Hi Gerv,

Thank you for reaching out to the mdsp community.

There are valid security reasons to consider a dis-trust date earlier than
April 2018 for the corpus of Symantec certs issued prior to June 1st, 2016.

However, I also believe there are security and operational risks in
complicating the needed remediation by having two major browsers propose
different dis-trust dates.

I believe the internet community would benefit more from simplified
messaging than they would from a dis-trust date that is a few months
earlier. For that reason, I think Mozilla should match Google's April 2018
dis-trust date.

Thank you,

Vincent

[Disclaimer: I work for a company that sells Symantec SSL certificates, but
am commenting in a personal capacity.]

On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 2:14 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

> Google have made a final decision on the various dates they plan to
> implement as part of the consensus plan in the Symantec matter. The
> message from blink-dev is included below.
>
> Most of the dates have consensus - the dates for Symantec to implement
> the Managed CA infrastructure are agreed by all, and the date for final
> distrust of the old Symantec PKI is agreed by Google and Mozilla (to
> within a week, at any rate). I proposed November 1st 2018. Google has
> gone for October 23rd 2018; in practical terms, we would implement that
> using Firefox 63 (October 16th) or 64 (November 27th).
>
> However, there is some difference in the proposals for the date on which
> browsers should dis-trust Symantec certificates issued before June 1st,
> 2016. This date is significant because after that, Symantec have been
> required to log all their certs to CT and so there is much better
> transparency of issuance practice. I proposed December 1st 2017. Google
> strongly considered late January, but have finally chosen April 17th 2018.
>
> We now have two choices. We can accept the Google date for ourselves, or
> we can decide to implement something earlier. Implementing something
> earlier would involve us leading on compatibility risk, and so would
> need to get wider sign-off from within Mozilla, but nevertheless I would
> like to get the opinions of the m.d.s.p community.
>
> I would like to make a decision on this matter on or before July 31st,
> as Symantec have asked for dates to be nailed down by then in order for
> them to be on track with their Managed CA implementation timetable. If
> no alternative decision is taken and communicated here and to Symantec,
> the default will be that we will accept Google's final proposal as a
> consensus date.
>
> Gerv
>
> -------- Forwarded Message --------
> Subject:        Re: [blink-dev] Intent to Deprecate and Remove: Trust in
> existing Symantec-issued Certificates
> Date:   Thu, 27 Jul 2017 17:16:06 -0700
> From:   Darin Fisher <[email protected]>
> To:     Darin Fisher <[email protected]>
> CC:     blink-dev <[email protected]>
>
>
>
> Representing Google Chrome and the Chromium open source project, what
> follows is our final proposal on this matter.
>
>
> We’d like to first thank the blink-dev community for your input on this
> discussion. After taking this input into consideration along with the
> latest responses from Symantec and Mozilla, we have produced the
> following proposal that is intended to be our final plan of action on
> this matter.
>
>
> Chrome 66 will distrust Symantec-issued TLS certificates issued before
> June 1, 2016:
>
> Chrome 66 will distrust Symantec-issued TLS certificates issued before
> June 1, 2016, which is tentatively scheduled to hit Canary on January
> 19, 2018; Beta on March 15, 2018; and Stable (the vast majority of
> Chrome users) on April 17, 2018. Affected site operators are strongly
> encouraged to replace their TLS certificates before March 15, 2018 to
> prevent breakage. Although this is significantly later than our initial
> proposal of August 2017 and Mozilla’s proposal for late 2017
> <https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/gn1i2JNVCnc/
> y7IRQALJBgAJ>,
> we think it hits an appropriate balance between the security risk to
> Chrome users and minimizing disruption to the ecosystem. This time will
> allow clear messaging and scheduling for site operators to update
> certificates.
>
>
> We considered a number of alternative dates for distrusting this subset
> of existing certificates before landing on Chrome 66. Given the scale of
> Symantec’s existing PKI and the impact to the ecosystem that these
> mitigations pose, one of our goals was to consider dates that gave site
> operators enough lead time, as well as to try to clear end-of-year time
> periods where production freezes are typically in place. Chrome 62 which
> comes out in October 2017 was seriously considered, but was rejected due
> to concerns around not giving enough lead time for site operators.
> Chrome 63 which comes out in December was rejected due to overlapping
> with end-of-year freezes. Chrome 64 which comes out in late January 2018
> was strongly considered, but its early release channels also overlap
> with holiday and end of year freezes.  Chrome 65’s branch point is close
> to the new year, and could present a challenge for some site operators.
> Hence, Chrome 66 was chosen as the final approach.
>
>
> Site operators currently using Symantec-issued TLS server certificates
> that were issued before June 1, 2016 need to replace these certificates
> as soon as possible to avoid disruption to their users. The distrust of
> these certificates is necessary and is specifically targeted at removing
> the risk of trusting old certificates that were issued under an
> inadequately controlled infrastructure. Site operators can choose to
> obtain their certificates from any trusted Certificate Authority.
> Although the old infrastructure will be distrusted in the future (see
> below), site operators with critical dependencies on Symantec’s current
> infrastructure may also obtain replacement certificates from Symantec,
> provided these certificates comply with the existing Chrome requirements
> <https://security.googleblog.com/2015/10/sustaining-
> digital-certificate-security.html>for
> new certificates issued from Symantec.
>
>
> While we intend to stick with this schedule, if there is new information
> highlighting additional security risks with this set of certificates,
> the dates could change to more rapidly distrust the existing certificates.
>
>
> Chrome 70 will distrust TLS certificates issued from Symantec’s old
> infrastructure:
>
> In order to complete this migration, we will be removing trust in all
> certificates issued by Symantec’s old infrastructure in Chrome 70. This
> includes any replacement certificates issued by Symantec prior to the
> transition to the non-Symantec-operated “Managed Partner Infrastructure
> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Yd079EsKQ-
> QawTvWgjIfrCV6d0NNlwoS1ftB0MaJkBc/>”.
> Chrome 70 is tentatively scheduled to first reach Beta on September 13,
> 2018 and Stable on October 23, 2018, which is approximately 5 months
> after Chrome 66’s corresponding dates.
>
>
> By these dates, affected site operators will need to have fully replaced
> any TLS server certificates issued from Symantec’s old infrastructure,
> using any trusted CA including the new Managed Partner Infrastructure.
> Failure to migrate a site to one of these two options will result in
> breakage when Chrome 70 is released.
>
>
> Reference Timeline:
>
> In order to distill Chrome’s final plan into an actionable set of
> information for site operators, we’ve drawn up a timeline of relevant
> dates associated with this plan. As always, Chrome release dates can
> vary by a number of days, but upcoming release dates can be tracked here
> <https://www.chromium.org/developers/calendar>.
>
>
> Date
>
>
>
> Event
>
> July 27, 2017
>
> through
>
> ~March 15, 2018
>
>
>
> Site Operators using Symantec-issued TLS server certificates issued
> before June 1, 2016 should replace these certificates. These
> certificates can be replaced by any currently trusted CA, including
> Symantec.
>
> ~October 24, 2017
>
>
>
> Chrome 62 released to Stable, which will add alerting in DevTools when
> evaluating certificates that will be affected by the Chrome 66 distrust.
>
> December 1, 2017
>
>
>
> According to Symantec, the new Managed Partner Infrastructure will at
> this point be capable of full issuance. Any certificates issued by
> Symantec’s old infrastructure after this point will cease working in a
> future Chrome update.
>
>
> From this date forward, Site Operators can obtain TLS server
> certificates from the new Managed Partner Infrastructure that will
> continue to be trusted after Chrome 70 (~October 23, 2018).
>
>
> December 1, 2017 does not mandate any certificate changes, but
> represents an opportunity for site operators to obtain TLS server
> certificates that will not be affected by Chrome 70’s distrust of the
> old infrastructure.
>
> ~March 15, 2018
>
>
>
> Chrome 66 released to beta, which will remove trust in Symantec-issued
> certificates with a not-before date before June 1, 2016. As of this
> date, in order to ensure continuity of operations, Site Operators must
> be using either a Symantec-issued TLS server certificate issued on or
> after June 1, 2016 or a currently valid certificate issued from any
> other trusted CA as of Chrome 66.
>
>
> Site Operators that obtained a certificate from Symantec’s old
> infrastructure after June 1, 2016 are unaffected by Chrome 66 but will
> need to obtain a new certificate by the Chrome 70 dates described below.
>
> ~April 17, 2018
>
>
>
> Chrome 66 released to Stable.
>
> ~September 13, 2018
>
>
>
> Chrome 70 released to Beta, which will remove trust in the old
> Symantec-rooted Infrastructure. This will not affect any certificate
> chaining to the new Managed Partner Infrastructure, which Symantec has
> said will be operational by December 1, 2017.
>
>
> Only TLS server certificates issued by Symantec’s old infrastructure
> will be affected by this distrust regardless of issuance date.
>
> ~October 23, 2018
>
>
>
> Chrome 70 released to Stable.
>
>
>
> A note on the Blink process and this Intent:
>
> As mentioned at the start of this discussion, the Google Chrome team
> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/
> eUAKwjihhBs/rpxMXjZHCQAJ>decided
> to use the Blink Process <http://www.chromium.org/blink#new-features>in
> discussing this change, as a way to gather feedback from site operators,
> the Chromium community, other browsers, and the broader ecosystem about
> how to balance the interoperability risk and compatibility risk. A goal
> of this process is to balance risk by aligning on interoperable
> solutions, minimize ambiguity, and provide transparency into the
> decision making process. This process was designed around balancing
> changes to the Web Platform APIs, and we recognize there are further
> opportunities to improve this for Certificate Authority decisions. As
> those improvements are not yet in place, we will be forgoing the Blink
> API owner LGTM process for approval, and treating this more as a
> product-level decision instead.
>
>
> Thanks to everyone who put in so much time and energy to arrive at this
> point.
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Darin Fisher <[email protected]
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>
>     I wanted to give folks an update about the current state of this
>     Intent. Given all of the feedback we've received from the community,
>     right now we are continuing to evaluate different options and are
>     improving our understanding of the impact these proposals would have
>     on the ecosystem. We understand the desire to reach closure here,
>     but also want to make sure that we take the appropriate amount of
>     time to ensure that we come up with the best possible proposal. If
>     you have additional feedback that could help inform our decision, we
>     welcome hearing it.
>
>     Thanks,
>     -Darin
>
>
>
>     On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 9:02 AM, Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]
>     <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>
>         Note: Historically, the Google Chrome team has not used the
>         Blink Process <http://www.chromium.org/blink#new-features>for
>         Certificate Authority-related security issues, of which there
>         have been a number over the years. However, we are interested in
>         exploring using this process for such changes, as it provides a
>         greater degree of transparency and public participation. Based
>         on the level of participation and feedback we receive, we may
>         consider using this for the future. However, as CA-related
>         security incidents may require immediate response to protect
>         users, this should not be seen as a guarantee that this process
>         can be used in future incident responses.
>
>
>         Primary eng (and PM) emails:
>
>         [email protected]
>         <mailto:[email protected]>[email protected]
>         <mailto:[email protected]>
>
>
>         Summary
>
>         Since January 19, the Google Chrome team has been investigating
>         a series of failures by Symantec Corporation to properly
>         validate certificates. Over the course of this investigation,
>         the explanations provided by Symantec have revealed a
>         continually increasing scope of misissuance with each set of
>         questions from members of the Google Chrome team; an initial set
>         of reportedly 127 certificates has expanded to include at least
>         30,000 certificates, issued over a period spanning several
>         years. This is also coupled with a series of failures following
>         the previous set of misissued certificates from Symantec
>
> <https://security.googleblog.com/2015/10/sustaining-
> digital-certificate-security.html>,
>         causing us to no longer have confidence in the certificate
>         issuance policies and practices of Symantec over the past
>         several years. To restore confidence and security of our users,
>         we propose the following steps:
>
>           *
>
>             A reduction in the accepted validity period of newly issued
>             Symantec-issued certificates to nine months or less, in
>             order to minimize any impact to Google Chrome users from any
>             further misissuances that may arise.
>
>           *
>
>             An incremental distrust, spanning a series of Google Chrome
>             releases, of all currently-trusted Symantec-issued
>             certificates, requiring they be revalidated and replaced.
>
>           *
>
>             Removal of recognition of the Extended Validation status of
>             Symantec issued certificates, until such a time as the
>             community can be assured in the policies and practices of
>             Symantec, but no sooner than one year.
>
>
>         Motivation
>
>         As captured in Chrome’s Root Certificate Policy
>         <https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/root-ca-policy>,
>         root certificate authorities are expected to perform a number of
>         critical functions commensurate with the trust granted to them.
>         This includes properly ensuring that domain control validation
>         is performed for server certificates, to audit logs frequently
>         for evidence of unauthorized issuance, and to protect their
>         infrastructure in order to minimize the ability for the issuance
>         of fraudulent certs.
>
>
>         On the basis of the details publicly provided by Symantec, we do
>         not believe that they have properly upheld these principles, and
>         as such, have created significant risk for Google Chrome users.
>         Symantec allowed at least four parties access to their
>         infrastructure in a way to cause certificate issuance, did not
>         sufficiently oversee these capabilities as required and
>         expected, and when presented with evidence of these
>         organizations’ failure to abide to the appropriate standard of
>         care, failed to disclose such information in a timely manner or
>         to identify the significance of the issues reported to them.
>
>
>         These issues, and the corresponding failure of appropriate
>         oversight, spanned a period of several years, and were trivially
>         identifiable from the information publicly available or that
>         Symantec shared.
>
>
>         The full disclosure of these issues has taken more than a month.
>         Symantec has failed to provide timely updates to the community
>         regarding these issues. Despite having knowledge of these
>         issues, Symantec has repeatedly failed to proactively disclose
>         them.  Further, even after issues have become public, Symantec
>         failed to provide the information that the community required to
>          assess the significance of these issues until they had been
>         specifically questioned. The proposed remediation steps offered
>         by Symantec have involved relying on known-problematic
>         information or using practices insufficient to provide the level
>         of assurance required under the Baseline Requirements and
>         expected by the Chrome Root CA Policy.
>
>
>         In January 2015, Symantec-issued certificates represented more
>         than 30% of the valid certificates by volume. While changes in
>         the CA ecosystem have seen that share decrease over the past two
>         years, there is still a significant compatibility risk for an
>         immediate and complete distrust. Further, due to overall TLS
>         ecosystem concerns, we understand that it may take non-trivial
>         effort for some site operators to find suitable solutions, as
>         the need to support older devices may necessitate the use of
>         particular CAs, meaning that distrust of new certificates also
>         has significant compatibility risk.
>
>
>         To balance the compatibility risks versus the security risks, we
>         propose a gradual distrust of all existing Symantec-issued
>         certificates, requiring that they be replaced over time with
>         new, fully revalidated certificates, compliant with the current
>         Baseline Requirements. This will be accomplished by gradually
>         decreasing the ‘maximum age’ of Symantec-issued certificates
>         over a series of releases, distrusting certificates whose
>         validity period (the difference of notBefore to notAfter)
>         exceeds the specified maximum.
>
>
>         The proposed schedule is as follows:
>
>         Chrome 59 (Dev, Beta, Stable): 33 months validity (1023 days)
>
>         Chrome 60 (Dev, Beta, Stable): 27 months validity (837 days)
>
>         Chrome 61 (Dev, Beta, Stable): 21 months validity (651 days)
>
>         Chrome 62 (Dev, Beta, Stable): 15 months validity (465 days)
>
>         Chrome 63 (Dev, Beta): 9 months validity (279 days)
>
>         Chrome 63 (Stable): 15 months validity (465 days)
>
>         Chrome 64 (Dev, Beta, Stable): 9 months validity (279 days)
>
>
>         The proposed schedule attempts to avoid making changes in Chrome
>         63 Stable, as that would be released during the winter holiday
>         production freeze many organizations undergo. This is solely to
>         reduce disruption for site operators and users, and attempts to
>         resume with Chrome 64 following the holiday season. Further, the
>         practical impact of the changes in Chrome 59 and 60 are
>         relatively minimal, due to many of the certificates issued
>         during that period of time being issued using SHA-1, which is no
>         longer supported for certificates in Chrome.
>
>
>         In addition, we propose to require that all newly-issued
>         certificates must have validity periods of no greater than 9
>         months (279 days) in order to be trusted in Google Chrome,
>         effective Chrome 61. This ensures that the risk of any further
>         misissuance is, at most, limited to nine months, and more
>         importantly, that if any further action is warranted or
>         necessary, that the entire ecosystem can migrate within that
>         time period, thus minimizing the risk of further compatibility
>         issues.
>
>
>         By combining these two steps, we can ensure that the level of
>         assurance in Symantec-issued certificates is able to match what
>         is expected by Google Chrome and the ecosystem, and that the
>         risks posed both from past and possible future misissuance is
>         minimized as much as possible.
>
>
>         Given the nature of these issues, and the multiple failures of
>         Symantec to ensure that the level of assurance provided by their
>         certificates meets the requirements of the Baseline Requirements
>         or Extended Validation Guidelines, we no longer have the
>         confidence necessary in order to grant Symantec-issued
>         certificates the “Extended Validation” status. As documented
>         with both the current and past misissuance, Symantec failed to
>         ensure that the organizational attributes, displayed within the
>         address bar for such certificates, meet the level of quality and
>         validation required for such display. Therefore, we propose to
>         remove such indicators, effective immediately, until Symantec is
>         able to demonstrate the level of sustained compliance necessary
>         to grant such trust, which will be a period no less than a year.
>         After such time has passed, we will consider requests from
>         Symantec to re-evaluate this position, in collaboration with the
>         broader Chromium community.
>
>
>         Compatibility and Interoperability Risk
>
>         As with any reduction in trust in a Certificate Authority, this
>         poses a non-trivial degree of compatibility risk. This is
>         because site operators desire to have their certificates
>         recognized in all client browsers, and if one or more browsers
>         fail to trust a given CA, this is prevented from happening.
>
>
>         On the other hand, all site operators expect that certificates
>         will only be issued for their domains upon their request, and
>         the failure to have that assurance significantly undermines the
>         security of HTTPS for both site operators and users.
>
>
>         This compatibility risk is especially high for Symantec-issued
>         certificates, due to their acquisition of some of the first CAs,
>         such as Thawte, Verisign, and Equifax, which are some of the
>         most widely supported CAs. Distrusting such CAs creates further
>         difficulty for providing secure connections to both old and new
>         devices alike, due to the need to ensure the CA a site operator
>         uses is recognized across these devices.
>
>
>         Further, the immediate distrust of a CA, as has been necessary
>         in the past, can significantly impact both site operators and
>         users. Site operators are forced to acquire certificates from
>         other CAs, without having the opportunity and time to research
>         which CAs best meet their needs, and users encounter a
>         substantial number of errors until those site operators act,
>         conditioning them to ignore security warnings. In the event that
>         only a single browser distrusts such a CA, the error is often
>         seen as the browser’s fault, despite it being a failure of the
>         CA to provide the necessary level of assurance, and the site
>         operator to respond in a timely fashion.
>
>
>         Assessing the compatibility risk with both Edge and Safari is
>         difficult, because neither Microsoft nor Apple communicate
>         publicly about their changes in trust prior to enacting them.
>
>
>         While Mozilla conducts their discussions regarding Certificate
>         Authorities in public, and were the first to be alerted of these
>         latest issues, they have not yet begun discussion of the next
>         steps to how best to protect their users. Our hope is that this
>         proposal may be seen as one that appropriately balances the
>         security and compatibility risks with the needs of site
>         operators, browsers, and users, and we welcome all feedback.
>
>
>         Alternative implementation suggestion for web developers
>
>         This proposal allows for web developers to continue to use
>         Symantec issued certificates, but will see their validity period
>         reduced. This ensure that web developers are aware of the risk
>         and potential of future distrust of Symantec-issued
>         certificates, should additional misissuance events occur, while
>         also allowing them the flexibility to continue using such
>         certificates should it be necessary.
>
>
>         Usage information from UseCounter
>
> <https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesearch#chromium/
> src/third_party/WebKit/Source/core/page/UseCounter.h&sq=
> package:chromium&type=cs&q=file:UseCounter.h%20Feature&l=39>:
>
>         For a variety of non-technical reasons, we do not currently
>         instrument the usage of CAs. Further, few public metrics exist
>         for intersecting usage information with the validity period,
>         since only certificates valid greater than nine months will be
>         affected outside of their normal replacement cycle. From Mozilla
>         Firefox’s Telemetry, we know that Symantec issued certificates
>         are responsible for 42% of certificate validations. However,
>         this number is not strictly an indicator for impact, as this
>         number is biased towards counting certificates for
>         heavily-trafficked sites, and whose issuance is fully automated
>         and/or whose validity periods will be unaffected, thus
>         significantly overstating impact. By phasing such changes in
>         over a series of releases, we aim to minimize the impact any
>         given release poses, while still continually making progress
>         towards restoring the necessary level of security to ensure
>         Symantec issued certificates are as trustworthy as certificates
>         from other CAs.
>
>
>
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