On 21/09/2017 23:08, alejandrovolcan--- via dev-security-policy wrote: > Dear Gerv, I have attached a document that gives us a greater > response to each of the points, as well as Mr. Oscar Lovera sent you > an email with the same information > > https://www.dropbox.com/s/qowngzzvg5q5pjj/Mozilla%20issues.docx?dl=0
To save everyone else some time trying to find out what has changed, these are the additions for every issue, diffed against the original response[1]: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue D: PROCERT initially claimed that this was entirely RFC-compliant, a claim comprehensively rebutted by Ryan Sleevi. This certificate was issued with the modifications and here it is possible to appreciate the evidence https://crt.sh/?id=209727657 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue E: This certificate is not in use and is appended to the internal revocation schedule, the current certificate is 2048 in length and can be seen in the attached OCSP response (ocsp.txt) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue G: Please find evidence of new certificate issued without problems https://crt.sh/?id=202869851 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue I: These certificates were revoked and generated again, please consult through the following link https://crt.sh/?iCAID=750&minNotBefore=2000-01-01&n=1000&cablint=25 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue J: Although certificates are not certified, the certificates have been revoked and corrected, please check the link https://crt.sh/?iCAID=750&minNotBefore=2000-01-01&cablint=782 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue K: Corrective action taken, please consult the link https://crt.sh/?id=197158298&opt=cablint ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue L: That certificate was revoked and generated again, please consult through the following link https://crt.sh/?id=167929373 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue M: This is not an infringement or violation of the RFC. Regarding to the language, the national language in Venezuela is the Spanish. We will work to updated the English version of this document and posted in the web page. https://www.procert.net.ve/documentos/AC-D-0011.pdf https://www.procert.net.ve/documentos/AC-D-0003.pdf Standard https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3647 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2527 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue N: Taking into account what the Baseline says, it states the following: i. Other Subject Attributes All other optional attributes, when present within the subject field, MUST contain information that has been verified by the CA. Indicates that another field can be included as long as it is information verified by the CA in this case the CA verifies the number of RIF of each company and also the field is with an OID for that purpose, which is 2.16.862.2.2 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue O: Our OCSP works without any problem in the validation with automatic tools such as certutil, even with the same command openssl, in consultation under standard. The standard openssl query is done in the following way: openssl ocsp -issuer issuer.cer -cert cert.cer -url http://ura.procert.net.ve/ocsp -noverify -text. We detected that OCSP does work correctly with the Microsoft tool. Open SSL creates a problem when doing a non-standard query (hacking). We are already working the point with Microsoft and we even have an assigned ticket. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue P: No RFC 2560 nor RFC 5280 is being violated. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue R: The certificate was revoked and reissued, please see the link https://crt.sh/?id=194225991 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue S: Already it was given previous answer to this point and was solved modifying certain parameters in our CA, which counts on a CSPRNG that acts like generator of serial numbers and was modified in its register so that it increased the capacity and strength of the serial numbers that generates automatically and without human intervention. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue T: These certificates were revoked and generated again, please consult through the following link https://crt.sh/?iCAID=750&minNotBefore=2000-01-01&n=1000&cablint=734 Additionally, we have already modified the certificate template to prevent it from containing this key usage. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue V: No additions. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue W: This action does not infringe any standard, in any case by security policy should not be issued for a long time, since despite having a quality environment, you can always test in the production environment some test certificate, all the certificates were revoked and were only issued under an authorization, since for the issuance of certificate there is a mechanism of approval of 3 levels, In addition the certificates were revoked https://crt.sh/?id=197073488&opt=cablint https://crt.sh/?id=197155020&opt=cablint ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Issue X: No additions. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Apologies in case I missed anything, the formatting of the document was not particularly consistent. [1]: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/lqZersN26VA/nrXoE9JiAQAJ _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

