On Friday, 11 August 2017 14:19:57 UTC+1, Alex Gaynor wrote: > Given that these were all caught by cablint, has Let's Encrypt considered > integrating it into your issuance pipeline, or automatically monitoring > crt.sh (which runs cablint) for these issues so they don't need to be > caught manually by researchers?
The former has the risk of being unexpectedly fragile, the latter puts a bunch of work on crt.sh which (even if Rob says it's OK) is a bit out of order. I would suggest that Let's Encrypt could automatically run cablint on some fraction of just issued certificates (where "some fraction" might be 100% if they've got the resources) and summarise the output for internal review. They're obliged to keep all the certificates they've just issued online by their own system design (ACME offers to deliver the certificate again if you ask for it) anyway. This way: If cablint breaks, or won't complete in a timely fashion during high volume issuance, it doesn't break the CA itself. But on the other hand it also doesn't wail on Comodo's generously offered public service crt.sh. Also, while on the subject I commend to any researchers at least as interested in the contents of the CT logs as myself the building of an actual Log Monitor of their own rather than relying on crt.sh. This is for several reasons, off the top of my head: 1. The Logs have anti-tamper features, but if only Comodo (and Google) look at the Logs themselves then we miss out on much real benefit from those features because we will never actually detect any tampering, we'd have to be told about it by someone we trust. 2. The Logs are obliged to achieve reasonable performance to hit Google's targets and will accordingly have been built to be robust, Rob has put lots of effort into crt.sh but it definitely has... off days. With my own monitor at least I can fix it when that happens. 3. You can custom design your Monitor around your interests. One completely reasonable thing to do, for example, would be to throw away all the DV certs if you are focused on Organizational details in certificates, another might be to discard all the certs from the bigger Issuers to focus only on what's going on with small CAs and sub-CAs that issue smaller volumes and thus might escape notice with anything they've got wrong. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

