On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 11:48:50AM -0400, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy 
wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 11:40 AM, Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy <
> [email protected]> wrote:
> 
> > On Friday, 11 August 2017 14:19:57 UTC+1, Alex Gaynor  wrote:
> > > Given that these were all caught by cablint, has Let's Encrypt considered
> > > integrating it into your issuance pipeline, or automatically monitoring
> > > crt.sh (which runs cablint) for these issues so they don't need to be
> > > caught manually by researchers?
> >
> > The former has the risk of being unexpectedly fragile,
> 
> 
> Could you expand on this? It's not obvious what you mean.
> 
> 
> > This way: If cablint breaks, or won't complete in a timely fashion during
> > high volume issuance, it doesn't break the CA itself. But on the other hand
> > it also doesn't wail on Comodo's generously offered public service crt.sh.
> >
> 
> Could you expand on what you mean by "cablint breaks" or "won't complete in
> a timely fashion"? That doesn't match my understanding of what it is or how
> it's written, so perhaps I'm misunderstanding what you're proposing?

My understand is that it used to be very slow for crt.sh, but
that something was done to speed it up. I don't know if that change
was something crt.sh specific. I think it was changed to not
always restart, but have a process that checks multiple
certificates.


Kurt

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