On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 11:48:50AM -0400, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote: > On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 11:40 AM, Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy < > [email protected]> wrote: > > > On Friday, 11 August 2017 14:19:57 UTC+1, Alex Gaynor wrote: > > > Given that these were all caught by cablint, has Let's Encrypt considered > > > integrating it into your issuance pipeline, or automatically monitoring > > > crt.sh (which runs cablint) for these issues so they don't need to be > > > caught manually by researchers? > > > > The former has the risk of being unexpectedly fragile, > > > Could you expand on this? It's not obvious what you mean. > > > > This way: If cablint breaks, or won't complete in a timely fashion during > > high volume issuance, it doesn't break the CA itself. But on the other hand > > it also doesn't wail on Comodo's generously offered public service crt.sh. > > > > Could you expand on what you mean by "cablint breaks" or "won't complete in > a timely fashion"? That doesn't match my understanding of what it is or how > it's written, so perhaps I'm misunderstanding what you're proposing?
My understand is that it used to be very slow for crt.sh, but that something was done to speed it up. I don't know if that change was something crt.sh specific. I think it was changed to not always restart, but have a process that checks multiple certificates. Kurt _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

