04 AM, Kurt Roeckx wrote: > If the key is compromised, you can't rely on any date information > anymore, you need to revoke it completely and break things. >
Won't that only be true in certificates without SCTs? Once you have a SCT, you have an independent timestamp you can check beside the NotBefore value, and can independently confirm since CT logs are append-only. (Granted, I realize nothing actually checks the SCT in this way to my knowledge, but the idea itself may be on semi-solid ground). Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJZHDLHAAoJEHM+GkLSJHY5rnAP/A7Y7x0B5yr/t3ft5Ua4k5BP P1EKD/Oguwf2QqTiBYgvuKOvdc8aCkOCoVXcq9awyERUzxpW/Pcvz5bOfLLyYY8v qLLFTAXylJSJvFCSlw8+M1aiFEcTzeVptOUl51yQbBxxooWh4Oc8BrhvBZsCZqO3 j5KEWKo7kGLN0pAfocXDHBktb3DVJBnQnyakrUFooz0BgoH+cfJ2te/dSSSNspvw TfPfydWC/ANg7FBkvuc4cZrH3PSGEfpnR7kcvFTfD56Pg2Q90i46gS3ikGdqHaA0 F3GOQ456J0sFpM3wjmIVvLV6OKnQG0jBNicrkyYOydw+YHTVwyhJN12VT7kAlYdc HUVdl18T+Fx2waf/J8sQLyrYoE8QQ0nEZ+8DC4/XXe7gkxwxSFfvD8fUTLnYRI8F TNfq1D+DnIQIQsEDEX5PYfgRAgNohKhzy6L+btLeyqLsqI1Vxak3cCJ40Zl68Pj8 NpTSvPchlSiUZNPRDD6moRIJdsSIfEGPDn6jjOntw4Go3gwg67jPl8btePBM3VWD 9WRAy6KGdX5rRWsrvH1Zrrmeqjsqe8kQ6t3vGbuU0Qcd7hDT4EoDWWTRafy8Nsbc BIag3UXSWtF27LLpw/0C+6wPDT9krdl01JMTPwc0li0tYYL8h7W3FfHe8jMvnOmT Z0bUn1hiBjaFftVpdlM0 =RWD4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
