On Thu, Sep 28, 2017 at 12:50 PM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> On 27/09/17 18:54, Matthew Hardeman wrote: > > In the case of StartCom, I can not help but feel that they are being > > held to an especially high standard (higher than other prior adds to > > the program) in this new PKI because of who they are -- despite the > > fact that management and day-to-day decisions are a completely > > different team. > > > > Where I am headed with this is a concern that perhaps no amount of > > technical remediation can really get these entities back in the > > graces of the community. > > I don't know if it's quite as absolute as that, but recent incidents > have caused me to ponder somewhat on the nature of trust. The root > program is all about trust, and trust is not something which can be > encoded in audits, checkboxes and rules. This will always be a tension > at the heart of our root program - we are trying to be as objective as > we can about something which is ultimately subjective. > > The nature of trust is that it's harder to regain than it is to gain in > the first place. Just ask someone who's been the victim of adultery - or > someone who is a now-repentant adulterer. Rightly or wrongly, people get > a first chance, but it's tough to get a second. I think you are right > when you conclude that this is just the way of things, and we should > accept it rather than kick against it. > That dynamic is natural, but accepting that this dynamic exists is different than giving into it in some absolute way. When offering second chances, requiring that the person/org fulfill certain conditions that speak directly to their ability to have learned and adapted from the thing they failed at the first time is an approach that accepts this dynamic, without shutting the door on people or organizations that have grown as a result of the experience. I think it would arguably lead to worse behavior, and less disclosure of incidents and mistakes, if Mozilla adopted a posture where second chances are rarely given. Not saying that's what's being said here, but I think it's worth emphasizing that the first principle here should be to optimize for incentivizing the behavior you want out of the CA community that protects users and increases information sharing. -- Eric > > Gerv > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > -- konklone.com | @konklone <https://twitter.com/konklone> _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

