On Friday, August 4, 2017 at 12:27:13 AM UTC, Kathleen Wilson wrote: > Along this line of discussion, I have not felt comfortable with StartCom's > current root inclusion request (bug #1381406), because Hanno raised a concern > about the private key used by the new root is also used by two intermediate > certificates, one of them revoked. This doesn't see like good practice to me, > and I'm not sure that Inigo's response is sufficient.
OK, maybe I'm just not getting it but what exactly *is* the issue that was brought up in that bug? I would think that this is, as the StartCom response seems to confirm, just the way you cross-sign new roots with existing ones? Old roots signing new roots is done by other CAs as well and I'm not aware of any talk or rule that this is discouraged or forbidden? My understanding is this (please correct me if I'm wrong): Hanno's crtsh link [0] just has a spkisha256 parameter. The list contains the root's self-sign and two instances where the root was signed by an old StartCom root. I get similar output with the spkisha256 of other trusted roots, i.e.: Amazon [1]: New roots signed with old Starfield Services Root that they bought Commodo [2]: Newer roots signed with their old AddTrust Root GlobalSign [3]: R3 root signed with their R1 root How, if not like this, can roots be cross-signed at all, technically? How are the above 3 examples different from the way StartCom did it? (If they aren't, I think it's important that the record is set straight and this specific thing doesn't appear in the real or mental list of things that new StartCom did wrong... If they are, disregard of course. :-D ). [0] https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d3b8136c20918725e848204735755a4fcce203d4c2eddcaa4013763b5a23d81f [1] https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=fbe3018031f9586bcbf41727e417b7d1c45c2f47f93be372a17b96b50757d5a2 [2] https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=82b5f84daf47a59c7ab521e4982aefa40a53406a3aec26039efa6b2e0e7244c1 [3] https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=706bb1017c855c59169bad5c1781cf597f12d2cad2f63d1a4aa37493800ffb80 _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

