On 21/09/2017 23:08, alejandrovolcan--- via dev-security-policy wrote:
> Dear Gerv, I have attached a document that gives us a greater
> response to each of the points, as well as Mr. Oscar Lovera sent you
> an email with the same information
> 
> https://www.dropbox.com/s/qowngzzvg5q5pjj/Mozilla%20issues.docx?dl=0


To save everyone else some time trying to find out what has changed,
these are the additions for every issue, diffed against the original
response[1]:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue D:

PROCERT initially claimed that this was entirely RFC-compliant, a claim
comprehensively rebutted by Ryan Sleevi.

This certificate was issued with the modifications and here it is
possible to appreciate the evidence https://crt.sh/?id=209727657

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue E:

This certificate is not in use and is appended to the internal
revocation schedule, the current certificate is 2048 in length and can
be seen in the attached OCSP response (ocsp.txt)

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue G:

Please find evidence of new certificate issued without problems
https://crt.sh/?id=202869851

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue I:

These certificates were revoked and generated again, please consult
through the following link
https://crt.sh/?iCAID=750&minNotBefore=2000-01-01&n=1000&cablint=25

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue J:

Although certificates are not certified, the certificates have been
revoked and corrected, please check the link
https://crt.sh/?iCAID=750&minNotBefore=2000-01-01&cablint=782

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue K:

Corrective action taken, please consult the link
https://crt.sh/?id=197158298&opt=cablint

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue L:

That certificate was revoked and generated again, please consult through
the following link https://crt.sh/?id=167929373

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue M:

This is not an infringement or violation of the RFC. Regarding to the
language, the national language in Venezuela is the Spanish. We will
work to updated the English version of this document and posted in the
web page.
https://www.procert.net.ve/documentos/AC-D-0011.pdf
https://www.procert.net.ve/documentos/AC-D-0003.pdf

Standard
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3647
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2527

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue N:

Taking into account what the Baseline says, it states the following:
i. Other Subject Attributes
All other optional attributes, when present within the subject field,
MUST contain information that has been verified by the CA.

Indicates that another field can be included as long as it is
information verified by the CA in this case the CA verifies the number
of RIF of each company and also the field is with an OID for that
purpose, which is 2.16.862.2.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue O:

Our OCSP works without any problem in the validation with automatic
tools such as certutil, even with the same command openssl, in
consultation under standard.

The standard openssl query is done in the following way: openssl ocsp
-issuer issuer.cer -cert cert.cer -url http://ura.procert.net.ve/ocsp
-noverify -text.

We detected that OCSP does work correctly with the Microsoft tool.

Open SSL creates a problem when doing a non-standard query (hacking). We
are already working the point with Microsoft and we even have an
assigned ticket.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue P:

No RFC 2560 nor RFC 5280 is being violated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue R:

The certificate was revoked and reissued, please see the link
https://crt.sh/?id=194225991

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue S:

Already it was given previous answer to this point and was solved
modifying certain parameters in our CA, which counts on a CSPRNG that
acts like generator of serial numbers and was modified in its register
so that it increased the capacity and strength of the serial numbers
that generates automatically and without human intervention.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue T:

These certificates were revoked and generated again, please consult
through the following link
https://crt.sh/?iCAID=750&minNotBefore=2000-01-01&n=1000&cablint=734
Additionally, we have already modified the certificate template to
prevent it from containing this key usage.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue V:

No additions.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue W:

This action does not infringe any standard, in any case by security
policy should not be issued for a long time, since despite having a
quality environment, you can always test in the production environment
some test certificate, all the certificates were revoked and were only
issued under an authorization, since for the issuance of certificate
there is a mechanism of approval of 3 levels, In addition the
certificates were revoked
https://crt.sh/?id=197073488&opt=cablint
https://crt.sh/?id=197155020&opt=cablint

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue X:

No additions.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Apologies in case I missed anything, the formatting of the document was
not particularly consistent.


[1]:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/lqZersN26VA/nrXoE9JiAQAJ
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