On Friday, 11 August 2017 14:19:57 UTC+1, Alex Gaynor  wrote:
> Given that these were all caught by cablint, has Let's Encrypt considered
> integrating it into your issuance pipeline, or automatically monitoring
> crt.sh (which runs cablint) for these issues so they don't need to be
> caught manually by researchers?

The former has the risk of being unexpectedly fragile, the latter puts a bunch 
of work on crt.sh which (even if Rob says it's OK) is a bit out of order.

I would suggest that Let's Encrypt could automatically run cablint on some 
fraction of just issued certificates (where "some fraction" might be 100% if 
they've got the resources) and summarise the output for internal review. 
They're obliged to keep all the certificates they've just issued online by 
their own system design (ACME offers to deliver the certificate again if you 
ask for it) anyway.

This way: If cablint breaks, or won't complete in a timely fashion during high 
volume issuance, it doesn't break the CA itself. But on the other hand it also 
doesn't wail on Comodo's generously offered public service crt.sh.

Also, while on the subject I commend to any researchers at least as interested 
in the contents of the CT logs as myself the building of an actual Log Monitor 
of their own rather than relying on crt.sh. This is for several reasons, off 
the top of my head:

1. The Logs have anti-tamper features, but if only Comodo (and Google) look at 
the Logs themselves then we miss out on much real benefit from those features 
because we will never actually detect any tampering, we'd have to be told about 
it by someone we trust.

2. The Logs are obliged to achieve reasonable performance to hit Google's 
targets and will accordingly have been built to be robust, Rob has put lots of 
effort into crt.sh but it definitely has... off days. With my own monitor at 
least I can fix it when that happens.

3. You can custom design your Monitor around your interests. One completely 
reasonable thing to do, for example, would be to throw away all the DV certs if 
you are focused on Organizational details in certificates, another might be to 
discard all the certs from the bigger Issuers to focus only on what's going on 
with small CAs and sub-CAs that issue smaller volumes and thus might escape 
notice with anything they've got wrong.
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