Hi Alejandro, Thank you for this initial response. It is, however, far less detailed than we would like to see. In the email I sent to you letting you know that we were looking at PROCERT, I wrote:
"You may wish to review a similar issue list we created for Symantec: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Symantec_Issues in order to see how such a wiki page might develop in the future. For example, we would expect most or all issues on your list to soon carry a "PROCERT Response" section. Good responses will be more than "yes, we have revoked the certificate" or even "we have revoked, and updated our software". We want to know how each problem occurred in the first place, and why it was not detected until now by PROCERT's existing systems for quality control. This wiki page: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Responding_To_A_Misissuance gives best practices in responding to incidents and writing reports, which may prove useful in formulating your responses." It seems you have chosen not to follow this advice, as many of your responses consist solely of an assertion that you have revoked and replaced the problematic certificates. So, because there is no root cause analysis, we have no assurance at all that the issue will not occur again. Even beyond that major concern, I think there are some of these issues where you have not entirely understood the problem. On 08/09/17 20:09, PSC Procert wrote: > Issue E: Issuance of 1024-bit Certificate (December 2016) > Procert: > > Based on internals test and validation, we contacting the client, we asking > for a new CSR and proceed to revoke and reissue the certificate in 2048, > supporting into the installation process. We completed those actions in this > point. Your cut-and-paste answer is inapplicable in this case, because the "client" was PROCERT itself - the certificate in question was an OCSP responder cert. > Issue L: helloburgershack.com (June - July 2017) > > Procert: > > Based on internals test and validation, we contacting the client, we asking > for a new CSR and proceed to revoke and reissue the certificate, supporting > into the installation process. This client provides a production window after > the next Tuesday in order to proceed with the revoke and the reissue of the > certificate. Pending action. What was sought here was an explanation of why it took five attempts to issue this certificate, and even the last version had problems. > Issue M: CPS not in RFC 3647 or RFC 2527 Format (2011 - August 2017) > > Procert: > > After a validation process, we modify the RFC number in our documentation. We > complete this point. I think you misunderstand. The issue here is not that some RFC number in the document is wrong, but that your document is not arranged according to the layout given in RFC3647. To fix this would require completely rearranging the document. Are you saying that you have already completed this? If so, can we see a copy of the updated document? > Issue O: OCSP Servers Return "Good" for Non-Existent Certificates (Unknown - > August 2017) .... > Now we stay contacting Microsoft in order to obtain and adequate procedure or > batch. In paralleled we work in our own OCSP software. I suggest that writing and deploying your own OCSP software is unlikely to be a route towards speedy conformance with all applicable regulations. If you are unable to get Microsoft's software to function, I would suggest approaching another vendor. But perhaps another CA has the Microsoft software working, and could help out? You may want to ask on the CAB Forum list. > Issue P: Use of SHA-1 To Sign OCSP Responses (Unknown - August 2017) > > Procert: > > We check the standard, the OCSP certificate is SHA 256, the answer in this > case is an observation. We work to check and validate the adjust to SHA 256 > in the OCSP answer. This situation does not contravene any standard. No, but it does contradict your assertions in your responses to two previous Mozilla CA Communications. > Issue Q: CRL Distribution Points Using HTTPS (August 2012 - August 2017) > > Procert: > > Please validate the certificate issuance. This certificate is not issued by > PSC PROCERT You are quite right - my apologies. It's from a different part of the Venezuelan Goverment's hierarchy. I was sent a large list of certificates with this problem but a few others I've sampled also seem to be from other parts. I will look into this and see if I can find an example issued by PROCERT; if not, I will strike this issue. > Issue S: Non-Random Serial Numbers (September 2016 - August 2017) > > Procert: > > We check the observation. Procert technical staff applied the observation and > fix the system in this particular point. Please can you explain the method of construction used for the most recent serial numbers, e.g. the one on https://crt.sh/?id=207894453? > Issue X: High Percentage of Revocations (August 2017) > > Procert: > > Staff takes actions considering the observations includes into the Mozilla > bug. In order to that, we made an internal audit, check the issuance process, > detected al the unconformities, contacting the clients, agree with the > clients a windows to revoke and installing the new certificates. In order to > duly comply, we proceeded to revoke certificates with observations (Mozilla > Bug). We planning replace all the certificates with observations. That why > you can appreciate a high percent into the certificates revocations The issue being raised here is not the large number of certificates that PROCERT is revoking (we might expect a large number of revocations, given all of the problems), but the fact that a large number are revoked very shortly after they are issued. Why does that keep happening? If they are being issued incorrectly, why are corrective steps not being taken? Thank you in advance for your timely further responses. Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

