On Friday, September 29, 2017 at 2:52:49 PM UTC-7, Eric Mill wrote: > That dynamic is natural, but accepting that this dynamic exists is > different than giving into it in some absolute way. When offering second > chances, requiring that the person/org fulfill certain conditions that > speak directly to their ability to have learned and adapted from the thing > they failed at the first time is an approach that accepts this dynamic, > without shutting the door on people or organizations that have grown as a > result of the experience. > > I think it would arguably lead to worse behavior, and less disclosure of > incidents and mistakes, if Mozilla adopted a posture where second chances > are rarely given. Not saying that's what's being said here, but I think > it's worth emphasizing that the first principle here should be to optimize > for incentivizing the behavior you want out of the CA community that > protects users and increases information sharing. > > -- Eric
I agree with Eric on this. The last sentence in our CA Communications and Mozilla Security Blog Posts regarding our CA Program is frequently: "... we believe that the best approach to safeguard that security is to work with CAs as partners, to foster open and frank communication, and to be diligent in looking for ways to improve." Below are my personal feelings... In the case of WoSign and StartCom, I felt such a level of deception that it will be extremely difficult for either CA to ever gain my trust again. Rightly or wrongly so, I have not recognized that level of deception from other CAs in Mozilla's program. The deception happened before Inigo went to StartCom, and I appreciate all of Inigo's efforts, but due to the position he is now in, he will have to do an outstanding job, be test-driven, and demonstrate a truly clean CA hierarchy in order to regain my trust in StartCom. Unfortunately, I just don't feel that I've seen that so far. In regards to PROCERT, I do not believe that they have intentionally deceived me, but that their representatives responded to previous CA Communications and the Bugzilla Bug without getting their technical people involved. That is very bad! and I am very disappointed! But perhaps there are actions that they can take to demonstrate their commitment to not repeating those mistakes, to putting code into place to prevent non-BR-compliant cert issuance, and to show that they do have the level of technical knowledge in their organization that is needed to operate a good CA. Thanks, Kathleen _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

