On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 10:31 AM, Alex Gaynor <agay...@mozilla.com> wrote:
> While the internet is moderately good at handling a single cross-sign > (modulo the challenges we had with 1024-bit root deprecation due to a bug > in OpenSSL's path building -- now fixed), as we extend the chains, it seems > evident to me that server operators are unlikely to configure their servers > to serve a chain which works on all clients -- the likely result is clients > will need AIA chasing. Most (all?) non-browsers do not implement AIA > chasing. This isn't an objection, just a flag and a potential action item > on the "non-browser" side of this. > That's basically an argument of "assume we change nothing" :) Yes, this proposal would impose some degree of change - either on server operators (of which tools already exist, such as Cloudflare's excellent cfssl - https://github.com/cloudflare/cfssl ) or on non-browser consumers (to support AIA). My view of AIA is that it is decentralized, distributed update mechanisms for the Web PKI. Either we presume these clients also support revocation checking (in which case, the incremental cost of AIA is negligible, regardless of whether it's OneCRL-style or OCSP/CRL style) or we assume they do not (in which case, they're in a tricky spot re: security anyways, and are not reasonable to consider "in scope") _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
