Hi Gerv, Thank you for reaching out to the mdsp community.
There are valid security reasons to consider a dis-trust date earlier than April 2018 for the corpus of Symantec certs issued prior to June 1st, 2016. However, I also believe there are security and operational risks in complicating the needed remediation by having two major browsers propose different dis-trust dates. I believe the internet community would benefit more from simplified messaging than they would from a dis-trust date that is a few months earlier. For that reason, I think Mozilla should match Google's April 2018 dis-trust date. Thank you, Vincent [Disclaimer: I work for a company that sells Symantec SSL certificates, but am commenting in a personal capacity.] On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 2:14 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote: > Google have made a final decision on the various dates they plan to > implement as part of the consensus plan in the Symantec matter. The > message from blink-dev is included below. > > Most of the dates have consensus - the dates for Symantec to implement > the Managed CA infrastructure are agreed by all, and the date for final > distrust of the old Symantec PKI is agreed by Google and Mozilla (to > within a week, at any rate). I proposed November 1st 2018. Google has > gone for October 23rd 2018; in practical terms, we would implement that > using Firefox 63 (October 16th) or 64 (November 27th). > > However, there is some difference in the proposals for the date on which > browsers should dis-trust Symantec certificates issued before June 1st, > 2016. This date is significant because after that, Symantec have been > required to log all their certs to CT and so there is much better > transparency of issuance practice. I proposed December 1st 2017. Google > strongly considered late January, but have finally chosen April 17th 2018. > > We now have two choices. We can accept the Google date for ourselves, or > we can decide to implement something earlier. Implementing something > earlier would involve us leading on compatibility risk, and so would > need to get wider sign-off from within Mozilla, but nevertheless I would > like to get the opinions of the m.d.s.p community. > > I would like to make a decision on this matter on or before July 31st, > as Symantec have asked for dates to be nailed down by then in order for > them to be on track with their Managed CA implementation timetable. If > no alternative decision is taken and communicated here and to Symantec, > the default will be that we will accept Google's final proposal as a > consensus date. > > Gerv > > -------- Forwarded Message -------- > Subject: Re: [blink-dev] Intent to Deprecate and Remove: Trust in > existing Symantec-issued Certificates > Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 17:16:06 -0700 > From: Darin Fisher <[email protected]> > To: Darin Fisher <[email protected]> > CC: blink-dev <[email protected]> > > > > Representing Google Chrome and the Chromium open source project, what > follows is our final proposal on this matter. > > > We’d like to first thank the blink-dev community for your input on this > discussion. After taking this input into consideration along with the > latest responses from Symantec and Mozilla, we have produced the > following proposal that is intended to be our final plan of action on > this matter. > > > Chrome 66 will distrust Symantec-issued TLS certificates issued before > June 1, 2016: > > Chrome 66 will distrust Symantec-issued TLS certificates issued before > June 1, 2016, which is tentatively scheduled to hit Canary on January > 19, 2018; Beta on March 15, 2018; and Stable (the vast majority of > Chrome users) on April 17, 2018. Affected site operators are strongly > encouraged to replace their TLS certificates before March 15, 2018 to > prevent breakage. Although this is significantly later than our initial > proposal of August 2017 and Mozilla’s proposal for late 2017 > <https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/gn1i2JNVCnc/ > y7IRQALJBgAJ>, > we think it hits an appropriate balance between the security risk to > Chrome users and minimizing disruption to the ecosystem. This time will > allow clear messaging and scheduling for site operators to update > certificates. > > > We considered a number of alternative dates for distrusting this subset > of existing certificates before landing on Chrome 66. Given the scale of > Symantec’s existing PKI and the impact to the ecosystem that these > mitigations pose, one of our goals was to consider dates that gave site > operators enough lead time, as well as to try to clear end-of-year time > periods where production freezes are typically in place. Chrome 62 which > comes out in October 2017 was seriously considered, but was rejected due > to concerns around not giving enough lead time for site operators. > Chrome 63 which comes out in December was rejected due to overlapping > with end-of-year freezes. Chrome 64 which comes out in late January 2018 > was strongly considered, but its early release channels also overlap > with holiday and end of year freezes. Chrome 65’s branch point is close > to the new year, and could present a challenge for some site operators. > Hence, Chrome 66 was chosen as the final approach. > > > Site operators currently using Symantec-issued TLS server certificates > that were issued before June 1, 2016 need to replace these certificates > as soon as possible to avoid disruption to their users. The distrust of > these certificates is necessary and is specifically targeted at removing > the risk of trusting old certificates that were issued under an > inadequately controlled infrastructure. Site operators can choose to > obtain their certificates from any trusted Certificate Authority. > Although the old infrastructure will be distrusted in the future (see > below), site operators with critical dependencies on Symantec’s current > infrastructure may also obtain replacement certificates from Symantec, > provided these certificates comply with the existing Chrome requirements > <https://security.googleblog.com/2015/10/sustaining- > digital-certificate-security.html>for > new certificates issued from Symantec. > > > While we intend to stick with this schedule, if there is new information > highlighting additional security risks with this set of certificates, > the dates could change to more rapidly distrust the existing certificates. > > > Chrome 70 will distrust TLS certificates issued from Symantec’s old > infrastructure: > > In order to complete this migration, we will be removing trust in all > certificates issued by Symantec’s old infrastructure in Chrome 70. This > includes any replacement certificates issued by Symantec prior to the > transition to the non-Symantec-operated “Managed Partner Infrastructure > <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Yd079EsKQ- > QawTvWgjIfrCV6d0NNlwoS1ftB0MaJkBc/>”. > Chrome 70 is tentatively scheduled to first reach Beta on September 13, > 2018 and Stable on October 23, 2018, which is approximately 5 months > after Chrome 66’s corresponding dates. > > > By these dates, affected site operators will need to have fully replaced > any TLS server certificates issued from Symantec’s old infrastructure, > using any trusted CA including the new Managed Partner Infrastructure. > Failure to migrate a site to one of these two options will result in > breakage when Chrome 70 is released. > > > Reference Timeline: > > In order to distill Chrome’s final plan into an actionable set of > information for site operators, we’ve drawn up a timeline of relevant > dates associated with this plan. As always, Chrome release dates can > vary by a number of days, but upcoming release dates can be tracked here > <https://www.chromium.org/developers/calendar>. > > > Date > > > > Event > > July 27, 2017 > > through > > ~March 15, 2018 > > > > Site Operators using Symantec-issued TLS server certificates issued > before June 1, 2016 should replace these certificates. These > certificates can be replaced by any currently trusted CA, including > Symantec. > > ~October 24, 2017 > > > > Chrome 62 released to Stable, which will add alerting in DevTools when > evaluating certificates that will be affected by the Chrome 66 distrust. > > December 1, 2017 > > > > According to Symantec, the new Managed Partner Infrastructure will at > this point be capable of full issuance. Any certificates issued by > Symantec’s old infrastructure after this point will cease working in a > future Chrome update. > > > From this date forward, Site Operators can obtain TLS server > certificates from the new Managed Partner Infrastructure that will > continue to be trusted after Chrome 70 (~October 23, 2018). > > > December 1, 2017 does not mandate any certificate changes, but > represents an opportunity for site operators to obtain TLS server > certificates that will not be affected by Chrome 70’s distrust of the > old infrastructure. > > ~March 15, 2018 > > > > Chrome 66 released to beta, which will remove trust in Symantec-issued > certificates with a not-before date before June 1, 2016. As of this > date, in order to ensure continuity of operations, Site Operators must > be using either a Symantec-issued TLS server certificate issued on or > after June 1, 2016 or a currently valid certificate issued from any > other trusted CA as of Chrome 66. > > > Site Operators that obtained a certificate from Symantec’s old > infrastructure after June 1, 2016 are unaffected by Chrome 66 but will > need to obtain a new certificate by the Chrome 70 dates described below. > > ~April 17, 2018 > > > > Chrome 66 released to Stable. > > ~September 13, 2018 > > > > Chrome 70 released to Beta, which will remove trust in the old > Symantec-rooted Infrastructure. This will not affect any certificate > chaining to the new Managed Partner Infrastructure, which Symantec has > said will be operational by December 1, 2017. > > > Only TLS server certificates issued by Symantec’s old infrastructure > will be affected by this distrust regardless of issuance date. > > ~October 23, 2018 > > > > Chrome 70 released to Stable. > > > > A note on the Blink process and this Intent: > > As mentioned at the start of this discussion, the Google Chrome team > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/ > eUAKwjihhBs/rpxMXjZHCQAJ>decided > to use the Blink Process <http://www.chromium.org/blink#new-features>in > discussing this change, as a way to gather feedback from site operators, > the Chromium community, other browsers, and the broader ecosystem about > how to balance the interoperability risk and compatibility risk. A goal > of this process is to balance risk by aligning on interoperable > solutions, minimize ambiguity, and provide transparency into the > decision making process. This process was designed around balancing > changes to the Web Platform APIs, and we recognize there are further > opportunities to improve this for Certificate Authority decisions. As > those improvements are not yet in place, we will be forgoing the Blink > API owner LGTM process for approval, and treating this more as a > product-level decision instead. > > > Thanks to everyone who put in so much time and energy to arrive at this > point. > > > > > On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Darin Fisher <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > I wanted to give folks an update about the current state of this > Intent. Given all of the feedback we've received from the community, > right now we are continuing to evaluate different options and are > improving our understanding of the impact these proposals would have > on the ecosystem. We understand the desire to reach closure here, > but also want to make sure that we take the appropriate amount of > time to ensure that we come up with the best possible proposal. If > you have additional feedback that could help inform our decision, we > welcome hearing it. > > Thanks, > -Darin > > > > On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 9:02 AM, Ryan Sleevi <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Note: Historically, the Google Chrome team has not used the > Blink Process <http://www.chromium.org/blink#new-features>for > Certificate Authority-related security issues, of which there > have been a number over the years. However, we are interested in > exploring using this process for such changes, as it provides a > greater degree of transparency and public participation. Based > on the level of participation and feedback we receive, we may > consider using this for the future. However, as CA-related > security incidents may require immediate response to protect > users, this should not be seen as a guarantee that this process > can be used in future incident responses. > > > Primary eng (and PM) emails: > > [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> > > > Summary > > Since January 19, the Google Chrome team has been investigating > a series of failures by Symantec Corporation to properly > validate certificates. Over the course of this investigation, > the explanations provided by Symantec have revealed a > continually increasing scope of misissuance with each set of > questions from members of the Google Chrome team; an initial set > of reportedly 127 certificates has expanded to include at least > 30,000 certificates, issued over a period spanning several > years. This is also coupled with a series of failures following > the previous set of misissued certificates from Symantec > > <https://security.googleblog.com/2015/10/sustaining- > digital-certificate-security.html>, > causing us to no longer have confidence in the certificate > issuance policies and practices of Symantec over the past > several years. To restore confidence and security of our users, > we propose the following steps: > > * > > A reduction in the accepted validity period of newly issued > Symantec-issued certificates to nine months or less, in > order to minimize any impact to Google Chrome users from any > further misissuances that may arise. > > * > > An incremental distrust, spanning a series of Google Chrome > releases, of all currently-trusted Symantec-issued > certificates, requiring they be revalidated and replaced. > > * > > Removal of recognition of the Extended Validation status of > Symantec issued certificates, until such a time as the > community can be assured in the policies and practices of > Symantec, but no sooner than one year. > > > Motivation > > As captured in Chrome’s Root Certificate Policy > <https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/root-ca-policy>, > root certificate authorities are expected to perform a number of > critical functions commensurate with the trust granted to them. > This includes properly ensuring that domain control validation > is performed for server certificates, to audit logs frequently > for evidence of unauthorized issuance, and to protect their > infrastructure in order to minimize the ability for the issuance > of fraudulent certs. > > > On the basis of the details publicly provided by Symantec, we do > not believe that they have properly upheld these principles, and > as such, have created significant risk for Google Chrome users. > Symantec allowed at least four parties access to their > infrastructure in a way to cause certificate issuance, did not > sufficiently oversee these capabilities as required and > expected, and when presented with evidence of these > organizations’ failure to abide to the appropriate standard of > care, failed to disclose such information in a timely manner or > to identify the significance of the issues reported to them. > > > These issues, and the corresponding failure of appropriate > oversight, spanned a period of several years, and were trivially > identifiable from the information publicly available or that > Symantec shared. > > > The full disclosure of these issues has taken more than a month. > Symantec has failed to provide timely updates to the community > regarding these issues. Despite having knowledge of these > issues, Symantec has repeatedly failed to proactively disclose > them. Further, even after issues have become public, Symantec > failed to provide the information that the community required to > assess the significance of these issues until they had been > specifically questioned. The proposed remediation steps offered > by Symantec have involved relying on known-problematic > information or using practices insufficient to provide the level > of assurance required under the Baseline Requirements and > expected by the Chrome Root CA Policy. > > > In January 2015, Symantec-issued certificates represented more > than 30% of the valid certificates by volume. While changes in > the CA ecosystem have seen that share decrease over the past two > years, there is still a significant compatibility risk for an > immediate and complete distrust. Further, due to overall TLS > ecosystem concerns, we understand that it may take non-trivial > effort for some site operators to find suitable solutions, as > the need to support older devices may necessitate the use of > particular CAs, meaning that distrust of new certificates also > has significant compatibility risk. > > > To balance the compatibility risks versus the security risks, we > propose a gradual distrust of all existing Symantec-issued > certificates, requiring that they be replaced over time with > new, fully revalidated certificates, compliant with the current > Baseline Requirements. This will be accomplished by gradually > decreasing the ‘maximum age’ of Symantec-issued certificates > over a series of releases, distrusting certificates whose > validity period (the difference of notBefore to notAfter) > exceeds the specified maximum. > > > The proposed schedule is as follows: > > Chrome 59 (Dev, Beta, Stable): 33 months validity (1023 days) > > Chrome 60 (Dev, Beta, Stable): 27 months validity (837 days) > > Chrome 61 (Dev, Beta, Stable): 21 months validity (651 days) > > Chrome 62 (Dev, Beta, Stable): 15 months validity (465 days) > > Chrome 63 (Dev, Beta): 9 months validity (279 days) > > Chrome 63 (Stable): 15 months validity (465 days) > > Chrome 64 (Dev, Beta, Stable): 9 months validity (279 days) > > > The proposed schedule attempts to avoid making changes in Chrome > 63 Stable, as that would be released during the winter holiday > production freeze many organizations undergo. This is solely to > reduce disruption for site operators and users, and attempts to > resume with Chrome 64 following the holiday season. Further, the > practical impact of the changes in Chrome 59 and 60 are > relatively minimal, due to many of the certificates issued > during that period of time being issued using SHA-1, which is no > longer supported for certificates in Chrome. > > > In addition, we propose to require that all newly-issued > certificates must have validity periods of no greater than 9 > months (279 days) in order to be trusted in Google Chrome, > effective Chrome 61. This ensures that the risk of any further > misissuance is, at most, limited to nine months, and more > importantly, that if any further action is warranted or > necessary, that the entire ecosystem can migrate within that > time period, thus minimizing the risk of further compatibility > issues. > > > By combining these two steps, we can ensure that the level of > assurance in Symantec-issued certificates is able to match what > is expected by Google Chrome and the ecosystem, and that the > risks posed both from past and possible future misissuance is > minimized as much as possible. > > > Given the nature of these issues, and the multiple failures of > Symantec to ensure that the level of assurance provided by their > certificates meets the requirements of the Baseline Requirements > or Extended Validation Guidelines, we no longer have the > confidence necessary in order to grant Symantec-issued > certificates the “Extended Validation” status. As documented > with both the current and past misissuance, Symantec failed to > ensure that the organizational attributes, displayed within the > address bar for such certificates, meet the level of quality and > validation required for such display. Therefore, we propose to > remove such indicators, effective immediately, until Symantec is > able to demonstrate the level of sustained compliance necessary > to grant such trust, which will be a period no less than a year. > After such time has passed, we will consider requests from > Symantec to re-evaluate this position, in collaboration with the > broader Chromium community. > > > Compatibility and Interoperability Risk > > As with any reduction in trust in a Certificate Authority, this > poses a non-trivial degree of compatibility risk. This is > because site operators desire to have their certificates > recognized in all client browsers, and if one or more browsers > fail to trust a given CA, this is prevented from happening. > > > On the other hand, all site operators expect that certificates > will only be issued for their domains upon their request, and > the failure to have that assurance significantly undermines the > security of HTTPS for both site operators and users. > > > This compatibility risk is especially high for Symantec-issued > certificates, due to their acquisition of some of the first CAs, > such as Thawte, Verisign, and Equifax, which are some of the > most widely supported CAs. Distrusting such CAs creates further > difficulty for providing secure connections to both old and new > devices alike, due to the need to ensure the CA a site operator > uses is recognized across these devices. > > > Further, the immediate distrust of a CA, as has been necessary > in the past, can significantly impact both site operators and > users. Site operators are forced to acquire certificates from > other CAs, without having the opportunity and time to research > which CAs best meet their needs, and users encounter a > substantial number of errors until those site operators act, > conditioning them to ignore security warnings. In the event that > only a single browser distrusts such a CA, the error is often > seen as the browser’s fault, despite it being a failure of the > CA to provide the necessary level of assurance, and the site > operator to respond in a timely fashion. > > > Assessing the compatibility risk with both Edge and Safari is > difficult, because neither Microsoft nor Apple communicate > publicly about their changes in trust prior to enacting them. > > > While Mozilla conducts their discussions regarding Certificate > Authorities in public, and were the first to be alerted of these > latest issues, they have not yet begun discussion of the next > steps to how best to protect their users. Our hope is that this > proposal may be seen as one that appropriately balances the > security and compatibility risks with the needs of site > operators, browsers, and users, and we welcome all feedback. > > > Alternative implementation suggestion for web developers > > This proposal allows for web developers to continue to use > Symantec issued certificates, but will see their validity period > reduced. This ensure that web developers are aware of the risk > and potential of future distrust of Symantec-issued > certificates, should additional misissuance events occur, while > also allowing them the flexibility to continue using such > certificates should it be necessary. > > > Usage information from UseCounter > > <https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesearch#chromium/ > src/third_party/WebKit/Source/core/page/UseCounter.h&sq= > package:chromium&type=cs&q=file:UseCounter.h%20Feature&l=39>: > > For a variety of non-technical reasons, we do not currently > instrument the usage of CAs. Further, few public metrics exist > for intersecting usage information with the validity period, > since only certificates valid greater than nine months will be > affected outside of their normal replacement cycle. From Mozilla > Firefox’s Telemetry, we know that Symantec issued certificates > are responsible for 42% of certificate validations. However, > this number is not strictly an indicator for impact, as this > number is biased towards counting certificates for > heavily-trafficked sites, and whose issuance is fully automated > and/or whose validity periods will be unaffected, thus > significantly overstating impact. By phasing such changes in > over a series of releases, we aim to minimize the impact any > given release poses, while still continually making progress > towards restoring the necessary level of security to ensure > Symantec issued certificates are as trustworthy as certificates > from other CAs. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "blink-dev" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/topic/blink- > dev/eUAKwjihhBs/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink- > dev/CAP0-QptbKT2UaAe_WhX2eYO3P4QMZmM8q2HT27YXSVRCouO4MQ%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink- > dev/CAP0-QptbKT2UaAe_WhX2eYO3P4QMZmM8q2HT27YXSVRCou > O4MQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > -- Vincent Lynch _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

